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THE
SĀNKHYA KĀRIKA
OF ĪSVARA KṚṢṆA

A Philosopher's Exposition

BY
C. KUNHAN RAJA

1963

FIRST EDITION

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1



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ITS DEDICATION

1. *The Noble Couple*

My revered teacher of sacred memory, the late Dr Alfred Cooper Woolner was a brilliant pupil of that well-known master of details, Professor A A Macdonell of Oxford. He was twenty-five when he joined the Panjab University at Lahore in 1903 as its Registrar as well as the Principal of its Oriental College. He held the Registrar's post till 1920 after which he was made, first, the Dean of University Instruction and, subsequently, in 1928, the Vice Chancellor. Simultaneously, he remained in the Principal's chair till he breathed his last on January 7, 1936. Whichever office he occupied, he brought to bear on it the noble impression of his gifted personality, thereby adding to its honour and dignity. He had completely identified himself with the University. Indeed, it could be said of him with great aptness that he and the University formed one, indivisible whole. One could never think of the one without thinking of the other. He was in his fifty-eighth year and at the height of his glory when he fell ill and passed away in harness, leaving behind his devoted wife, a large number of friends and admirers and hundreds of pupils to mourn his irretrievable loss.

In his personal life, he was an embodiment of simplicity, frugality and hard work. He was very abstemious and perfect teetotiller. A man of quiet nature, homely habits and simple style of living, he was devoted to books, and enjoyed walks, in the company of his wife, along the banks of brooks. He would invariably spend his vacation in the midst of wild nature in the hills and, at its end, go a-hiking for a hundred miles or so. He was kind, generous and upright in his dealings with all, and was like a fond father to his pupils. He would love to do all he could for them. And, to those of them with a special aptitude for scholarship, he was a never-failing

friend, guide and patron. Himself an ideal student throughout his life, nothing pleased him better than youngmen taking pains to acquire the habit of marshalling facts before making ill founded generalisations and proclaiming new discoveries. He was averse to all humbug. The ideal of his life is beautifully summed up in his following Vedic epitaph, engraved in Devanagari characters and accompanied by its rendering into English.

‘असतो मा सद् गमय ।
तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय ।
मृत्योर्मा मृत गमय ।

*“From the Unreal lead me unto the Real ,
From Darkness lead me unto Light ,
From Death lead me unto Life Eternal ”*

That epitaph was the selection of his wife, Mrs Mary Emily Woolner who rightfully claimed that it expressed those noble sentiments which her husband loved the most. So long as the tomb remains intact at Lahore, it will serve as a standing testimony to the universally attuned Indian cultural background of that angelic English lady herself. Consonant with the highest reach of universal Sanskritic culture, she not only gave her husband her best love and devotion as his due, but also worshipped him, literally, as her eternal hero. And, when, at last, the Providence called him to eternal rest, she passed every moment of the period of her survival, eight years and eleven days, in thinking of him when she was awake and in dreaming of him when she was asleep. Thus, she worshipped him to her last in the shrine of her heart. India was dear to her, Veda and Sanskrit were dear to her, because her Altied had made the former his home and the latter his life-interest. This seemingly frail but really heroic woman had her eternal merger in the hero of her heart on January 18, 1944, bequeathing, practically, her entire estate to the Panjab University towards creation, after the name of her life-hero, of research scholarships at the Oriental College and of a Chair as well as a Lecture Foundation at our Institute for advancement of Sanskritic studies.

2. *The Great Benefactors*

My contact with Dr Woolner began in 1915 when as an Honours Under Graduate I had the privilege of first sitting at his feet. During the years 1917-1919, I had the rare advantage, in my Post Graduate studies, of receiving his exclusive attention, because, as chance would have it, there was no other student in my class. This opportunity combined with the guidance that I had from him during the next two years of my incumbency as a Research Scholar at the University really, provided me with the necessary grounding on which I have been able to do my humble bit to this day.

When in the early twenties, our Institute was established at Lahore and we launched our Vedic Lexicographical Project which is still in progress, we continued to have the constant benefit of Dr Woolner's valuable consultation and support. His *extempore* Presidential Address to the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference (Vedic Section), held at Baroda in 1933 was briefly recorded in the Proceedings and Transactions of the Session of the Conference (pages 3 and 4). Out of a total of 61 lines of the record, as many as 27 gave an account of our aforesaid project in the following words :

'A more detailed description was then given of a monumental Vedic Dictionary—*Vaidika Sabdārtha-Parījāta* being prepared by Pandit Vishva Bandhu of the Vishveshvaranand Research Institute, Vedic Ashram, Lahore. Each article of this Dictionary gives: (1) Derivation and Etymology, (2) Complete record of citations with references, (3) The various interpretations, classified and reviewed.

"The first fasciculus with the Introduction and 84 articles was published in 1929. It was well received and appreciated by many scholars. The work has been continued during the last three years, and about 500 articles are now ready. Publication has been delayed, partly, in order to profit by a number of suggestions made by scholars with reference to the first instalment and, partly, on account of the attention being given to the work of indexing. This indexing is considered to be a necessary ancillary to the dictionary. A

complete Word-Index is being prepared of all Vedic literature comprising the *Samhitās*, *Brāhmanas*, *Āranyakas*, *Upaniṣads* and *Sūtras*. Of this *Valdika Padānukrama Koṣa*, the second volume comprising the entire vocabulary of the *Brāhmanas* and *Āranyakas* has been prepared and is being printed. Three other volumes remain to be completed. Every entry has been textually checked, classified, grammatically analysed and arranged under its proper radical and (from accented texts) properly accented. Often there are critical notes on the reading or accent.

"Pt. Vishva Bandhu has been carrying on his work with about a dozen assistants, generally, his old pupils, with very limited financial resources. He makes an earnest appeal for further assistance."

That great benefactor of the Institute kept up in his loving heart the same deep and zealous interest in the progress of its work, literally, up to the end of his noble activity on this earth. For, so did it come to pass that the last thing written in his hand was a personal note written on the 17th December, 1935, addressed to Sir George Anderson, the then Education Commissioner with the Government of India, pressing for the Institute being favoured with a grant-in-aid of Rs 50,000/- towards its aforesaid Vedic Lexicographical Project. That very day he was overtaken by the illness from which, alas, he could not recover. How pathetic but, also, how wonderful, indeed!

Mrs Woolner cherished exactly the same noble sentiments and high ideas as her husband did. Therefore, when the present writer exercised the privilege of suggesting to her the aforesaid epitaph, she at once appreciated the idea and agreed to it. A Vedic text covering the last remains of a Christian was to be for all time a unique cultural testament declaring the fundamental harmony of the human heart. When generations pass and the conception of essential unity of all the faiths that can uphold the man in us all, supplies the common basis for all human action, this event might receive its legitimate recognition as a very significant fore-

runner of the coming manifestations on the canvas of universal human culture. For obvious reasons, however, the denominational and imperial setting of the time would not permit anything like this taking place. So, there was bitter opposition from the high official circles to the proposal. But Mrs. Woolner was adamant. She had taken a position from which she would not budge an inch. In the end, they did as she wished, thereby enriching the world with a cultural monument, replete with great significance for the coming generations and a high potential for developing into a place of universal pilgrimage.*

Two years later, in the course of a special talk I had with her, she took me into her full confidence regarding her intended Will. Thereafter, she went back to England and from there told me in her letter of July 17, 1939, "I have been staying in Suffolk with old friends there, also visiting my lawyers, seeing everything was in order. Sanskrit Research and your Institute will benefit at my death and further, eventually."

Giving expression to her great love for India, she wrote to me in her letter of July 9, 1942, "If you can, in your beautiful philosophy, advise me how I can best comfort myself when I cannot rise above such a selfish depression, I shall indeed welcome it.....All you said to me before I left Lahore, is ever in my memory, I prize it exceedingly and all your letters I guard and value.....how deeply I admire the splendid way in which you continue to carry on your noble work".....(and continued, quite prophetically) "Yes, I feel sure your reward is awaiting you. My love for India is so deep, and with all my heart, I trust the issue of this world chaos will work for India's great and lasting benefit" And, in her letter of November 8, 1943, being the last one that I could have from her, she said, "How I wish I could see and talk with you, to be able to settle many problems that are now disturbing my mind.....A few minutes' talk with you will be consoling. Your wise and great help through these days is a

*The related cemetery lies between the Lahore West (Mianmir) Station and the left Canal bank.

continual support and I feel indeed grateful to have such a true Indian friend " Obviously, her relative, Thompson correctly observed in his letter of March 9, 1944, "Her heart and all her thoughts were in India.It is most unlikely that she would have been satisfied to settle down here after the war "

3. *The Dedication*

It is to the ever sacred memory of these noble specimens of humanity and loving benefactors of our Institute that as decided by our Management, a new series of research and cultural works is most reverently and gratefully dedicated This Mary Emily Woolner and Alfred Cooper Woolner Indological Series or simply, Woolner Indological Series will incorporate works of research and cultural interest pertaining to all aspects of Indology, namely, studies in and text-editions of Indian languages, literatures, religions, philosophies, histories, arts and sciences and other allied disciplines. Hallowed be for ever the two noble names which this series now goes forth to commemorate !

Most respectfully subscribed

V V R INSTITUTE,
SADHU A HRAM, HOSHIARPUR
November 6, 1960

VISHVA BANDHU

FOREWORD

Of the different systems of Indian philosophy, the Sankhya system is very conspicuous in that its earliest source-books still remain in oblivion. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya Kārikā* happens to be the most authoritative text now available, but it represents only a particular later phase of Sāṅkhya. The classic commentaries of Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra on this work are sometimes inconsistent and not fully satisfactory in their expositions. An attempt is made in the following pages by Dr C Kunhan Raja to make an original approach to and give a thorough-going and critical exposition of the system using the said two commentaries just for the purpose of his comment and criticism. Dr Raja has brought to bear on this exposition his deep knowledge of the Indian philosophical thought and an analytical and scientific approach to the subject. I feel that our Woolner Indological Series, of which this work is being issued as Volume IV, has definitely been enriched by this publication.

But a very pathetic interest indeed, attaches to this publication because its learned author had hardly completed and sent to us the last pages of this book for printing when a severe heart-attack suddenly brought about the end of his life. He had however already seen the entire text of the book through the press and despatched his last packet containing the final part of the Notes and the Introduction. It is therefore with an intense feeling of sadness that we place before the scholarly world this posthumous publication of our dear and esteemed colleague, Dr C K. Raja. May it go forth to keep his sacred memory ever fresh and green!

Xmas, 1963.

GENERAL EDITOR

PREFACE

The *Saṅkhya Kārikā* is the only authentic work we have at present from which we can get an idea of the central doctrines of the Sāṅkhya system of Indian philosophy. Īśvarakṛṣṇa the author of the *Kārikā* mentions only one work which he has made use of in writing his own work and that is the *Śaṣṭitantra* or the Sixty-treatise. We know nothing about that work and references to it found in the later commentaries on the *Kārikā* are not based on a direct knowledge of the text. For the *Saṅkhya Kārikā* there are two important commentaries. One is by Gaudapāda which is known as a *Bhāṣya* and the other is the *Saṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra. The *Saṅkhya Kārikā* with the commentary of Gaudapāda is available with a translation by Colebrooke and Wilson with elaborate Notes by the latter. The *Saṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* has been edited with a translation by the late Hara Dutta Shastri in the Poona Oriental Series. There is also a *Māhara Vṛtti*.

In 1934 the late S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī who was then the Head of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Madras translated the text with his own critical notes and a very scholarly Introduction and it was published by the University. A second edition became necessary in a very short time and the revised edition of the text with his translation and notes appeared in 1935. Ever since Suryanarayana Sastrī and myself had joined the University we were consulting each other in our respective works. I went through his translation of Appaya Dikṣita's *Śivadvaitanirṇaya* and we were working together to translate the Mīmāṃsā work *Māṇameyodaya* and the *Catussūtrī* portion of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. I read through his translation and explanation of the *Saṅkhya Kārikā* also. When he was revising his original work I brought to his notice a rather

recent commentary on the *Kārikā* of which there was a manuscript copy in the Adyar Library¹ This commentary differed from the classical commentaries of Gauḍapāda and of Vācaspati Miśra and I found that in many places its interpretations were far more satisfactory than what was found in the other two commentaries I also pointed out to him the many places where the classical commentators Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra were not at all satisfactory in their interpretations

Suryanarayana Sastrī's plan was to present the interpretation of Vācaspati Miśra to modern students and if he started on a discussion of the commentaries that would be more than what he had planned and would also take him far out of his track So he presented the interpretation of the *Kārikā* by Vācaspati Miśra with some critical observations just noting the interpretations of other commentators also

Meanwhile I had been studying the *Kārikā* and noting all the points where I could not accept the interpretations of the two classical commentators Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra I had explained the text to my students, when I was in the University of Madras When later on I was in the Andhra University I delivered a course of popular lectures on *Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy* which I revised and enlarged and issued as a separate book published by Motilal Banarasidas of Delhi There I pointed out many contexts where I found the interpretations of the two commentators unacceptable Since these were the two commentators whose interpretations were in the hands of the modern students through the editions and translations I took a special note of their interpretations I however wanted to bring out an edition of the *Kārikā* with my own interpretation

In the middle of 1959 my health began to fail and by the close of 1960 my condition became very precarious and

1 See Preface to the revised edition of 1935

I had to resign my position in the University to take rest at Bangalore. When I recovered completely, I thought of reviving my idea of interpreting the *Saṅkhya Kārikā* and started the work early in 1962. As I was doing other works also, having already prepared a book on the *Poet-Philosophers of the Rgveda*, which Ganesh and Co., Madras were publishing, it was only in May, 1963 that I could find time to finish the interpretation of the *Saṅkhya Kārikā*.

I have carefully examined all the previous materials available on the subject by way of translations and interpretations and discussions. Here I am giving my own view of the *Saṅkhya* system of thought. I have drawn attention to the interpretations of Gaudapāda and of Vācaspati Miśra at places where I differ from their interpretation. I have not pointed out the views of any others since these two are the best known and since only theirs are the commentaries which the students read and depend upon for understanding the system. From the beginning to the end there are few verses in which I do not have some difference of view. They lived in a certain environment and they interpreted the *Kārikā* from that background. They differ from each other and there are other commentators who differ from both of them. Thus, there is nothing that can be called the traditional interpretation of the *Kārikā*. We have to distinguish between the *Saṅkhya* theory of an earlier date and the *Saṅkhya* theory presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the *Kārikā* and also the interpretations of the theories by Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra and other early commentators. We are perfectly at liberty to give our own interpretation of the system. I take the *Kārikā* as the basis for my presentation of the system since that is the only original text available. My purpose is to present my own view of the *Saṅkhya* system in an independent way. I am not presenting here what I have studied from books. I have my own feelings and my own convictions as a philosopher and I read into the text what I can accept as the doctrines of the system, just as the earlier commentators and even the author of the

Kārikā have done. They have all given their own views of the Sāṅkhya system and I am giving my own views.

There must have been a voluminous literature on the subject at an earlier period. All the other systems have a *Sūtra* and a *Bhāṣya*. Here there are no *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* is on the *Kārikā* and not on any *Sūtra*. Neither the author of the *Kārikā* nor of its commentary mentions a *Sūtra*. The *Sūtra*, now available with its commentary by Vijnāna Bhikṣu is generally not accepted as a genuine basic text of this system. I too do not accept the *Sūtra* as such. Śaṅkara discusses the Sāṅkhya system². Not one point there is found elaborated in the *Kārikā*. He must have had before him some texts in which the points that he criticised had been elaborated. Perhaps it was the *Śaṣṭitantra* the original of which the *Kārikā* is a compendium. He must have had before him some literature on the Sāṅkhya in which the Upanisadic passages had been interpreted from the Sāṅkhya point of view. Unless there had been some such system of interpretations for the Upanisads and unless the interpretations had been popular there was no occasion for him to attempt at a refutation of the Sāṅkhya stand to establish his own position³. Perhaps the system dropped out and the Vedānta became the system in which Indian metaphysics was developed. Now, we have only the *Kārikā* and the commentaries thereon as the chief basis for understanding and presenting the Sāṅkhya doctrine and I take such material for my book.

Besides the text in Devanagari and Roman and also the translation and my own commentary I have added a few short notes at the end which may be of interest to the readers.

It is my very pleasant duty to thank the Viśhveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute for having kindly

2 *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I 1-5 and II-11 1-9

3 At the end of the 1st chapter he says that the Sāṅkhya is the *Pradhana Malla* (chief adversary) he has to face

accepted this book for publication in their series, and my special thanks are due to Shri Vishva Bandhu, the Director of the Institute, for the personal interest that he has been taking in my work. Shri Mahendra Kulasrestha made excellent arrangement for the prompt despatch of the proofs after very careful correction and the way in which the proofs had been read through at that end made my task very easy, indeed. The whole printing, too, has been done in an incredibly short time. The press has finished the printing in an excellent manner and I also thank the press for their work. There were many points in which I had to secure information, for which my own library was not adequate. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, a former student of mine and now in the Sanskrit Department of the University of Madras, has all along been very helpful by way of making the necessary references and supplying me with all the information that I required and I express my very sincere and appreciative thanks to him.

"NAIMISHAM",
Dr. C. Kunhan Raja Academy,
Cultural Centre for World Harmony,
Bangalore,
16th October, 1963.

C. KUNHAN RAJA

CONTENTS

DEDICATION	..	v
GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE	..	xi
PREFACE	..	xii
INTRODUCTION	..	1
TEXT AND COMMENTARY	..	43
NOTES	..	173
TEXT IN DEVANAGARI	..	195
INDEX TO HALF VERSES	..	203

Introduction

The *Rgveda* is by common consent the earliest available record of Indian culture. It is also considered to be the earliest actual record of the civilization. But the text of the *Rgveda* is reminiscent of a long history of the evolution of a culture in this country. The authors of the *Rgveda* speak of their ancient forefathers¹, who had composed poetry in praise of the various gods and who had been also performing the rituals which they themselves had been performing. Such ancient forefathers had been in communion with the gods and Yama had seen the path which he followed and which later people had also been treading². They mention a large number of their predecessors. It is not unlikely that the available text of the *Rgveda* represents the closing stages of a civilization and not the earliest stage in the evolution of that civilization. According to Indian tradition, there had been a decadence from that age³.

The *Rgveda* also presents various philosophical ideas of a general nature, and three regular currents of philosophical thought are traceable in the available text. I have explained them in my book on the *Poet-Philosophers of the Rgveda*⁴. The three currents represent the currents found flowing through the channels of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta and the Nyāya systems of later periods. I have also been able to trace into the *Rgvedic* poetry the beginnings of the Tāntric current with the Nāda Brahman as the root cause in the universe⁵.

(The references are to the *Rgveda* unless otherwise stated)

1 See *The Vedas* by C. Kunhan Raja, Andhra University, Ch. 1
■ X 11 2

3 They are represented by the four Yugas called the Kṛta, Tretā, Dvāpara and Kali.

4 Ganesh & Co. Madras

5 See the *Poet-philosophers of the Rgveda* by C. Kunhan Raja, Ganesh & Co., Madras

Among the general philosophical ideas that are found throughout the *Rgveda*, mention must be made of the distinction between the changing and moving world and the absolute world of a stationary, permanent and immortal nature. There is frequent mention of *Sthātus caratham*, *Jagatas tasthuṣaḥ* and *Amṛtam martyam*⁶. *Sthātus caratham*, and *Jagatas tasthuṣaḥ* should not be taken to mean only the stationary objects and the moving objects of the world like the animals and the trees. I do not ignore the combination of *Dvīpade catuṣpade* found in the *Rgveda* rather prominently and also the combination of *Toḥasya tanayasya*. They refer to the bipeds and the quadrupeds and to the children and the grand children. Although the terms *Sthātus caratham* and *Jagatas tasthuṣaḥ* can be interpreted to mean what are stationary and what are moving like the trees and the animals the terms *Amṛtam martyam* cannot be so easily disposed of. It is true that the term is interpreted by the classical commentators of the *Rgveda* as relating⁷ to the gods and to men; one commentator relates it to the life and to the body⁸. But the terms should be taken in the context of the whole of the *Rgveda*. There are many other concepts in the *Rgveda* that have a close relation to these terms.

The authors of the *Rgveda* speak of some dark regions,⁹ some positions that are hidden in the cave¹⁰. They speak of some mysterious names¹¹ and of the highest position¹². Only

6 The terms mean respectively: What is stationary and what is moving, what is moving and what is stationary and what is immortal and what is mortal.

7 See the commentaries of Skandasvāmīn Mādhava son of Venkṭṭya and Śhīyana.

8 Mādhava who is different from Mādhava son of Venkṭṭya whose commentary is published in the Adyar Library along with the commentary of the other Mādhava.

9 See expressions like *ā kṛṣṇena rajasā* and *kṛṣṇā rajatni* (I 35.2 and 4).

10. See *guhā trini nih ta* (I 164-45) etc.

11 See *gavām nihita sapta nṛma* (I 164-3) and *trih sapta nīmāghnyā* E bharti (VII-87.4) etc.

12. See *tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam* (I 22-20) etc.

some gifted persons can know such positions, they are hidden from the view of the normal vision of man¹³. Who are such gifted persons? The *Rgveda* authors speak about the winning of the light by Indra. Light is pictured as cows, in contrast to *karma* (Rituals) which is pictured as bulls. Indra killed Vṛtra and released the waters and in this exploit it is essentially the group of seven gods called the Maruts that helped Indra. Indra killed Vala and released the cows that were hidden behind the mountains within the caves. In this there are many Sages who had been helping Indra, Brhaspati and the Angirases are the chief among them. Water is in the Atmospheric region, which is above the earth and below the celestial regions, and light is in this celestial region. It would be found that the gods in the celestial region are more closely related to Soma. Maruts are the foremost among those who drink the Soma and it was the Maruts that helped Indra in this feat. Brhaspati and the Angirases are closely related to the songs of praise and they helped Indra in winning the light. There is also the relation of *Devayāna* (the path of gods) to the *Pitryāna* (the path of the dead ancestors).

It would be found that wisdom and song are related to the light in the highest region. Thus the vision of the highest position that is concealed from the view of the normal human beings, is not merely the vision of the physical space above the Atmosphere. The light is not also the light of the sun at the close of the rainy season when the sun was hidden by the dark clouds nor the light after the winter season when the day had become very short and when the sun loses its lustre. Besides winning the light, there is the event of Yama having seen the Path for the first time. This is also some sort of illumination which he had about the region in the universe that is concealed from the ordinary persons. There is enough evidence in the *Rgveda* to show that the thinkers of the times had some notion of an eternal unchanging part and a changing, dying part in the universe. This is not a notion of the people

13 See tad vipraso vipanyavo jagṛvāmsaḥ samindlate (I 22 21) etc

whose compositions now form the available *Rgveda*. They are all notions which the composers of the poetry of the available *Rgveda* had inherited from an earlier age.¹⁴

The world is pictured as a tree. Śunahsepa speaks about such a tree in his *Suktas* and there is a similar reference to the tree in the *Suktas* of Dirghatamas. It is also mentioned in the *Sukta* about Yama attributed to Kumāra, the son of Yama. It is contained in the instructions given by Yama to Naciketas in the *Kathopanishad* and also in the *Bhagavad Gita*. The tree has its roots above and the branches below, as is described by Śunahsepa and in the *Kathopanishad* and in the *Bhagavad Gita*. The tree is the abode of the wise according to Dirghatamas and Kumāra (in his *Sukta* about Yama). Śunahsepa also says that the key to solve the mystery is kept within man himself.¹⁵ When we deal with the philosophical thoughts of the *Rgveda*, we cannot ignore all such evidences that are spread out throughout the *Rgveda*.

That the changing world is a manifestation of the unchanging fundamental Absolute is a cardinal doctrine of Indian thought throughout the ages. This is the one important point on which there is a conflict between the Buddhistic thought and the thought within the systems that followed the traditional Vedic path. It is a real world arising out of a real fundamental. Life and wisdom are also at the base of this world. It is not a change without any plan, it is not a chaos. It is an orderly, well designed evolution from the absolute to the phenomenal. There is no difference among the various systems of thought in India on this point, namely, the positive nature of the world both in its evolved stage and in its absolute stage and the existence of life at the root of the whole world formation and evolution. And this goes back to the *Rgvedic* times.

I am not taking up, at this stage, the question of the *Rgvedic* origin of the Tāntric philosophy, where the root

14 See *Poet philosophers of the Rgveda*, Ganesh & Co Madras for a detailed account.

15 For the description of the world as a tree see *Ibid* where the point is often raised.

cause is the *Śabda* or *Nāda Brahman*. I am taking into consideration only the three other currents of thought that have taken definite shape in the systems of philosophy of a later date. They are what are found in the Sāṅkhya, in the Nyāya and in the Vedānta systems. The Yoga and the Vaiśeṣika have no independent theory different from what is contained in the Sāṅkhya and in the Nyāya. In the Mīmāṃsā also, the position is not much different from what is found in the Nyāya system, that the world is a construction of the whole from parts called the *Paramāṇus*¹⁶. There may be some difference regarding the agent who is at the back of this construction and also regarding the nature of the *Paramāṇus*¹⁷. That is a minor affair.

There is a *Śukta*¹⁸ in the *Rgveda* which begins with the words—*nāsa āsīn no sad āsīt*, 'It was not what was not, it was not what was'. We speak of a thing as "it is" only in relation to the things that are not elsewhere, or in relation to another that is not there. Similarly, we say that a thing is not, only in relation to something that is elsewhere or in relation to something that is there. In the absolute stage, such a relative usage is impossible. "There is no space nor the aspects of space at that stage." That is how the poem begins. Certainly the reference is to a positive thing. This accords with the *Avyakta* or the Unmanifest, the *Pradhāna* (the Chief) or the *Prakṛti* (the root cause) familiar in the Sāṅkhya system.

But in the classical Sāṅkhya, there is no life inherent in this *Pradhāna*, which is in itself insentient and which receives its sentience as a reflection from the *Puruṣa*, the self that is a pure sentience. The sentience is external to the absolute basis of the phenomenal world, in the classical Sāṅkhya. But in the *Rgvedic* system of thought, sentience

16 *Paramāṇus* are the smallest particle of matter

17 The Nyāya system accepted distinctions between *Paramāṇus* (Ultimate atoms), *Dvyanukas* (Double atoms) and *Tṛyanukas* (Triple atoms)

18 X 129

seems to be within the Absolute that is the basis of the phenomenal world "That one breathed by its own power without the air coming in or going out as breath"¹⁹ This shows that there is the life fundamental within this absolute though there is no life function in it There was also some power in that absolute, what is called the *Tapas* The root *Tap* has the meaning of both light and heat Here it must be the heat aspect of the root that is to be understood in the context The Germ was born on account of this *Tapas*²⁰ Then there arose a will *Kāma*²¹ This was the seed of the mind

There is this question in the poem "Who knows, who can declare, whence was born this creation?" "It cannot be the gods that produced the first creation, the first change of the absolute into the phenomenal, the gods came after this event" The poem ends with the statement, "He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or not, only the highest person in heaven who can see, perhaps knows, or perhaps even he does not" The idea behind seems to be that there was no one who could be declared as a creator, the creation arose out of itself The absolute from within was transformed into the phenomenal, there was no external agent Many of the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya are traceable to this *Sūtra* in the *Rgveda* The one major deviation in the classical Sāṅkhya is that there is in it a factor external to the material root cause (the *Pradhāna*) in the form of *Puruṣas* When there was the reflection of the external sentence from the *Puruṣas* on the material absolute, the evolution was from within that material fundamental and there was no external agent to start or to guide and control the evolution in the material world

19 Anid avātam svadhayā tad ekam (verse 2)

20 Tapasas tan mahināḥyāyataṁkam (verse 3)

21 Kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi manaso retah prathamam yad ānt (verse 4)

There is the *Sukta* of Hiraṇyagarbha²² and there are two *Suktas* of Viśvakarman²³. Here there is the supreme creator god who was the agent to give a shape and a form to the world. There is practically no mention of the absolute from which the phenomenal world arose. There is a question what the timber could be from which the edifice of the world was built and where the builder could have been sitting when he was making the construction²⁴. What is very prominent in these three *Suktas* is the presence of a great god who was the builder of the world. Hiraṇyagarbha dropped out of the scene while Viśvakarman continued rather prominent in the *Yajurveda*. There arose Prajāpati as another great power in the *Yajurveda*. Here I may say that the *Sukta* to which I trace the origin of the Sāṅkhya system and which begins with "nāśad āsin no sad āsit", is assigned according to tradition to Prajāpati Parameśthin, the Lord of the people who abides in the highest position, as the author, and according to the epics of the later day, he is the creator God. God as an agent in every event in the world is a cardinal doctrine in the Nyāya, though there may be no clear evidence of such a doctrine in the basic text, the *Sūtras* of Gautama, nor in the Vaiśeṣika *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda. For this reason I trace the doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to these *Suktas* in the *Rgveda*.

Then there is the *Sukta* that is known as the *Puruṣa Sukta*²⁵, the hymn about the *Puruṣa* or the person or self. This *Sukta* starts with a description of the absolute as a great Person, immense in size. While the absolute of the *Sukta* which I consider as the source of the Sāṅkhya, is material in content, the absolute in the *Puruṣa Sukta* is more an intelligence, a Person. The immensity of the Person indicates a material aspect, but that material aspect is only the body of the Person. A Person is an intelligent individual and

22 Hiraṇyagarbha X 121

23 Viśvakarman, X 81 and 82

24 Verses 2 and 4 in X 81

25 *Puruṣa* X 90

that is the most conspicuous feature in the absolute of the *Puruṣa Sūkta*. From this absolute there arose a diversification in *Virāt* (what shines in a manifold way). This *Virāt* became the material for the creation of the world, and this creation is compared to a grand ritual. The performers of the ritual are the gods and the demigods called the *Sādhyas* and the sages.²⁶ Thus the diversification of the absolute, the *Puruṣa* took the form of the material for the world and also the agent for giving a shape to the world. Here we find the Advaita Vedānta doctrine of the *Para Brahman* and the Creator. The material and also the agency for the world creation were evolutes from this *Para Brahman*. Here the gods are mentioned as having given the shape of the world. In the *Sūkta* which was mentioned above as the beginning of the Sankhya there was the allusion to the gods who could not be the agents for the first creation in so far as they appeared later.²⁷ The reference is to the doctrine found in the *Puruṣa Sūkta*.

In the *Rgveda* we find only the three currents of thought regarding the transformation of the absolute into the phenomenal. We do not meet with the details of the change the various stages in the evolution. They are described in the *Upaniṣads* and they are followed up in the later systems of philosophy. In the *Purāṇas* also the various stages are described. What is found in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* by way of the animals and the castes²⁸ is not of the nature of what is found in the system of philosophy and in the *Purāṇas*. The details are not at all comprehensive in the *Puruṣa Sūkta*.

Here it must be noted that in the *Rgvedic* philosophy the author of the poem to which is traced the seeds of the Sankhya thought is Prajapati Paramēsthīn who is the Creator God of a later day, while in the latter-day Sankhya itself there is no such creator. It is Atheistic. In the hymn to which the thoughts of the Vedānta are traced the Supreme is called

26 Verse 7

27 X 1²⁹ *arvāṅ devā asya viśatjanena* (verse 6)

28 X 90 10 11 and 12

Puruṣa, which is a term that is prominent in the Sāṅkhya system ; in the Vedānta itself of the later days, the supreme is known as Brahman, which term means only poetry in the *Rgveda*. Such cross-currents and such interlockings in the developments of philosophical thoughts and doctrines may be taken note of. They developed without any conflict along separate paths.

In the *Rgveda*, we have the division of the world into the three regions, the Earth, the Atmosphere and the Heaven. We have to interpret their division as relating to their fineness in the course of the change over from the absolute to the phenomenal and not in relation to space. The earth being the grossest corresponds to the first of the five elements of the later days. Water and light are the special features of the other two divisions and they correspond to the Water and the Fire of the classical division of the five elements. I have not been able to find anything that strictly corresponds to the air, in a clear way. The supreme positions may relate to the *Ākāśa* (ether) of the later systems. The body and the breath and the eye are related to the earth and to the air and to the sun²⁹. But we do not get any systematic classification of the elements in the *Rgveda*. We do not have any text bearing on the philosophy of those days ; we have only poetry with that philosophy of those days as the environment, as the background.

In the *Upaniṣads* we get at the various gradations of the world, the gradations of the various sense-organs and of the mind and of the facts that transcend them. We see a close relation between this classification in the *Upaniṣads* and what is found in the Vedānta, which is not, in this respect, much different from the Sāṅkhya scheme also. There are the three *Antahkaraṇas*, the internal organs, of *Buddhi* or

29. *Sūryaṁ cakṣur gacchato vātam ātmā dyāu ca gaccha prthivīm ca dharmāṇā apo vā gaccha yadā tatra te hitam oṣadhīṣu prati tiṣṭhā śarīraṁ* (X.16.3). What is given here does not fit into the classification of the Five Elements and the Five Sense-organs of a later stage.

intellect, *Ahankāra* or subjective consciousness and *Manas* or mind. There are the five sense organs and the five organs of activity. There are also the five qualities of the elements with the five elements corresponding to them. There is the subtle body and the gross body. In the Vedānta, the five elements are not pure, except the finest, the *Ākāśa* or ether, all the others contain that element and also a part of all the other elements. The five qualities abide in the five elements in the Vedānta. In the Sāṅkhya, the elements are pure and the five qualities are the sources for the evolution of the five elements³⁰. But in the main there is some close correspondence. The course of evolution, rather creation, is described in the *Purāṇas*, namely, in the second and in the third Books of the *Bhāgavata* and in the first Book of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. In the third Book of the *Bhāgavata*, the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya are also elaborated by Kapila himself to his mother Devahūti.

Such is the background for the development of the classical Sāṅkhya. The main doctrine of the Sāṅkhya is that what is experienced as the world has arisen from an absolute and that the evolution is from within, by the will within itself, through the power within it, can be traced back to the *Rgveda*. But we do not see the important terms like *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*, *Puruṣa* as a plurality, and the name Sāṅkhya itself, in the earlier stages of the development of the thought in the Vedas. We see the mention of the five elements, the sense organs and other factors in the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad* there is the mention of some absolute, unborn entity which consists of three colours³¹. That may be equated with the *Prakṛti* with three constituents. Here the *Tamas* is the dark colour, the *Rajas* is the red colour and the *Sattva* is the white colour. In some of the later thoughts, red or yellow colour is the symbol of peace and serenity, of renunciation. But here it represents intense activity. There

30. The admixture of the Five Elements is explained in the *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* VIII 29ff (Adyar Library)

31. See the verse *ajām ekām lohita śukla kṛṣṇām*

is also the term *Śramana*, which must mean a man of intense activity, and a *Śramana* became a man who has renounced the world

Sāṅkhya can mean only what is related to discriminative knowing, Sāṅkhya. The root *Khyā* means "to know" and the preposition *Sam* means "clear". This term was applied in some specific sense to a separate system of philosophical thought only at a later stage, and the earlier stage in the meaning of the term is found retained in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* says that he had expounded the system of knowledge according to the Sāṅkhy and that he proposed to take up the point in its Yoga aspect³². Sāṅkhya and Yoga are given here as antithetical, but in some places it is said that in spite of this antithesis, they are both ultimately identical. *Karma Yoga* is further brought in antithesis with *Sāṁnyāsa*,³³ and from this it may be concluded that Sāṅkhya was also related to renunciation, to *Sāṁnyāsa*.

In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Sankara, we find a refutation of the Sāṅkhya system. Such a refutation presupposes the existence of a regular system of interpretation in the Sāṅkhya system in which *Upaniṣadic* terms are explained as relating to the *Prakṛti*, the *Pradhāna*, the root cause. We do not know the work in which there was such an interpretation. Perhaps it is the *Śaṣṭitantra*, the elaborate work dealing with sixty topics. This may be an exhaustive commentary on some basic set of *Sūtras*. We do not know if at that time there was any set of *Sūtras* current traced back to Kapila, just as the Yoga is traced to Patañjali, the Nyāya to Gautama, the Vaiśeṣika to Kanāda, the Mīmāṃsā to Jaimini and the Vedānta to Bādarāyana. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not mention any such work, he simply says that the first teacher of the system, Kapila, taught the doctrines to Āsuri and that Āsuri taught it to Pāñcaśikha. Pāñcaśikha has elabo

32 *Eṣa te bhāṣitā sākhye buddhit yoga tv imām ānu* II 39

33 *Jñānayogena sākhyānām karmayogena yoginām* (II 3)

But see also *ekam sākhyāṁ ca yogaṁ ca yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati* (II 5)

rated it. It was in the *Śaṣṭitantra* that there are discussions on the opposite views and the narration of various anecdotes, to illustrate and to maintain some doctrines³¹. Can we say that Āsuri must have written a set of *Sūtras* containing the teachings of Kṛpīla and that Pañcaśikṣā wrote a commentary on it? This is only a surmise. Then in the *Śaṣṭitantra* there must have been some detailed discussion of the doctrines as in a *Vārtika*. From Sankara's *Brahmasūtra bhāṣya*, it is certain that there must have been some section in the Sāṅkhya work in which the *Upanisadic* terms have been interpreted as relating to *Pradhāna* and other Sāṅkhya concepts. But we see nothing of the sort in the available text on the Sāṅkhya, which is a condensation of the *Śaṣṭitantra*.

In the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* of the *Rgveda*, the hymn which starts with the words *nāsad āsit*, and to which I traced the Sankhya doctrine as the original source, the absolute is regarded as matter with life in it. In the *Puruṣa Sūkta* there is the Absolute life with matter in it. I feel that this must be the main difference between the Sankhya and the Vedānta originally. In the Sankhya there is matter as the ultimate and in the Vedānta there is life as the ultimate. But in the Sankhya which Sankara criticises in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* the *Pradhāna* or root cause does not seem to have life. There is no mention of such a life even as a reflection from the *Puruṣa* along with a duality between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Sankara does not mention Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Is Sankara prior to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*? I do not propose to enter into a consideration of this rather complex problem. If I enter that path, I may not be able to extricate myself from the winding paths and from sub paths and lanes to take up the main point at issue. Sankara had some work different from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* as the authoritative text, and perhaps he had a *Sūtra* and a *Bhāṣya* and other literature, now lost to us. My important point is that the Sankhya

31 Verse 72 of *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*

did not arise in a lonely region at an age far later than the Vedas. There are traces of the Sāṅkhya in the *Rgveda* itself, along with the fundamentals of the Nyāyā and of the Vedānta, these three being the three main currents of thought regarding the transformation of the absolute into the phenomena.

The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* starts with the problem of the necessity for a system of philosophy. It is suffering that sets man's mind active regarding the sources of suffering and the remedy for it. Within the *Kārikā*, at a later stage there is reference to the termination of the three-fold suffering which are mentioned in the first *Kārikā*³⁵ and in another place it is said that the suffering is due to old age and death³⁶. In this context I cannot ignore the event in the life of Buddha in which it was the sight of disease, old age and death that changed his whole outlook on life and persuaded him to take to renunciation when he saw a mendicant, *Bhikkū*. Such a search for the root of the suffering and the remedy for such suffering takes three courses. I will call them the course followed by the Cārvākas, the course followed in religion and the course of philosophy.

The Cārvāka is generally spoken of as a system of heterodox philosophy, a *Nāstika Darśana*. It is not at all right to designate it as a *Darsana*. It is only a way of looking at the problem of life for the general public. The system accepts only two ends in life, that of *Artha* and *Lāma*, acquisition of the necessary means and the enjoyment of life thereby. This presupposes some regulation in man's life, otherwise it would become the law of fish (*Matsya Nyāya*), the stronger fish eating the weaker ones. That would defeat the very end kept in view. So they recognise *Dharma*, but only as included within *Artha* and *Kama*. Thus *Rāja Nīti* or secular law is included within the *Artha Śāstra*, the treatise on the acquisition of means for a happy life.

35 Duḥkhatrayābhihātāt See also aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam āpnoti (68)

36 Tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtāṃ duḥkham prāpnoti kevalaḥ puruṣaḥ (Verse 55)

The standard text starts with the statement that it deals with the problem of acquiring power over territories and giving them proper protection³⁷. This does not mean mere conquest. It means also the method of getting into political power in a state. The protection is the enforcement of the Law. The Cārvāka system does not recognise the other meaning of *Dharma*, namely, that which leads a man to heaven. They did not also recognise what is termed the fourth and the highest goal of man, the *Parama Puruṣārtha*, that of *Mokṣa* or final release from the bondages of the world. Their principle was that man should lead a happy life so long as he can live³⁸.

With such an approach to life, they could not recognise sin and suffering as integral factors in life. There is suffering and no one can fail to recognise it. What brings about suffering is evil. So it is not proper to say that the Cārvākas did not recognise sin and suffering. If there is suffering, there is a method within the world itself to remedy the suffering. And that method of remedying the suffering can be known through the common channel of experience, *Pratyakṣa*. There cannot be a suffering for which there is no remedy within the world itself. Something in life is called suffering not absolutely and within itself, but as a contrast to another state which we call happiness. If there is a happiness as a contrast to suffering, there is also a way to realise that happiness. In this way, the ordinary ways are enough for man to secure everything in life that would make him happy, that would remedy all the sufferings.

It is generally said that the Cārvākas did not recognise a mode of knowing called the inference; certainly they did not recognise scripture as any authority. When a man sees smoke and fire together in many places, no Cārvāka could

37. *Pṛethvyā lābhe pālāne ca yāvanty arthaśāstṛāṇi pūrvecār-
yāḥ prasthāpitāni*

38. *Yavajjivam sukham jivet* See *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*, closing verses in Ch. I dealing with the Cārvāka System. These verses may be from an original work on the subject.

say that one cannot know of the existence of fire when he sees only the smoke. What they must have been refusing to recognise is inference as the sole means to understand certain facts in the universe. Whatever comes within the sphere of inference which they could recognise is what could also come within the sphere of perception, after the perception its subsequent knowledge can be had by inference. But religion and philosophy speak of facts that cannot be known at all through perception. The Carvākas do not recognise the reality of such facts and the modes of knowing them which transcend perception.

In the first verse of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, the author says that there are reasons to believe that certain kinds of sufferings cannot be remedied by the means available within the sphere of perception, that is, direct experience. They say that the remedies of this nature do not always bear fruit and in many cases when there are the fruits, they are not of an absolute and final nature. Perhaps the Cārvākas may say that if the remedies do not bear fruit, the reason must be that the proper remedy has not been known. If there is no permanent result, then there can be the repetition of the remedy, anyway there must be the possibility of some remedy for every evil and for every suffering, within the scheme of the experienced world. There is no need to think of an outside for the world of experience³⁹.

Religion prescribes remedies for sufferings in its own way. There are rituals prescribed to ward off suffering and for gaining possession of riches. Then there are rituals prescribed which would take man out of this world of suffering, which would take them to heaven. For such rituals and for their fruits, one must depend on the authority of scripture. The philosopher would say that even in such remedies for the sufferings, there are defects. There are certain rituals that are associated with unclean practices like

39 The views assigned to the Cārvākas here are in many cases what I consider to have been their real views though they are not based on any authentic texts.

earlier transformation. Then a stage must come when the transformations cease to transform into further modifications. The knower must be neither a basis for a transformation nor in itself the transformation of a fundamental. This is the basis for the entire world of experience with changes and movements. The changes and movements specified in the above classification do not come within the sphere of experience, they are arrived at through a process of inference. It is only the further changes in this four fold scheme of the basis for the world of experiences that can come within the experience of man. This four fold scheme consists of twenty five categories, and they are enumerated with the above scheme in the third verse. The objects within the final stage in the formation of the basis for the world of experiences and their experience alone come within the sphere of the direct experience of man. The lower stages fall within the sphere of inference. There is no denial of facts transcending the objects within the sphere of reasoning. If there are such facts, they can and must be known through scripture where they are dealt with⁴⁴.

Thus there is no open refutation of the Vedānta position that the Ultimate from which the world of experience has evolved should not be traced only up to the Pradhana, and that the process must proceed further to the *Brahman*. The Sāṅkhya stops with an infinite number of *Purusas* as affording the basis for the infinite number of living beings. The question whether the entire group of such *Purusas* should be reduced to a single *Puruṣa* is also not considered in the Sāṅkhya, as falling outside of man's reason. There is also the question whether some active agent is working behind the scheme of the world. Here also, reason is against such a presence. But if scripture deals with such a God, that is another matter and that falls outside the system. There are various rituals prescribed in scripture and such rituals are supposed to provide man with freedom from sufferings and

44 Tasmād apī cāsiddham parokṣam āptāgamāt siddham (verse 6 in Sāṅkhya Kārikā)

also with gain of material wealth like cows. Then there is also heaven promised in scripture as a fruit of rituals. Such points also fall outside the scope of rational philosophy.

So far as the world of experience is concerned, there is little scope for controversy. So among the three factors mentioned for attaining release from suffering in an absolute and in an unfailing way, the *Vyakta* does not come up much for discussion. They are taken up only as the ground for establishing the other two facts, the *Avyakta*, the unmanifest and the knower, *Jna*. These are the three factors mentioned in the second verse.

Does the world of experience go back on an absolute? If it exists how is it that we do not have a direct experience of such a fact? The answer is given that such a root cause as the absolute, is by its very nature, outside the sphere of direct perception. We are considering the question of a basis for the entire aggregate of the experienced world. If we say that such a root cause exists and that it is within the experience of man, it would be a contradiction in terms. So it is spoken of as *Sukṣma* (subtle) and the reason for its falling outside the range of common experience is its *Saukṣmya*. This is subtilty. Even in our own experience we know of many facts that are not experienced though they exist, on account of various causes and such cases are given in the seventh verse. Subtilty as the ground for the root cause of the experienced world falling outside the sphere of experience is given in the eighth verse. It is on this point that there is a serious controversy with the Carvakas. The grounds given from ordinary experience do not prove the point. If a thing is far away and is not seen, that thing is seen when it is near and the same holds good in the case of things that are very near. If a man with a defective sense organ does not see a thing, another man can see it. If a thing is noticed when the mind is otherwise engaged, it can be known when the mind is attentive. If a thing is covered up by an obstacle, the removal of the obstruction will make the object visible. If stars are not seen by day on account of the superior brilliance of the sun, they are seen at night.

the killing of animal. Then the remedies are not uniform. There are gradations. There is also a termination of the fruits. That itself is a philosopher's suffering. The philosopher wants a remedy for suffering that would be free from all such defects. That is what the philosopher prescribes through rational investigation into the reality of the world.

It is on account of this three fold approach to the problems of life that the system recognises also three methods of knowing. Perception is what is accepted by the Cārvākas. Scripture is what religion accepts. Reason is what the philosopher adopts. This is the basis for the recognition of three modes of knowing in the Sāṅkhya system. They do not go into the question of further subdivisions of the modes. It is within the sphere of inference that there are various kinds of subdivisions, like immediate and mediate. But such problems are not taken up for consideration in the system. They accept the three modes recognised in the three courses adopted for mitigating sufferings in the life of man in the world.

The philosopher is thinking only of a philosopher's suffering which others do not experience. A philosopher is a philosopher only when he is able to create, at least to experience a new sort of suffering which the ordinary people cannot experience. He is what Śāṅkara terms a *Mumukṣu*, one who craves for a release⁴⁰. But ordinary people do not feel any bondage in the world. Man knows that there are limitations in life and he takes limitations as factors in the Nature from which there is no escape. This sense of a bondage arises in a philosopher when he realises that there is a distinction between something that is permanent and something that is of a transient nature. Ordinary people do not think of something that is absolutely permanent in nature. This is what Śāṅkara calls *Nityānityavastutveka*⁴¹. Such a distinction between

40 *Mumukṣutva* is the fourth of the four eligibilities (*Adhikāra*) enumerated by Śāṅkara for one to become a philosopher searching for the truth.

41 This is the first of the four eligibilities enumerated by Śāṅkara.

things that are absolutely of an eternal nature and things of experience that are transient in nature arises only out of the study of the scripture. For this reason Śāṅkara says that the study of scriptures is a necessary precedent for philosophical speculations.⁴² But in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the craving for a release from the sufferings in the life arises even without dependence on scripture. The release arises from the proper application of one's reasoning faculty.

Suffering is an experience. Experience presupposes the experiencer and the experienced. The experienced world is changing and moving in nature. This world of experience with change and movement must go back on something which is of a fundamental nature, which cannot come within man's experience. The former is *Vyakta* (manifest) and the latter is *Avyakta* (unmanifest). Such an unmanifest fundamental absolute behind the changing and moving facts of the phenomenal world can be arrived at only through reason, through a process of inference. The experiencer must be something entirely different from both of the other two.⁴³ The root cause cannot be the transformation of another cause, if it be so that ceases to be a root cause. So we must accept a root cause which is not the transformation of anything, which, at the same time, is the fundamental for its own transformations. Within such transformations, there must be two categories. Some of them must be what transform into other modifications, while they are themselves the transformations of their own cause, either the root cause or an

42. Svādhyādhyanam to samānam (In the Bhāṣya on the first Sūtra, where he discusses the meaning of the word 'atha' (Then) It makes no difference whether a man has studied the texts relating to Dharma and has lived according to the prescriptions in such texts. But it is only the Vedic Texts that can direct a man's mind towards such problems, otherwise the possibility is that one would proceed towards Nihilism. The study need not be according to the prescriptions relating to some vows and ceremonies.

43. See *Fundamental Problems of Indian Philosophy*, Moti Lal Banarsidass, where it is stated that there is no difference between the subject and the object in this world. Nothing is a pure object (Ch. 16). Here a subject is presumed as external to the world since there are facts in the world that are never a subject.

It has the normal form of *Sattva* which consists of the consciousness of the Law (*Dharma*), knowledge (*Jñāna*), detachment (*Virāga*) and lordliness (*Aśvarya*). But it has also a *Tāmasa* side in which the features will be the opposite. In the beings below man, the *Buddhi* takes this form, and even in men, there is a possibility of the *Buddhi* being dominated by the *Tamas* aspect. But the Sāṅkhya system does not recognise the fact that this feature in *Buddhi*, which is an effect of the root cause, is an inherent feature in the root cause. The *Buddhi* has only the *Sattva* side as dominant in it and this side is what it has inherited from the root cause. The nature of the *Sattva* is, according to the thirteenth verse, to illuminate. The sentience comes from the *Puruṣa* and on account of the *Sattva* aspect in the root cause, there is the feature of manifestation or illumination.

Why did the system postulate that the sentience side in the evolutes of the root cause is not a heritage from the root cause itself, but is an extraneous feature which really exists only in the *Puruṣa*? [The reasons are given in the seventeenth verse. The first four of the five grounds given there can as well be explained from the root cause itself. The combinations of the three aspects of the root cause in various ratios to form the various objects of the experienced world must have some external entity as the purpose. What was in equilibrium could not have got the equilibrium disturbed from within, the push must have come from outside. Ultimately, it would be found that according to the system itself, the *Puruṣa* has no purpose to be served by the root cause. That is what is said in the sixty second verse, towards the very close of the exposition of the Sāṅkhya tenets in the text. The bondage and the suffering and the release are all in the root cause itself and there is none, by implication (no *Puruṣa*), to be bound and to suffer and to be released. Why should there be some opposite to the constitution of the three constituents? We may note some opposite for everything within the experienced world, but that does not warrant a supposition that for the entire world of experience there is an opposite. The control is of the form *I am doing and I am*

experiencing" A part of the root cause can be the "I" and the other part may be what is done and what is experienced There is no real ground for assuming that there is some entity external to the world that is the "I" in such experiences The same argument holds good for the fourth of the grounds, that one is the experiencer for the entire world as object He feels that he is an experiencer for a part of the world and the "I", as experiencer, has room in the other part of the world, outside the experienced objects

But the real ground to assume that there is a *Puruṣa* distinct from the root cause, is the fifth of the list At the time when the Sāṅkhya system was developing and taking a shape as is presented in the *Ārīka*, there was also developing a certain trait in the national genius which no one could ignore A universal observance has been taken always as a ground for accepting the genuineness and validity of certain facts It is just like the opinion in the modern world Evolution has been accepted as a fundamental Law in the world at present and no one can go against that doctrine In those days there was the goal of isolation for the self kept in view in the activities of the nation and *Mokṣa* (final emancipation) had been accepted as the fourth and the highest goal of man⁴⁵ In the seventeenth verse where the grounds for the postulation of a *Puruṣa* are enumerated, there are the terms *Parārtha* (the purpose of another), *Adhiṣṭhāna* (control) and *Bhokṣṭbhāva* (the sense of being the experiencer) This another for whom there is the combination of the three constituents of the root cause, who experiences himself as the controller and the experiencer, is taken to be in a state of bondage and suffering All the people are found to make an effort to reach the final goal of release from this bondage and from this suffering One tries to be oneself, free from entanglements with the root cause If the sentence is within this root cause, the sentient self cannot get isolation from the root cause This effort on the part of

45 It is called the highest goal *Paramapuruṣārtha* that is to get release from the bondages of the world

the *Puruṣa*, it is certain that the *Puruṣa* can have no purpose of its own to be accomplished either by the *Puruṣa* itself or by another. Since the *Puruṣa* is sentience and since it is also *Sākṣin* (an onlooker) the *Puruṣa* must have been viewing the *Prakṛti* always, prior to the start of change and activity in the *Prakṛti* and also after that. In the nineteenth verse, it is definitely stated that the *Puruṣa* is a *Sākṣin* and this term *Sākṣin* is explained in the second half of the verse, that it is isolated from the events in the *Prakṛti*, that it is indifferent that it views the events in the *Prakṛti* and takes no part in such activities. That is what is called a *Sākṣin*, a witness. In this case it is rather difficult to see how the activities in the *Prakṛti* should have as their purpose the process of being viewed by the *Puruṣa* and yet in the closing section of the text, it is specifically said that the *Puruṣa*, at the final stage sees the *Prakṛti* and remains like a spectator, in a state of purity unaffected by the possible activities in the *Prakṛti*.

In the twentieth verse it is said that there is a special kind of contact between the *Prakṛti* and the *Puruṣa* (*Tasmāi Samyogāt*). Even after the final stage, they both remain together in the universe, as is said in the sixty sixth verse. But that contact between the two factors existing in the universe is different from the contact that produces the mutual transfer of the features between the two. I realise that there is actually no mutual transfer, there is only a transfer of the feature of the *Puruṣa* to the *Prakṛti*; nothing is really transferred to the *Puruṣa* from the *Prakṛti*. The semblance of activity is not in the *Puruṣa*, but only in the sentience in the *Prakṛti* transferred from the *Puruṣa*. What was the cause of the production of the special kind of contact between the two factors of the universe at that time and why should not the same kind of contact occur again even after the *Puruṣa* had a view of the *Prakṛti*? The illustration in the twenty first verse shows that there is some difference between two factors remaining together and their contact with each other with some purpose. The illustration is that of two persons, one of them being lame and the other being blind. If the blind man wants to go to some place, that does not

mean that the lame man would consent to sit on his shoulders and show him the way. If the lame man alone wants to go to the place, that does not mean that the blind man would consent to carry him to the destination. I do not want to stretch the simile too far. In the illustration, there is a common purpose for both and the common purpose is to reach a common destination. That destination is the place where they can separate and can manage for themselves, and there should then be no need for any such further collaboration.

On account of the introduction of an element called the *Puruṣa* as distinct from the *Prakṛti*, there are all sorts of contradictions in the doctrines in the system. If *Duḥkha* (suffering) is in the very nature of the *Puruṣa*, then such a *Puruṣa* can never be free from *Duḥkha* absolutely. If the *Puruṣa* is by nature free from any touch of *Duḥkha*, there is no occasion for any *Mokṣa* (final emancipation) for the *Puruṣa*. If the entire evolution on the other hand is traced solely to the *Prakṛti* with its three constituents, then all such difficulties can be avoided. The *Sattva* aspect of the *Prakṛti* has been spoken of as of the nature of an illumination, in the thirteenth verse, and one of the four natures of *Buddhi* with the dominance of *Sattva* has been spoken of as *Jñāna* (knowledge) in the twenty third verse. If the *Sattva* aspect is taken as life in itself and not merely as a part of the dead *Prakṛti*, then such difficulties can be overcome. If *Prakṛti* is a combination of the three constituents of life (*Sattva*), activity (*Rajas*) and matter (*Tamas*), then that would explain all the phenomena in the world of experience. There is no objection to the postulation of a state of equilibrium for them in its infinite state, in its absolute state. The *Rajas* starts activity and consequently, change and movement, in the *Tamas*, there is the life aspect of *Sattva* to determine the direction and the pace and the other factors in the movement. There is no actual beginning for this course of change and movement in the *Prakṛti*. This is a fact recognised in the Sāṅkhya system also. In this course of the change and movement in matter under the guidance of the *Sattva*, there is a progression

the thinking people among the nation, this effort which is being followed by all the people, shows that there is an entity outside of the *Prakṛti*. But it would be found that ultimately, this assumption to explain a feature in the national genius of the people at the time invites more difficulties than what it is supposed to remove. It would have been better if it were plainly said that this is just a superstition which philosophy cannot take cognizance of.

If there is such a *Puruṣa* outside of the sphere of the root cause in the universe that *Puruṣa* must be free and not subject to bondage. The *Puruṣa* cannot be an agent engaged in activities and cannot also be an experiencer. It cannot be an entity with sentience it must be sentience itself. If there is the relation of the sentient and its locus between *Puruṣa* and sentience, then we are recognising another category in the Universe, namely, the sentient *Puruṣa* distinct from the sentience in the *Puruṣa*. Can the relation be separated? If it is not an agent engaged in activities and if it cannot also experience the fruits of those activities who is it that is in bondage and for whom is the effort for release? In the nineteenth verse it is definitely said that the *Puruṣa* is only a *Sākṣin*, a disinterested onlooker, it is always isolated. It is neutral in all the affairs of the world of experience. It can see. It is not at all an agent engaged in activities.

But in the twentieth verse, it is said that since there are two such factors, the *Prakṛti* (root cause) and the *Puruṣa* (the sentience) in the universe, there is a sort of transfer of their respective features to each other, each becoming thereby, partly what the other is. The *Prakṛti* has no sentience in itself and there is a semblance of sentience developed in it. There is no activity in the *Puruṣa* and yet the *Puruṣa* appears to be an agent with activities. The activity is really in the *Prakṛti* in its manifested form in the *Prakṛti* with the three constituents in equilibrium there is no activity at all. Thus in the real nature of the universe there is no activity. What was really generated through the presence together of the two elements in the factor of an activity. It is definitely said that the activity is in the *Gunas*.

meaning, thereby, in their disturbed state when the equilibrium is lost. If there had been activity in the *Prakṛti* itself, the word *Guna* or constituent need not have been mentioned in the context.

Actually there is not even an apparent activity in the *Puruṣa*. The activity is only in the *Prakṛti* with the equilibrium upset and since there is the transfer of sentience from the *Puruṣa* to the *Prakṛti*, there is the association of sentience and of activity in the same locus i.e., in the *Prakṛti*. It is this activity in the *Prakṛti* that is called *Duhkha* or suffering. In this way, it will be found that, strictly interpreted, the Sāṅkhya system makes the *Puruṣa* the source for the suffering in the *Prakṛti*. Without the transfer of the sentience from the *Puruṣa* to the *Prakṛti* there would have been no disturbance in the equilibrium of the three constituents in the *Prakṛti* and there would consequently have been no *Duhkha* in the form of activity. In this verse, the apparent *Caitanya* and the real activity are both in the *Prakṛti* with its equilibrium disturbed. In the case of the sentience it is in the *Linga* (Mark),⁴⁰ from which we infer the *Prakṛti* in its absolute state and the activity too is in the *Gunās* in their disturbed condition when their equilibrium is upset, which disturbance is due to the sentience that is transferred to the *Prakṛti* from the *Puruṣa*.

We cannot miss some semblance in this to the modern theory regarding the relation of dead matter and life. According to the modern theory, life is a far later phenomenon in matter. In the Sāṅkhya also, life activities come later when originally there was only the dead *Prakṛti*. There is the fundamental difference also that in the Sāṅkhya, life as a fundamental was there and that activity in matter started only after life was infused into it. Since the *Puruṣa* was there with its nature of being pure sentience and since the *Puruṣa* continues in that nature without any change after the activities started in the *Prakṛti*, arising out of the transferred life in it on account of the presence of the sentience, namely

The *Sattva* aspect increases in its manifestation. That is what is found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, where there is the prayer, "Lead me from darkness to light." The goal is when the *Sattva* aspect becomes completely manifest without any suppression by the *Tamas* aspect. When the *Rajas* starts its operation in the *Tamas*, the *Sattva* side is dim and the *Tamas* side is more prominent. There is never a time or condition in which there is a complete elimination of any of the three constituents. Thus the world is always dynamic in a state of change and movement. There is the infinite absolute in which there is no change and movement. But the change and the movement starts in it in the finite aspect. There are the two sides in the universe, the changing and moving aspect and the infinite aspect.

The Sāṅkhya system is one way of explaining the Vedic conception of the world being an infinite absolute with a changing and moving side in it. It will take me far out of the track if I enter the field of the relation of the finite to the infinite. One cannot be the other and one cannot also be different from the other. This question is not discussed in the system; this question arises in the Vedānta. That cannot be rationally discussed, that transcends our reasoning faculty.

There is no Vedic authority for the bifurcation of the universe into life and matter, into a dead *Prakṛti* and the sentence or the *Puruṣa*. In the *Nāsadiya Sūkta*⁴⁷, the breath without the air coming out and going into,⁴⁸ is within the infinite, absolute matter itself and not a feature extraneous to it; a feature reflected on it or transferred into it from an external source. *Kāma* and *Tapas*⁴⁹ (will and power) also are in it and they become manifest. In the *Puruṣa Sūkta*⁵⁰ also there is no contrast between matter and life, both came out of the *Puruṣa*.

47 X-129

48 *Ānīd ayātam svadhayā tad ekam* (verse 2)

49 *Kāma* is mentioned in verse 4 and *Tapas* in verse 3

50 X 90

The Vedas do not support the theory of a *Mokṣa* (final emancipation), the *Kaivalya* of the Sāṅkhya system. There is a description of a heaven in the *Rgveda*⁵¹. But there is no ultimate departure for the soul from this world into what is called a *Mokṣa* State. Dirghatamas says that when he realised the truth there arose a double personality in him, one immortal and the other mortal⁵². Sunahśepa was full of the thoughts about sin and suffering and bondage in life⁵³. Yet he never wanted to escape from life as a remedy for the sufferings. He wanted to continue his full span of life like all the *Rṣis* of the Vedas⁵⁴. That shows that he knew that there is a remedy for sufferings within the world and within the life.

A pure spirit and the matter full of sins and sufferings, the entanglement of the spirit in matter and the effort for release from this bondage—these are beliefs that came into Indian thought at a later stage. They cannot be traced to any part of the Vedas. The renunciation of activities in the world as a preliminary for release from the bondages of the world is also a later idea. In the Vedas the authors prayed for help in removing suffering only to continue their activities in life. That is what we find in the poems of Dirghatamas and of Sunahśepa. Philosophically also, a pure spirit and its entanglement in the matter which is full of sin and suffering and the efforts to get release are impossible doctrines. If the spirit is pure it cannot get so entangled, if it has got entangled, it is not pure. If the spirit has activity towards release, it is no spirit activity being only in matter. If the matter functions for the release of the spirit, why should the spirit run away from such a beneficent matter?⁵⁵ How

51 IX 113 6 ff

52 I 164 38. The point is explained in the *Poet philosophers of the Rgveda* by C. Kunban Raja. Ganesh & Co. Madras.

53 Sunahśepa frequently speaks of Enas and Paśa in I 24 and 25.

54 See *māna āyuh pramoṣa* I 24 11.

55 Matter is compared to a Nartakī to the milk from the mother's breast for the growth of the baby to a dutiful woman working for the master under hard conditions and to a lady born of a noble family. See verses 57 ff in the *Kṛitika*.

can we say that contact with such a matter is a bondage and is a seat of sin and a source of suffering ?

When the element of a pure *Puruṣa*, extraneous to *Prakṛti*, was introduced into the system, complications arose. We find the system a mass of contradictions so far as this point is concerned. The point must have been external to the genuine Sāṅkhya.

Puruṣa is introduced as a *Sākṣin*. Then it is said that though indifferent, it has some apparent activity. Later there is the illustration of the collaboration of a lame man and a blind man, and though the lame man does not actually work, he is an associate in the activity and not an indifferent onlooker. After this there is frequent mention of a purpose of the *Puruṣa* subserved by the *Prakṛti* in the latter's activities⁵⁶. If the activity of the *Prakṛti* is to subserve the purpose of the *Puruṣa*, how can such a *Puruṣa* be accepted as a mere *Sākṣin*, an indifferent spectator?⁵⁷ It is also said that the *Puruṣa* has no purpose of its own. The purpose and the activity to subserve the purpose are both in the *Prakṛti*⁵⁸. If the release is for the *Prakṛti*, what is the nature of that release? There is the subtle body which gathers a gross body around it, and that is the individual who is to realise the release from the bondage. What actually happens is that the subtle body dissolves into the *Prakṛti*. That is not what we mean by release. If a man is in prison and if he is sent to the gallows, where he becomes extinct that is not a release for him from the prison. One is not at all sure what the bondage is, for whom there is the bondage, who works for the termination of the bondage and what happens at the time of the release.

If we accept the world only as a seat of sin and suffering

56 See verses in the *Kārikā* 21 31 36, 37 42 44 (where *Apavarga* can be only for the *Puruṣa*), 56 57 58 59 60 61 (it is *Kaivalya* that is implied) 63 65 66 and 68.

57 *siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya* (verse 19 in the *Kārikā*)

58 *Samsarati badhyate mucyate ca prakṛtiḥ* (verse 22 in the *Kārikā*)

and if absolute happiness is only outside the life in the world and if for this reason, an escape from this world, called *Mokṣa*, is recognised as the supreme goal of man (*Paramapurusārtha*), we must consider the moral implications of such a doctrine. Practically, the world becomes a sinking ship. The desire of everyone in such a ship is to find an escape from the danger and each one of them can be kept in his position only by physical force. In such a world each individual tries only to secure his own salvation. No sort of harmonious community life and mutual co-operation is possible in such a situation. If the world is a place of activity meant to secure happiness then the people can live together and co-operate. Happiness is only in a community life. One cannot be happy in solitude. But escape is in the form of deserting others, since everyone wants to find his escape first and before others.

I can very well understand the position taken up in the first two verses of the text. There is suffering. Ordinary man has suffering for which he finds remedies in the ordinary ways of the world. There are people who suffer and who have faith in religious remedies for their sufferings. But a philosopher has his own sufferings and those sufferings cannot be terminated by the two kinds of remedies mentioned above. He has created a suffering of his own and he can find a remedy for the suffering only through a certain specific kind of knowledge. His suffering is not at all among the three fold sufferings mentioned in the first verse. The remedies that he finds out will not eradicate the sufferings of the three kinds mentioned in the first verse.

There are three parties in this situation. Two parties have more or less similar sufferings and they follow different methods. The third party, the philosopher has his own suffering different from the sufferings of the other two parties and he also follows a course different from what is followed by the other two parties. A medicine may cure a man of his ailments. A ritual may give a subjective satisfaction to another to the extent that he believes in the efficacy of that ritual in securing him release from his sufferings.

But they are of no avail to a philosopher. Similarly, a philosopher may have some satisfaction that his inner sufferings through ignorance of certain facts in the universe have been removed. But that does not terminate his physical ailments. The system starts with the postulation of a philosopher's suffering and a philosopher's remedy for that suffering. But the remedy has a defect. It is said that the remedy is the discriminative knowledge of the three factors. Really there are only two factors—the unevolved, and the evolved world. The *Jña* or the knower is not a separate factor.⁵⁹ The introduction of this new factor has brought in all sorts of contradictions in the thoughts of the system. This is a case of religion creating some inconsistency in rational thinking. Knowing the truth is philosophy. Separation of the Spirit from matter is religion. The latter has crept into the former. That is the stage when the text was written.

I am not at all sure whether Śaṅkara is refuting the Sāṅkhya as is presented in the *Saṅkhya Karika* or whether he had another form of the Sāṅkhya of an earlier time. It is true that many facts mentioned in the *Saṅkhya Karika* are found alluded to in the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Thus there is the reference to the lame man and the blind man, there is the reference to the flow of milk from the mother to allow the baby to grow. There is also the reference to the *Puruṣa* being pure and there is the suggestion of a possible sentence in the *Pradhāna* through transfer from an external locus. But I do not find the contents of the twentieth⁶⁰ verse sufficiently brought into operation in refuting the doctrine of

59. It is the *Prakṛti* in a state of modification that is the locus for the suffering and thereby for the release also, and that is through knowledge. So, the locus for the knowledge that secures the release must be also the *Prakṛti* in the state of modification. See *samsarati, badhyate mucyate... prakṛtiḥ* (verse 62). It is said that there is a transferred sentence in the *Prakṛti*. See *acetanam cetanāvad iva lingam* (verse 20 in the *Kārikā*).

60. Here, the sentence of the *Puruṣa* is specifically stated to have been transferred to the insentient *Prakṛti*, *ih tatsamyogād acetanam cetanāvad iva lingam*.

the Sāṅkhya system. There is too much emphasis on the insentient nature of the *Pradhāna* that has evolved into the world. According to the *Kārikā*, it is not the insentient *Pradhāna* that evolves, the evolution is due to the sentience in the *Pradhāna* that has been transferred into it from the *Puruṣa*. According to Śaṅkara, the illustration of milk flowing from the mother to enable the baby to grow, given in the Sāṅkhya, is to show that even insentient objects can function. This is how the *Kārikā* has been interpreted by the classical commentators also. But in the *Kārikā* itself, the context is one of activity in one entity entirely to subserve the purpose of another. The *Kārikā* comes immediately after the statement that there is the activity in *Pradhāna* for the sake of another, but it appears as if it is working for itself⁶¹. The point of grass transforming itself into milk found in Śaṅkara is not found in the *Kārikā*. I have a feeling that the *Kārikā* is a revision of some earlier Sāṅkhya text and that Śaṅkara had this earlier text before him when he criticised the Sāṅkhya interpretation of the *Upaniṣads*. Can the revision be in the light of the criticism of Śaṅkara? There is the difficulty of the relative chronology between the *Kārikā* and Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara is, according to the accepted chronology, about 800 A.D. and the *Kārikā* cannot be later than about 600 A.D. There are evidences to show that Śaṅkara is much earlier than the date accepted for him now. In this revision the *Kārikā* must have absorbed many new concepts also. That is the form in which we have the text now. A pure *Puruṣa* distinct from matter and a *Mokṣa* (final emancipation) may be among such new factors that crept into Sāṅkhya in the light of the Vedānta doctrines.

My chief point is that the Sāṅkhya system has its root in the Vedas and that the system has undergone many changes in the course of its evolution on account of the

61 *svārtha iva parārthā ārambhah* (verse 56 in the *Kārikā*). Here it is said that the *Prakṛti* works for another as if for itself. The illustration of milk flowing from the mother's breast as in the next verse *vatsavivṛddhinimittam* (*Kārikā* 57).

the time of *Mokṣa*⁶⁵ This is not much different from the Buddhistic *Nirvāṇa*, the complete elimination of the individual. The difference is that in the Sāṅkhya, the actual reality is positive in the form of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. In the Buddhistic thought it is *Śūnya*, void. The extinction of the individual at the time of reaching the goal is common to both.

The Sāṅkhya doctrine does not deserve to be called Pessimism. Pessimism is really the belief that there is nothing worse than this world. But that is not what the Sāṅkhya texts teach. It is true that there is the postulation of suffering in the world. This suffering can be got rid of only by *Mokṣa* (final emancipation). That means that there is no real happiness in life in the world. But we must look at the problem with the illustrations given in the system, and such illustrations go back to a stage far anterior to the *Kārikā*. The matter and the spirit are in the relation of collaborators for a common end like a lame man and a blind man⁶⁶. The activity of the *Prakṛti* is compared to the activity of milk flowing from the mother to enable the baby to grow⁶⁷. *Prakṛti* is also compared to a lady dancing on the stage,⁶⁸ and certainly the dancing cannot be to bring about suffering to the spectator. *Prakṛti* is also compared to a very dutiful woman serving a master under hard conditions⁶⁹ and there is a pun on the words which indicates that the *Prakṛti* is good while the master served, i.e., the Spirit, is not good. Thus there is no aversion at all shown towards the world and life in it. This attitude towards life is a heritage from the Vedas.⁷⁰

65 See verses 64-66 in the *Kārikā*.

66 *pāṅvandhavād ubhayaṃ apī samasargah* (verse 21 in the *Kārikā*).

67 *vatsavyūddhānūmittam bhrāsya yathā pravṛttih* (verse 77).

68 See verse 59 in the *Kārikā*.

69 Verse 60. This is only by implication and is not expressly stated. There is the pun on the word *guṇa* meaning both the constituents of Matter and good qualities.

70 In the Vedas the world is a good world and man can be happy in this life in this world. All the ṛsis of the Vedas found happiness in this world and no one wanted an escape. See *The Vedas* by C. Kunhan Raja, Andhra University.

Another such heritage is the atheism of Sankhya. In the Sankhya system there is no place for a God. The evolution is from within the world itself. The world in some positive form or another was always there and will always be there. There is nothing that can be thought of as a Creation, the bringing into being of what never existed before. Thus there is no scope for a Creator and for a giver of the Law. The work of regulating and maintaining the Law was also arranged within the world scheme and never depended on the existence of a God. This sort of Atheism is found throughout Indian thought. What is called Theism in Indian thought is only an idealisation of the World Unity into a God.

Attempts have been made in the past to equate the Sankhya with the Vedānta⁷¹ and even now there are scholars who say that the Sankhya is a step towards the Vedānta⁷² that there is no essential difference in fundamentals between the two. There are scholars who see Gladstonian Democracy at work found in ancient India as studied from the *Artha Śāstra* and other texts and there are also scholars who see Darwinian Evolution in Sankhya and in the theory of the ten Incarnations of Viṣṇu. They all belong to the same category of thought pattern.

Really the Sāṅkhya is the direct development of one out of the three currents of thoughts found in the Vedas regarding the mutual relation of the absolute and the phenomenal. In the Sāṅkhya, the absolute is matter with life as an integral factor in it, as is found in the *Nasadiya Sukta*⁷³. The Vedānta is the development of the current of thought in which the absolute is essentially life with the potentiality of matter evolving out of it. That is what is found in the *Puruṣa Sukta*⁷⁴. In the Nyāya, matter absolute and life are distinct

71 This is what Viśāṅkabhikṣu tries to establish in his *Sāṅkhyavivaraṇa Bhāṣya*. The Chinese translation too seems to show some Vedānta leaning.

72 RV X 129

73 RV X 90.

There ■ ■ Supreme life and an infinity of ordinary lives. The Supreme life works on the matter to produce the phenomenal world. This is what is found in the *Hiranyagarbha* and in the *Viśvakarmā Suktas*⁷¹. All the three go back on the *Rgveda*.

The difference is based on the difference in the view regarding the nature of the absolute matter. The absolute matter is a collection of material particles according to one view. If matter ever remains as a collection of the particles, such particles must be united together to form the whole in the world of experience. The particles of matter cannot by themselves join together for the formation of such wholes. There can be no life in the absolute matter if it is a collection of particles. If matter in its absolute state is a collection of particles and if such collection of particles has life also, the result would be that what is called life can be reduced to particles. Or we have to say that each such particle has also a life in it. Then the combination of the particles will be the result of a joint work of different life principles existing in the different particles. If there is such a collaboration possible, then there can be no individuality in the final combination. If life in the particle A and the life in the particle B work in such a way that there results the combination of A+B as a unitary individual, then where is the difference between the two elements called the life in the two particles? It is more reasonable to assume that the life behind A and the life behind B in that formation is the same. There is nothing to distinguish the two. For this reason, along with the recognition of the absolute matter as consisting of particles, there is also assumed a single power, called life, in the whole world which brings about such a combination of the particles to form the wholes in the world of experience.

It is not merely a matter of putting two or more particles together in spatial contact. Any two parts in spatial contact will not form a whole. What is called a whole is a

collection of parts in a special kind of contact with one another. Thus electrons come together to form atoms and atoms come together to form molecules. The parts in the atoms and in the molecules are not merely in the relation of proximity in space. There is something that keeps them together without causing a break up of the spatial continuity among the parts. If particle A is operated by one life and if particle B is operated by another life, then how could they come together to form such a whole? Either the life in A and the life in B are not different, or the particles A and B can not be held together by them to form a whole. It is for this reason that a world power is recognised as existing behind the formation of the world. This point is explained by Udayana in his *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* in the fifth Book under the headings of *Āyojana* and *Dhriti* (combination and holding together), which is the second and the third of the grounds that he brings forward to establish a god⁷⁵. Then corresponding to the differences in experience, we have also to postulate a large number of individual lives in the world. If the world of experience is to be reduced to particles, then a postulation of such a supreme God and of the individual souls becomes a necessity.

But if the world is a fluid without any break up into particles, one such force is able to effect the changes and the movement in the whole of the evolving matter. Life is necessary for the evolution. Otherwise matter will remain motionless in the absolute stage, there will be no evolution of the world of experience. Therefore, life within the evolving matter is accepted. There are two possibilities in this case. Either matter contains life or matter arises out of life. The latter means that the duality of matter and life has to be reduced to a unity. To say that there was only matter and that life arose out of it defeats the very purpose of the acceptance of a life element as a fundamental. If there had

75 The verse is

*Āryaśāstranadhīstādeh padāt pratyayaśāśtrīteḥ
vākyāt sāmānyārūpeṇ ca sādhyo vidhauḥ avyayaḥ* ॥

been only matter and if life arose out of it, there must have been some activity in dead matter. This is a contradiction in terms. It is the source of the change that we call life and to say that life is the effect of such a change is against reason. But the other alternative is a philosophical possibility. If there had been only life, then that life can function from within and give rise to matter in it. Either we must accept the matter-life dualism as a state of the fundamental absolute or accept matter as an evolute from life, reducing both to the unity of life.

If matter is an evolute of life and if there has been only a unitary life as the fundamental absolute, then that absolute life evolves into two factors, namely, life and matter. In the absolute stage, there can be no activity, there is an activity only if there is matter. The operation in life as a fundamental cannot be of the form of change and movement. Change and movement presuppose matter. What is it that evolves out of the life fundamental? Is it a dualism of matter and life or a unitary matter with life in it as an integral part? If matter and life evolved from the life fundamental, it is more reasonable to postulate that they evolved as two separate facts in the world. In that case, there arises the need for a universal life evolved from the life fundamental along with matter and also along with the lives. The need has been explained in the previous section just above. Thus we get at the position of a life fundamental, a universal life, many individual lives, and matter evolved from it. This is what we find in the Advaita Vedānta. Matter as fundamental with life in it or life in matter as fundamental is the other possible alternative. We call something as an absolute, as a fundamental in the universe, because there is unity. What is a dualism cannot be a fundamental. We accept the fundamental as the ultimate basis for the diversities in the world of experience. If we stop at a dualism, there was no need to go beyond the world of diversities to reach a fundamental, an absolute. This is the position taken up in the Advaita Vedānta.

In the Nyāya where there are three realities as fundamentals, namely, the Supreme God, the soul and the matter,

there is the explanation that the unity required for explaining our start on the journey towards the fundamental diversities is secured through the supremacy of the God over the other two elements. This is also the position in the other two systems of Vedānta where there is no absolute unity in the ultimate fundamental. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Supreme has parts in the form of the diversified facts of the world, namely, the souls and the objects. They are the *amsas* while the Supreme is the *amśin* (parts and what has the parts). In the Dvaita, the difference between the Supreme and the facts of the world, namely, the souls and the objects, is a cardinal point. Yet there is the unity on account of the Supreme, the others being subordinate to it.

In the Sankhya, there is a unity. The three constituents are not different factors, they all form into a unit, indivisible into parts. That absolute is capable of evolving into three constituents. But in the absolute stage, the three constituents are not recognised as separate constituents, there is only a uniform. There are two currents in modern science. There is the materialistic monism of Darwin's evolution. The absolute was the uniform matter which evolved into the diversified world. But there was no life in it. Life appeared much later in the course of evolution. There is also the theory of the uniform gravitational field or Electro-magnetic field, in the absolute stage which evolved into the diversified world of relativity. In this thought current, the problem of life does not find a place. We can call Darwinism the *Tamas* absolute, and Relativity the *Rajas* absolute. The Advaita Vedānta has the *Sattva* absolute.

If in the Advaita Vedānta, the absolute can evolve into matter and the various selves with a Supreme Self also as agent, that shows that matter is a potentiality in the absolute. Activity also is a potential factor in that absolute. Otherwise there cannot be the evolution of the selves and the Supreme God and the matter, where the activity abides. It may be said that it is all *Māyā*, *Mithyā*, which cannot be described either as "is" or as "is not". Yet it cannot be said that it does not exist absolutely. And to that extent, there is some

relation between matter and activity on one side and the absolute on the other, as evolute and source. In Darwinism, life came later, and what never existed can never come into existence. To this extent, life must have been a potential content of the primal uniform of dead matter. In the Theory of Relativity, matter is involved in it since the original Relativity has been brought into relation with the Quantum Theory and the Unified Field Theory has been evolved. In this way somehow or other, the three constituents of the Sankhya are implied even in the absolute, whether it is the absolute of the Advaita Vedānta or of Darwinism or of Relativity. What is implied in them is explicit in the Sankhya. The *Purusas*, the bondage, the *Mokṣa* (final emancipation) and the other factors in the classical Sāṅkhya must be later accretions.

I have preference for the theory of the *Linga Śarīra* or subtle body as an enduring factor which continues life, in relation to the cell theory where the cells are destroyed and life is continued from cell to cell. I also feel that it is more reasonable that evolution takes place in the body in activity, when a subtle body takes up a gross body until that gross body drops out, than that the evolution is between one cell and the subsequent cell. Evolution is associated with the increase in knowledge, in the dominance of the *Sattva* constituent over the matter or *Tamas* constituent. Thus there must be the possibility of an absolute knowledge in the gross body as the goal of evolution. That is what is meant by the eradication of suffering through the discriminative knowledge of the unevolved and the evolved world. The knower is only a part of the evolved world. He is the subject in relation to the other objects and he is also the object in relation to other agents in knowing. There is never an extinction of an individual. The gross body may drop out and a new gross body may gather round the subtle body even at the time of attaining this perfect knowledge. There may be a termination of the Personality, but the individuality can still continue. The body need not be the result of the normal activity of the absolute matter, beyond the

control of the individual. It is what the individual assumes for himself through his knowledge of the exact relation between matter and the spirit. Such a body will not be a limitation and also not a cause for suffering. The individual can continue in that body with perfect knowledge and free from all suffering. Then we get the sufferer who has ceased to be subject to suffering absolutely and eternally. Some such thing must have been the genuine Sāṅkhya into which some new factors crept in course of time and we have the classical Sāṅkhya in the *Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. These new factors have only created troubles and contradictions, no problem has been solved thereby. Philosophy absorbed a little of religion from the passage to the classical stage.

This is the standpoint that I have taken up when I interpret the *Kārikā*. The theories have changed from time to time according to the changes in the beliefs current. There were certain doctrines which dominated the thoughts of the philosophers in the Vedic time. This was not a uniform current, there were different currents of thought at that time. Then there came about a change with the advent of the latter-day currents of thoughts in Buddhist philosophy and there was also a change in the Vedic current of thought, with proper adjustments. It is the thought current in this period that we find in the *Kārikā*. Now we live in a new period. We have to take stock of the four periods through which the thought currents have flowed and we have to prepare a new channel. We are concerned only with the nature of the objective world. We are not interested in the sins and in the sufferings of the world and we seek no escape from the sufferings in life. We try to understand the world. We can develop an intellectual suffering and find a remedy for this suffering through a solution of the problems which created the suffering. That suffering is in life and the way out is also confined to the limits of life. It is with such a philosopher's attitude that I interpret the *Kārikā*.

The Sāṅkhya Kārikā

1. *duḥkha trayā 'bhūghātaḥ*
jijñāsa tad-abhīghātaḥ hētau
dr̥ṣṭe sā 'pārthā cen
naikāntā-'tyantato 'bhāvat
2. *dr̥ṣṭavad ānuśravikah*
sa hy avīśuddhiḥ ksayaḥ 'tisaya-yuktah
tad-vīparītaḥ śreyān vyaktā-'vyakta-jñā-vijñānāt

1 When one is oppressed by the three fold sufferings, there arises a desire to know the means for suppressing them. If it be said that when there is the seen means, it is without a purpose, it is not so, since it does not exist either in an invariable way or in an absolute way.

2 What relates to the scripture ■ like the seen means, that, indeed, is associated with lack of purity, decay and gradations. Something different from them is superior, whereby, there results the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower.

There is suffering in life and man is oppressed by this suffering. It is the subjection to suffering that stirs up man to think of a way out of the suffering. The sufferings as experienced in life are of three kinds. Some are generated from within oneself and they are called *Adhyātmika* (arising from *Ātman* or self). Others arise out of the elementals like the fire and the water and they are called *Ādibhautika* (arising out of the *bhūtas* or the elementals). Still others arise out of the will of Providence and are called *Ādidaivika* (arising out of *Daiva* or Providence).

There is suffering, but there are also means for escape from the suffering through various known ways. There is the medical science, there are precautions against fire and water and even in the case of what are brought about by Providence, there are the means prescribed by way of worship of the deities. There is nothing to think about in regard to

such sufferings, how man may find an escape from the sufferings

On this *prima facie* issue, the position taken up in the system is that though there are the means available, which are being practised in man's life, such means do not always bring about the desired effect and even when there are the desired effects, such effects are only of a temporary nature and not permanent

It may be that the means usually employed in the practical affairs of life may fail sometimes and do not bring about any unfailing and lasting effect, but there are the means prescribed in scriptures like the performance of certain Sacrifices which bring about such effects. What is prescribed in scripture cannot fail and when there is the attainment of Heaven, there is the final disappearance of suffering

Here also there is not the absolute and invariable disappearance of suffering through such means. Certain aspects of suffering continue to remain as intimately associated with the Sacrifices prescribed in the scripture. There are impure actions like killing of animals. The effects of such rituals that are prescribed in the scriptures are not at all permanent, they too are of a temporary nature and it is said that when the effects terminate, the man returns to this life on earth, and suffering starts once more. There are also different gradations of happiness prescribed as the fruits of the Sacrifices in the scripture. Impurity, fear of decay and other effects that excel the effects of the ritual performed bring about some suffering, by their very nature

Therefore a means whereby one can attain to a discriminative knowledge of the three factors in the universe, namely, the manifest world, the unmanifest source of that world and the knower can alone be taken as what would suppress suffering in life. This means is of the nature of a rational approach to the problem, an investigation into the real nature of the universe comprising of the three factors

Therefore in spite of the practical means, in spite of sacrifice, there is scope for an enquiry into the truth of the

universe, and that is what is proposed to be undertaken in this system

The classical commentaries give an impression that the investigation proposed to be undertaken according to the system keeps some "purpose" in view and is on a par with the normal means adopted in the world for the removal of the sufferings in life. Certainly, a philosophical system cannot prescribe any such remedy against individual cases or types of suffering in man's life. It is the individual cases of suffering in man's life that are classified under the three headings and it is the individual sufferings for which remedies are found in the form of practical steps dealt with in the medical science and in the form of the ritual prescribed in the scripture. *But when one suffering is removed, another suffering arrives*

The investigation undertaken in the system takes note of suffering in its generic aspect in life and does not keep the individual suffering in view. What is suffering? Why is there suffering? It is this that the system takes note of and on account of the presence of suffering in life, the philosopher himself experiences a suffering, which is not included within the scope of the three fold suffering. It is a philosopher's suffering that is proposed to be removed through the investigation. The system is not a means of removing suffering parallel to the practical steps in the sciences and the steps prescribed in scripture. It is not proposed that diseases and poverty and other aspects of suffering are cured through the means advocated in this system. The system is a system of philosophy and not a treatise to be made use of by any social service organisation.

It is suffering that has enabled man to develop various sciences and various religious practices. It is suffering that enables man to develop philosophy. But the method and the goal are different in the two sets—science and religion on one side and philosophy on the other. When through a rational investigation, the truth is known, there is a happiness in a philosopher. That happiness in a philosopher is quite different from the happiness which an ordinary man

experiences by the application of practical means and through scriptural means as remedies for the various cases of suffering in life. If there is a "purpose" in philosophy, that is different from the purpose kept in view in sciences and in religion.

No investigation can start unless there is some doubt in man's mind and unless the removal of such a doubt creates some difference in the condition around man in his life. A philosopher's uneasiness in mind on account of the doubt and a philosopher's happiness when the doubt is removed, shall not be confused with the uneasiness and happiness in the ordinary affairs of life. The purpose in philosophy is only the removal of a doubt, and the state of mind when a doubt is removed is a state of happiness. It is this happiness which is the "purpose" in philosophy.

It is such a doubt that must have created a suffering in Buddha, and when that doubt was removed through his "Illumination" it is a similar happiness that he must have experienced. He must have had the same doubts. Why is there suffering and what is the real nature of suffering? His doubts were removed when he had the realisation of the four-fold truth.

dukkham dukkha samuppādam dukkhasa ca

atikkāman

ariyam cā'tthā'ngakam maggam dukkhū'pasama

gāminar

Suffering, origination of suffering, overcoming the suffering and the eight fold noble Path that leads to the cessation of suffering.

(Dhammapada, 14 11, 191)

The thoughts of Buddha were stirred and moved along such lines, when he saw suffering in man's life like diseases, old age and death, and when he also saw the happiness in hermits by withdrawing from the normal affairs of life. Buddha did not follow up the path to find remedies to supplement the available ones against the individual sufferings. To say that the greatest achievements of Buddha are in prohibiting sacrifices where there is injury to life and in eradicating

caste differences, is to degrade him to the level of the founder of a social service league. His attempt was to find out a means of ending "suffering" through the realisation of the nature of suffering and the source of suffering.

There is suffering. But that suffering has an origination. What has an origination, what is not in the eternal nature of the universe, can be overcome and removed. And there is a way, within the nature of the world itself, for the removal of the suffering, there is the eight fold path consisting of *Sammā Ditthi* (right view), *Sammā Sankappo* (right aspiration), *Sammā Vācā* (right speech), *Sammā Kammanta* (right action), *Sammā Jivanto* (right living), *Sammā Vayāmo* (right exertion), *Sammā Sati* (right learning) and *Sammā Samādhi* (right meditation). Not one of them has a relation to the removal of any particular item of suffering in man's life, for which science and religion prescribe remedies. This is not different from what is given in the verse that the real means of overcoming "suffering" is the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower.

Vacaspati Misra makes the position of the Sāṅkhya system clear when he says "The subject matter of this treatise will not be an object of any one's desire to know if (i) there is nothing called suffering in the world, (ii) it is not what has to be avoided, and (iii) even when it has to be avoided, it is impossible to completely cut it off. There are two contingencies under which it becomes impossible to completely cut it off, either the suffering is eternal or the method of cutting it off is not known. Even if it is possible to cut it off, the knowledge which is dealt with in the treatise may not be a way of effecting it or there may be another way which is easier to accomplish, for these two reasons also there may not arise any such desire."

(Commentary on the first verse)

The opening passages establish that philosophy and philosophers have a place along the side of sciences and religion and of those who move in the fields of practical arts and of religion, and there is also a hint that the philosopher's

position is higher than what has to be assigned to the others

I have nowhere seen the point considered that the suffering and the cessation of suffering contemplated in philosophy relate only to the sufferings of a philosopher and not the sufferings of the common people in the world. It is the sciences and the arts and the religions that seek a remedy for the ordinary sufferings of humanity.

There is another point to be considered. Who is the one who suffers and for whose sufferings is the discriminative knowledge among the three factors promised as a remedy? It cannot be either the unmanifest matter or the self. When the evolved matter is reduced to the unmanifest matter, there is the cessation of the suffering. That unmanifest matter, when thus reduced to that condition, does not again start diversification and become manifest. The Self does not suffer at all (see verse 62). It is the modifications of matter in its manifest state, that suffers (see verse 62). At the time of the discriminative knowledge, there is no evolved matter that is manifest (see verse 65). Not merely the physical body, the subtle body too dissolves. That is, this is not a case of the cessation of suffering, but an extinction of the sufferer. There is no sufferer who will continue and enjoy the stage of the cessation of his suffering. Only the Self and the unmanifest matter remain and neither suffered. The manifest matter that suffered ceases to continue. Unless the sufferer continues with the suffering terminated, one wonders how anyone can take to the philosophy.

3 *mūla prakṛtiḥ avikṛtī mahad ādyāḥ prakṛtiḥ vikṛtayaḥ
sapta
sodasakas tu vikāro na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*

The root cause is not a modification. The seven starting with intellect are both causes and modifications. The group of sixteen, on the other hand, are modifications. The Self is neither a cause nor a modification.

We see the world as a series of movements and changes. When there is a change, there must be something in which the change takes place, and through this change there must be something that comes into existence. That in which the change takes place is the cause out of which, through the change, the new thing comes into being as a modification. Thus clay is the cause from which as a result of the change, there is the transformation called a jar. Or take an ornament. It is a transformation of the cause called gold, gold is the transformation of its own cause called the ore.

In this series of causes and transformations we reach a stage when the cause is not the transformation of any thing else as its own cause. This cause, which is not the transformation of another cause, is called the root cause of this world. In this system it is called the *Mūla Prakṛti*.

From this root cause there is transformation called the intellect, this transformation in its turn becomes the cause for another transformation called the "I" (*ahankāra*) nature. From this "I" nature, which is a transformation, there arises another transformation as a group of the five that are called the *tanmātrās*, the things in themselves. From these *tanmātrās*, the five elements are produced. From the "I" nature, the eleven organs (five sense-organs and five organs of action and mind) are also produced. In this way the seven, namely, the intellect and the "I" nature and the five *tanmātrās*, are causes from which other things are produced as transformations and at the same time, each of them is a transformation of another cause. So they are sometimes causes and sometimes effects.

The five elements produced from the five *tanmātrās* and the eleven organs produced from the "I" nature do not transform themselves into further effects and they are transformations of their own causes.

Then there is the Self, the sentence, which is not the transformation of a cause nor a cause out of which another thing comes into being as a transformation.

On the whole there are thus twenty five categories constituting the universe. All of them will be taken up for detailed treatment in the course of the work.

It was enunciated that the philosophy of the form of an investigation into the nature of the universe is superior to practical sciences and arts and to religion. This philosophy results in a discriminative knowledge of three things, the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower. Therefore, there are these three categories to be treated of in this philosophy.

The unmanifest, among them, is the root cause out of which the manifest world comes into being. That cause itself has not come out of any cause, it is the root. In the case of the manifest, there are two further sub-divisions. In the earliest stage of transformation, the transformations themselves become the cause for further transformations. There are seven such. Then at the final stage, there are transformations that do not form the cause for further transformations. They are sixteen. There is also the knower, the Self that is not a transformation of any cause nor does it form the cause for the production of any other transformation.

It comes to this. The universe is made up of two constituent factors. They are the sentience and dead matter. Sentience does not evolve into any other form nor is it an evolute from another cause. The dead matter exists in two forms. One is the root cause which is not manifest and which is not evolved from another cause, but from this root cause, there arises the manifest matter. When there is transformation into a particular evolute, that becomes a cause for the further transformation into other evolutes. Then a stage comes when the transformed aspect does not get itself further transformed. Sentience or Life is absolute and not an accidental product during the transformation of matter.

The need for a philosophy, distinct from practical knowledge and from religion, and also the subject matter of that philosophy have been given. The three fold subject matter, further subdivided into twenty five categories, will now be taken up for detailed treatment.

The term *mahat*, meaning "great" is used to signify the first evolute from the root cause, what is generally known as the Intellect. It will be found that the root cause is expressed also by the term *Pradhāna* in subsequent verses, what really means "The Primary"

- 4 *dr̥ṣṭam anumānam āptavacanāñ ca
sarva pramāna siddhatvāt |
tri vidham pramānam iṣṭam
prameya siddhēh pramānād dhi ||*
- 5 *prati viśaya-'dhyavasāye
dr̥ṣṭam tri vidham anumānam ākhyātam |
tat līnga līngi-pārvakam
āptasrutīr āpta vacanan tu ||*

' Perception, inference and the statement of a reliable person—modes of knowing are recognised as of three kinds in so far as all the modes of knowing are established thereby. The establishment of the objects of knowing is, indeed, through the modes of knowing" (4)

"Perception is a determinative knowledge in respect of every individual object. Inference is spoken of as of three kinds, it is what has the mark and what is marked as its antecedent. But the word that is reliable is that of the reliable person and of the scripture," (5)

It was stated that the system of Sāṅkhya takes up for a detailed treatment the three primary categories further sub divided into twenty five categories. One would have expected that each one of them would be taken up at this stage. But actually a new subject is taken up. This requires an explanation. So, the new subject is introduced and the explanation for this departure from what was legitimate in the context is also given. Instead of taking up the categories, the modes of knowing are given and the explanation for this is that one cannot deal with the categories without first of all establishing the mode of knowing the categories. Therefore, before the categories are taken up for treatment, the modes of knowing are taken up at this stage.

There are different views regarding the modes of knowing in the different systems of philosophy. One has to make it clear whether the system follows any of the other systems in this respect in which the subject matter has been dealt with or whether it takes up an independent position of its own. If the position taken up is an independent one, then the relation of the system to the other systems where there is another position taken up, has also to be explained; otherwise one may reject the position of the system in so far as it goes counter to the positions adopted in other recognised systems.

There are three recognised modes of knowing. One is perception, another is inference and a third is the statement of a reliable person. This is the position taken up in the Sāṅkhya system. There are the Cārvākas who accept only perception, as the mode of knowing. There are others, the Buddhists, who accept inference also, besides perception. The Vaiśeṣika system accepts the statement of a reliable person as a mode of knowing a thing, but they do not accept it as distinct from inference. There is a universal relation between a word and its meaning. When a man utters a word another infers, in the mind of the speaker, the presence of the corresponding meaning. So, it is not a distinct mode.

A group of Naiyāyikas accept the three modes; but there are Naiyāyikas who accept analogy as a distinct mode of knowing. But in the Sāṅkhya and in the above mentioned school of the Nyāya system, analogy is included in inference. When a man knows that a wild animal called the *gavaya* resembles a cow and when he finds in the woods an animal resembling a cow, he gets the knowledge that that animal is what is called a *gavaya*. This is the mode known as Analogy. Thus, this is primarily a mode of knowing the meaning of a word. This is accepted as a distinct mode in the Mīmāṃsā and in the Vedānta systems. There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyika conception of this mode and the Mīmāṃsā conception. While in the Nyāya, it is the meaning of the word *gavaya* that is known through this mode, in the Mīmāṃsā, when a man knows that there is the resemblance of a cow in a *gavaya* and when he sees the *gavaya* in the forest, he knows

the resemblance of the *garzya* in the cow that he had already seen in the village. The difference is very subtle. The matter is of importance only when the Nyaya or the Mimāṃsā system is critically studied and may be ignored in the Sāṅkhya system, where it is not a distinct mode, but is included in inference.

There is another mode of knowing. We cannot know a universal except in a particular. We know the universal relation of smoke and fire only in individual instances of smoke found in the kitchen or in a street corner. In an inference, when we see an instance like a mountain where there is smoke, we infer that there is also fire. It is a case of knowing one co-ordinate in a universal relation like the fire, when the other co-ordinate, the smoke, is seen. This is the definition given by Śabarasvāmī in the *Mimāṃsā Bhāṣya*.

Now, we cannot know a thing as existing, except as existing in a particular place and at a particular time. When a man's existence is known with reference to a particular place and when there is the knowledge that the man is not there, then the knowledge that he exists must have another locus in relation to which alone his existence can be known. So another locus comes into the mind and this mode of knowledge is what is called *arthāpatti*. The Mimāṃsā system accepts this as a particular mode of knowing. But in the Nyaya and in the Sāṅkhya, it is included in inference.

When a man does not see a jar on the floor, he gets the knowledge of the absence of a jar on the floor. If the jar had been there he would have seen it, there is light and there is no factor that could prevent the knowledge of the jar. This mode of knowing the absence is accepted as a distinct mode in the Mimāṃsā. But in the Nyāya it is only a case of knowing the absence through the same mode through which the presence of the thing can be known. Thus, since the jar would have been known through perception, its absence too is known through perception. The Vedānta follows the Mimāṃsā system. In the Sāṅkhya too, it is not accepted as a distinct mode.

All the modes of knowledge are recognised in the various systems, except in the Cārvāka and Buddhistic systems. The difference is only in the matter of the classification and definition of the various modes. The Cārvākas and the Buddhists do not recognise some of the modes at all. The Cārvākas recognise only perception and the Buddhists accept inference too.

A statement is accepted as a mode of knowing a fact in all the systems of thought, except in the Cārvāka and in the Buddhistic systems. In the Vaiśeṣika system, it is a mode of inference and not a distinct mode. As a matter of fact, there is an element of inference even in the mode of knowing as recognised by the Cārvākas. The Buddhists also recognise the statement of Buddha, like "one shall worship a sacred spot," as a means of knowing.

There are two reasons why the statement of another person has to be accepted as a distinct mode of knowing. There are factors in the universe which cannot be known through perception and inference. If there is no other mode of knowing, all such facts would turn out to be what cannot be known. That is a confession of human limitations. If I cannot know a thing as true from what another person says, how can I trust myself? So, another person's experience is as much a mode of knowing as the experience of myself. Both inference and the statement of another person must be accepted as modes of knowing things.

Those who deny a mode of knowing called inference, have to admit that mode for such a denial. After all, he has to discuss and there can be a discussion only if there is an impression that another person has a doubt or a wrong knowledge or a lack of knowledge. This impression is not produced by perception, since the mental states of one are not within the scope of another. That is what Vācaspati Miśra says. "If a Lokāyatika (Cārvāka) says that inference is not a mode of knowing, how can he know that another person has not understood a thing or has misunderstood a thing or has a doubt about a thing? And the lack of knowledge, misunderstanding and doubt existing in another person cannot be

known through perception by a person with only the normal powers of vision. And the knowledge of such a thing is not through another mode. One encountering another person without realising that the other has a lack of knowledge or a misunderstanding or a doubt, has to be ignored by those who have an intelligence and commonsense since the words of such persons do not deserve any consideration."

There is an element of inference implied in perception and inference itself implies some transcendental mode. I cannot distinguish between an ordinary wire and a "live wire" except by noting the difference in the behaviour of the two wires. From the peculiar behaviour, we infer that one of them is electrified. The electrified nature of the wire is only an object of our inference. Now, an inference gives only a generic knowledge, and the particulars about it can be known only by other modes. Thus when we note smoke on the mountain, we infer fire; we do not know the details or the particulars of the fire. In the case of the "live wire," either we have to say that there is no method of knowing the particulars of the electricity or we have to admit that there is some mode of knowing the particulars of the electricity which transcend our perception and our inference. It may be that man does not now possess that faculty; but the fact that something is inferred in a generic way itself warrants that there are particulars and that there must be some mode of knowing those particulars. It may be some new faculty that can be developed in man. And when some men develop such a faculty, then the only way in which another person can know those particulars is through the statement of that person about the particulars.

Now, perception is a determination in respect of every individual object. When we see a jar, there is no other factor coming in as a factor in this perception. It is simply a relation between a sense-organ and an object. There is a determination when the generic and the particulars are known, and this determination is effected within the perception itself without the aid of another object and its knowledge. This is what differentiates perception from the other two modes of

knowing In inference there must be the knowledge of the mark and what is marked as a pre-condition In the third, there must be the *apta* or reliable person and a scripture

The next mode of knowing is the inference This is spoken of as of three kinds This division must be what is found in the *Nyāya-sūtras* The three varieties are what are called *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, i.e. what has a prior, what has a posterior and what is generally seen When there is the cause as the prior and when from this prior the effect is inferred, that is the first variety When the clouds are found to gather in the sky, one infers from this, as the cause, that there would be rain, this is the first variety The second variety is when from the effect, which is posterior to the cause, the cause is inferred When one finds the river swollen with greater speed for the current, one infers that there was a rain The third variety is like the inference of the movement of the sun when there is found a change in the position of the sun It is with a movement that there is usually seen a change in the position of objects The *Sūtra* contains the element 'the inference is of three kinds' in the same words as are found in the *Kārikā* (*trivīdham anumānam*) The commentary on it by Vātsyāyana gives the expression "what is preceded by the mark and what is marked" (*linga lingi-pūrvakam*) The examples given above are taken from that commentary

The commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* gives another meaning also for the three terms What has a prior is given in this explanation, as what was seen before, in which when one is seen the other that is not seen is inferred When both fire and smoke have been seen together before, and when smoke alone is seen later, one infers fire, this is the example What has a posterior is what is left behind When the definition of sound is found to be applicable to a substance or a quality or an action, and when it is found that sound cannot be applicable to a substance or an action, it is inferred that sound is a quality This is the second variety What is seen in general is a variety in which the relation between the mark and what is marked is not known by perception, but when

the mark is known somehow in a general way, then the other is inferred. Thus neither desire nor the self is an object of perception. But when somehow we know that there is a quality called desire, then the self is inferred as the locus for the quality since a quality must have such a locus.

The classical commentaries introduce other explanations for the three-fold division of the inference, and also for the passage, "What has the mark and what is marked as prior." Now, perception has been explained as what is determined with regard to each object by itself. This is not the same with inference. In inference, there is something more than the object itself in the process of determination. The presence of fire on the mountain is determined not by itself, but by the knowledge of the co-existence of smoke and fire elsewhere and also by the knowledge of smoke on the mountain. It is really to show this difference between perception and inference that the passage is introduced in the description of inference among the three modes.

Gaudapada takes this passage as stating a division of inference into two: one is where from the mark we infer what is marked and the other is when from what is marked we infer the mark. A particular kind of staff is a mark of a mendicant. When we find a staff in the hands of a mendicant we infer that that is the staff which mendicants usually carry. Also, when a particular kind of staff is carried by a man, we infer that the man is a mendicant.

While Gaudapāda accepts the three-fold division as given by Vatsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāya sūtras*, Vacaspati has another division. First he divides inference into *vita* and *avita*. In the former, we infer through positive co-existence and in the second we infer through the co-existence of negations. The first variety is divided again into "what has a prior and what is generally seen." The second is what is called "what has a posterior." What has a prior is that in which the objects are perceived already. The example is that of the inference of fire from smoke, where the smoke and the fire and their relation had already been perceived.

When, in the inference, the objects have not been already perceived, that is where there is only what has been generally seen. When no specific instance has been perceived it is a case of what is generally seen. Thus when we see colour, we know that there has been some function and that for a function there must be an instrument. So in the process of the function that resulted in the knowledge of the colour, we infer an instrument in the form of the sense-organ called the eye. In every process like the cutting of a tree, there is an instrument. Knowing the colour is a process of that kind and so there must be an instrument in that process also. What has a posterior is what Vācaspati Miśra calls by the alternative name of *avīta*, and it is that inference in which there is only the co-existence of negations, where a positive co-existence is not found outside the field of the inference in question.

Vācaspati Miśra gives the example in the ninth verse in connection with the proof for the identity of the cause and the effect. The example given by him is as follows. The cloth, which is an effect, cannot be different from its cause, the yarns, because the cloth subsists in the yarns. If an object is different from another, it cannot subsist in the other, as in the case of a cow and a horse. We have as examples only the cases of objects where there is no such subsistence and no such identity. If there is such subsistence and such identity, that is a case coming within the scope of the inference at hand and is not an example.

On the whole, the three-fold division of inference is accepted by all. But there is considerable difference among them regarding their nature and their examples. The following sets will make the point clear as among the commentators.

(a) Vātsyāyana

pūrvavat (having the prior known)—clouds and rain

śeṣavat (having the posterior known)—flood and rain

sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (generally seen)—change of position and movement

I am not taking note of his alternative explanation

(b) Gaudapāda The same

(c) Vācaspati Mīśra *vita* and *avita*

Vita 1 *pūṛṇavat*—smoke and fire

2 *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*—sense organ as an instrument from the process of perception of colour etc

3 *avita* (which is *śesavat*)—identity of cause and effect known from the subsistence of effect in the cause, in this case such a co-existence is not found outside the sphere of what is to be inferred and what is found is only the co-existence of the negation of identity and negation of subsistence

On the other hand, what is called the words of a reliable person is the reliable person and the scripture. Gaudapada divides the mode into two sets, the reliable person and the scripture. But Vacaspati Mīśra takes it as a single group, the scripture of a reliable person. He says that instead of simple scripture, there is the qualification of the scripture being that of a reliable person in order to exclude from authority what are presented as scripture, but they may not be genuine scripture, as the scripture of the Buddhists. The words of a person can be either what a reliable person states or what is stated in scripture, and both are modes of knowing things. When a man says that there are fruits available on the bank of the river and when it is said that by performing the sacrifice called *citrā* one gets cows there is, in both cases, the statement of a reliable person. From both the modes we know a fact. The question whether the scripture is the word of a reliable person like God or whether it is an impersonal, eternal mode of knowing is not taken up in the system. The question of scripture is introduced only to show how many modes there are for knowing facts. Scripture is not a mode of knowing any of the facts that come within the purview of this system of philosophy. So it is

better to accept the interpretation of Gaudapāda that the "words of a reliable person consist of the reliable person and the scripture" The exclusion of the scripture of the Buddhists does not come into the picture

The position is this There are two main modes of knowing One set of knowledge is derived with reference to each of the objects in itself In the other set the knowledge of the object must have an antecedent knowledge This antecedent knowledge may be the knowledge of oneself regarding something else like the knowledge of smoke in inferring fire, it may also be the knowledge of the same object in another person There was the knowledge of the fruits on the river bank in another person and one knows it from that other person These are the three modes of knowing

6 *sāmānyatas tu siddhāḥ
atīndriyānām pratītiḥ anumānāt |
tasmād apti ca 'siddham
parokṣam aptāganāt siddham ||*

"Generally the cognition is through perception The cognition of things that transcend the sense-organs is through inference What cannot be established even through that and what are not within perception are established through the reliable person and the scripture " (6)

All the classical commentators take only two modes of knowing as noticed here They do not take note of perception They take the mode of inference as the mode of "what are generally seen " Three kinds of the mode of inference were mentioned in the previous verse and one was "what was generally seen " The cognition of things that transcend the sense-organs is through this particular mode within inference This is the interpretation of the classical commentators, both Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra Having said that there are three modes of knowing, it is necessary that the sphere of all the three modes should be given, there is no justification in ignoring perception And if only one out of the three divisions

of inference is taken up, what is the sphere for the other two modes within inference? Having stated that inference is of three kinds it is necessary that the sphere for each of the three modes is defined. For these reasons I do not accept the interpretation found in the classical commentaries. The translation that I have given is also found in some recent publications. There is one old commentator, Nārāyaṇa, who also splits up the first half into perception and inference.

Then there are many facts that cannot be perceived and that cannot also be known through the process of inference from what are known. For such facts, there must be another mode and that mode is what is called the reliable person and the scripture. The examples given by Gaudapāda for the first group of facts that can be known only through a reliable person or through scripture are - Indra, the Lord of the gods, the country of the Northern Kurus, the Apsaras damsels in the heaven etc. They are what cannot be known through inference and also what cannot be known through perception. For their knowledge there must be the authority of a reliable person or of the scripture.

The cases mentioned by Gaudapāda are not what can be legitimately introduced in a work on philosophy. There are many facts that have to be given a place in philosophy, which are known through perception, like the various material objects and the qualities in them and their states like motion. All the remaining facts that are dealt with in the philosophy are understood through inference. There is nothing coming within the scope of this system of philosophy which does not also come within the sphere of perception or reason. But there are cases which can possibly come within the scheme of this philosophy and which cannot be included within the sphere of perception and reason, such things are excluded from the philosophy though they have some relation to the contents of the philosophy and as such they could also have been included within the philosophy.

Through a process of reasoning it is concluded that all the material objects with their qualities and states can be reduced to a scheme of an undifferentiated root cause, which

is termed the *Mula-prakṛti*. It is also concluded through a reasoning process that what is called life is not an internal factor within the material contents of the universe, which is nothing but matter and that the life in matter is an extraneous factor and comes from another source called the *Puruṣa*, the Self. The Self is accepted, through the same process of reasoning, as innumerable. Questions may arise whether the matter came out of the Self, whether the Self is only one and whether there is a universal Self involved in the process of the evolution of the world. These topics do not come within the sphere of perception and they cannot also be settled by inference. There are sages and there is the scripture. If there is any information about such matters that we can have from these sources, that is not a part of this philosophy. It is for explaining the position in this philosophy regarding such questions that the third mode is mentioned. Of course, there are systems like the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* where this mode is recognised, and as such this mode must be mentioned for the fullness of the treatment. The chief purpose is to show the limits of this philosophy, which is purely a rational system. Only such facts as come within the scheme of perception and reason are included in the system. But it is not claimed that everything possible in the universe comes within this system of philosophy. Rational philosophy has its own limitations. The questions do arise and they cannot be answered within the sphere of perception and reason. In the *Mīmāṃsā* system also there is a statement that there are facts that have to be determined from other systems of thought.

In practical sciences and arts, there is an emphasis on perception. They deal with what come within perception and what arise immediately and naturally out of perception. In religion, there are facts that come within the field of the authority of reliable persons and of scripture. In philosophy there is a dominance of reason. The modes of knowing are classed under three heads for allocating them to the three fields of intellectual activity. Because there is a preponderance of reason in philosophy, the philosophical approach to the problems of suffering in the world is also claimed as superior.

to the other two approaches based on perception in sciences and on scripture in religious practices. The defects in the other two approaches are that there is no invariable success and no ultimate success in the remedies based on perception and that in the remedies prescribed in the scripture there is impurity, decay and gradation.

There is a lack of certainty about success and also a lack of finality in the success in the case of perception as a mode of knowing the problems of the world. In perception, one does not go to the fundamentals, one remains on the surface, on the outside. The depths and the inside are not probed into. When we apply reason and take to the philosopher's approach we realise everything and there can be no scope either for a failure or for a reappearance of the evil. The root is found out, the ultimate basis is known and the evil is rooted out for ever and without any future. As for the defects in the remedies found prescribed in the scripture, the defects are also mentioned in the same scripture.

The position taken up in the system was that what is called evil and the consequent suffering are originated and not natural in the universe and that whatever is originated can be destroyed. Now the question may arise whether knowledge which is derived through the process taken up in the philosophy will not itself be at a certain stage destroyed in so far as it is originated through the philosophical process, and if the knowledge which annihilates suffering is itself terminated, there may be a recurrence of suffering. So the remedy is not absolute even in philosophy. Now it must be understood that the philosophy does not accept a beginning for the appearance of suffering. If there is a beginning, various problems arise which cannot be solved rationally. The when and the why and the how for the beginning of suffering in the world which at one time was free from suffering cannot be determined through reason.

What is adopted in philosophy is only this, that suffering is not a nature of the two constituent factors in the universe, the dead matter and the intelligence. There is nothing

positive in what is called suffering. It is not an external positive thing. Suffering is an experience. Dead matter cannot have experience. Pure intelligence too cannot have experience since experience is a modification, pure intelligence cannot undergo modifications. What is called suffering is some sort of defect, some sort of a dislocation, some vacuum. The defect, the dislocation, the vacuum is in the form of the appearance in the intelligence, of what really is in the matter and also the appearance in the matter, of what was really in the intelligence. Intelligence which is necessary for experience is one thing and modification which is another factor in experience is in matter. When there is the superimposition of modification in the intelligence and when there is the superimposition of intelligence in matter, there is dislocation and this dislocation produces some defect and also some vacuum. Philosophy does not produce a thing called knowledge, knowledge was there and it is external to matter, and this extension of knowledge beyond itself creates modification in itself, or rather a semblance of it.

Thus there is intelligence in dead matter, and as a consequence there is modification, which can be only in the dead matter, introduced into that intelligence when it was so extended to matter. This is suffering. When intelligence is understood as distinct from matter and if matter is understood as devoid of intelligence and intelligence is free from modification, there is no scope for suffering. The modification in matter is due to the extension of intelligence beyond itself to matter. This final state is what is called *Kaivalya*, being isolated free from any admixture. If knowledge is produced through a process, then knowledge can also be destroyed and as such the suffering destroyed by knowledge may reappear at the termination of knowledge. Nothing is produced, intelligence becomes pure intelligence and matter becomes dead matter. Both become themselves without admixture, *kevala*.

The question of the beginning of this admixture, of this mutual transposition, of this mutual superimposition does not arise. In our present stage, it is a natural state of affairs.

(Kārikā 55) and there is no such transposition. When the discrimination comes, it would be found that the experience of the mutual transposition was only casual and that there was never a real transposition. Both were always isolated from each other. So there is no occasion for taking up the question when and why and how the super-imposition took place. Thus the ultimate result of the philosophical investigation is without a failure and is also absolute without a termination.

There is no positive result produced through philosophy. Thus there is nothing that can be called a goal in philosophy, there is nothing positive, the attainment of which can be a purpose in philosophy. Philosophy ends in knowing. There is no possibility of a failure in this knowledge, there is no terminus for it. It is absolute and final.

- 7 *ati-dūrāt śamipyād
 indriya-ghātān mano 'navasthānāt |
 sauksmyād vyavadhānād
 abhībhavāt samānā 'bhikārāc ca ||*
- 8 *saukṣmyāt tad-anupalabdhir
 nā 'bhavāt kāryatas tad upalabdheh |
 mahad ādī tac ca kāryam
 prakṛti-sarūpam vīrūpaṁ ca ||*

Through extreme distance, through proximity, through harm to the sense organs, through non attention of the mind, through subtlety, through interception, through suppression and through admixture with similar things (7)

It is not cognised because of subtlety, not because of its non-existence, since it is cognised from its effects. And that which begins with the intellect is that effect, similar and dissimilar to the cause (8)

It was first explained why there is scope for philosophy even when there are ways of meeting all our normal needs through other methods like sciences, where we depend mainly on perception, and religion, where we depend on the teachings of reliable persons. It was also explained that in philosophy

we depend mainly on reason. The method known as philosophy was also declared as superior to sciences and to religion, and the scope of philosophy was presented as a discriminative knowledge of these factors in this universe, namely, the evolved world which is the manifest, the root cause for this evolved world, which is unmanifest, and the intelligence.

The question arises why we should worry about the unevolved and unmanifest factors in the world. Science deals with the evolved and tangible world and that must be enough. Where is the proof for such an unmanifest factor in the world as the root cause for the evolved and tangible world? Can we not remain content with the factors that we can handle, factors that are tangible and can be brought within the scope of science? To this the reply is given that there are factors in this universe that transcend direct perception and that though they do not come within the scope of perception and the immediate and natural inferences from such observed facts, when we apply reason as a major factor and not merely as an adjunct to perception, as is done in science, the intellect naturally begins to think of another factor. In our day-to-day experience we know that there are things which do not always come within the sphere of our knowledge for various reasons and which yet are important in our daily affairs. Therefore, the fact that they do not come within the scope of knowledge in the ordinary application of perception does not exclude the factors from the sphere of reality and does not minimise their importance. Thus (1) a bird flying far up goes beyond our view, (2) the paint on the eye lashes is not seen by the person himself, (3) a blind man does not see and a deaf man does not hear, (4) when one's mind is engaged on one thing, he does not notice another thing on which the mind is not engaged, (5) dust particles are not seen by the eye (6) an object hidden behind the wall is not seen, (7) when the sun shines the moon and the stars are not seen, (8) if something belonging to one class is placed along with other similar things, one may not be able to identify what belongs

to that class. In this way there are eight grounds for our failure to know what actually exist, in our real experience. In this way, like intelligence and the tangible, evolved world, there is also an unevolved, intangible factor in the world. It is legitimate that the objects that come within our intellectual activities include the third factor also.

In verse 7, there is given only a group of eight grounds. But there is no verb and it is not stated what we are to do with the eight grounds. What is it that we have to presume on account of these eight reasons? The point is not clear. Vacaspati Miśra says that the verb must be taken from the following verse, namely, there is the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). Gaudapāda has no comment. Perhaps it is better to join this verse along with the previous verse where there is a reference to things that are beyond the sphere of perception, things that are beyond the scope of sense organs (*parokṣa* and *atindriya*). They are not perceived, they are beyond the sphere of the sense organs for the eight reasons in this verse. It is true that the two verses do not join together in a very natural way. Yet in the absence of a verb with which the eight grounds are to be joined on, some such recourse must be resorted to. I prefer to connect the verse to the previous verse.

The medieval commentators include in the factors that are not cognised and that have, yet, to be recognised as factors in the universe, the intelligence also and not merely the unevolved part of the universe. But from the next verse, it will be found that the author of the *Kārika* had only the unevolved part of the universe in his mind. Further, there is no question about intelligence, intelligence is experienced, and experience itself justifies the recognition of the factor in the universe.

The factor called the root cause is not cognised through the methods employed in science because of the subtlety of that factor. In the second of the two verses, the term 'subtlety' means something different from what is meant in the first verse. There it was the diminution of volume or spatial

extension in the object. Here it means the complete absence of spatial extension. A thing can become tangible only if it has a spatial extension. If we trace the objects of this manifest world to the causes, we come to a stage when the spatial extension becomes negligible and such things cannot either be seen or grasped with the hands. Yet it is possible to perfect instruments by which they can be handled. But according to a philosopher, there is a further stage when even instruments cannot handle the things ; at that stage it is not a question of the diminution of spatial extension ; it is a question of the complete elimination of spatial extension. Spatial extension is necessary for visual perception or for cognition by touch, and a scientist can perfect instruments only to magnify what exists in a subtle form ; he cannot create what does not exist in the object through his instruments. It is on account of the complete elimination of spatial extension that the unmanifest factor in the constitution of the universe is not cognised through the methods adopted in science. But reason can cognise what the sense-organs and the instruments cannot detect. If that factor is not cognised through modes employed in science, the reason is not that it does not exist ; the reason is that it transcends the conditions, like spatial extension, for being cognised by such means.

And how can one cognise it ? It is cognised by the process of inference from the effects of that cause. What are the effects from which a cause is inferred ? The effects are the intellect and others that follow. Twenty-three categories enumerated in *karikā* 3 are all effects. All such effects must have a cause. If the effects are absolutely like the cause, then there is no scope for inference, since the cause is always known like the effects. If the effects are absolutely dissimilar from the cause, then too an inference is impossible. There must be some similarity between the effects and the cause. So it is said in the verse that the root cause inferred from the effects is partly like the effects and partly unlike the effects.

The dispute is between the Cārvākas and the philosopher. The position of the Cārvāka is more or less what the present-day scientists hold. To them there cannot be realities that fall absolutely outside the scope of perception. Perception includes certain inferences that follow easily and naturally from the perception. The root cause of the philosopher is absolutely outside the sphere of observation. It can be inferred only from certain universals, for which there is no authority. A universal is a universal only within certain limits, and need not be held to be valid for facts that are outside verification. Certainly a Cārvāka will not question the validity of the inference of fire on the mountain from the smoke that is seen. For, both smoke and fire had been seen elsewhere, and what is inferred is only the fire on the mountain and not fire in its very nature.

Everything that has change and movement is an effect, and every effect must have a cause. There are two universals here. What the Cārvākas must have held is that such universals have a validity only within the world of change and movement. Because there is the relation of cause and effect between two things where there is change and movement within the world of experience, can we say that the whole world of change and movement must have a cause outside of it? This is the doubt which the Cārvākas must have raised against inference. If there is such a cause, that cause can be known only through this process of inference. Here we are extending what is known inside the world of change and movement to an area outside of it. Can there be an area outside of the world which we cannot handle with our normal faculties of knowing? All the facts within the world of change and movement come also within perception. The limiting conditions are enumerated in the first of the two verses. But the condition that limits the perception in the case of the inferred factor is outside of this field of conditions, *i.e.*, a subtlety which is inherent in the fact, not a casual and occasional subtlety found in the facts of the changing and moving world.

The real conflict is between the followers of the Vedic path and the followers of the latter day Buddhist thought. According to this latter, there is no happiness in our life in this body, to them there is also no reality for the world that is experienced. They argue that what is experienced can be only what has come out from a void, from a mere nothing. What is experienced as a reality is a transformation of a void. And then this non-existent nature is extended to the world that is experienced as a reality, as positive.

The position in the Sankhya is quite different. They take the positive nature of the experienced world as a fact and then they argue that there must be a cause for this positive world of experience and that that cause must also be positive in nature. That is what is done in the following verse. If reason is applied and if through the application of reason, what is cognised within the world of experience is extended then we come to another fundamental factor called the changeless undifferentiated, root cause for the world of experience which too must be positive in nature like the world of experience. The world of experience is positive and changing while the root cause is positive and unchanging.

9 *asad akaranād upādāna
grahanāt sarva sambhavaḥ bhāvāt |
śaktasya śakya karanāt
kāraṇa bhāvaḥ ca sat kāryam ||*

Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, because there is resort to a material cause, because there is not the production of everything, because what is capable to produce produces what is capable to be produced, and because there is the nature of the cause (in the effect)—for these reasons the effect is existent (9).

After explaining their position in regard to the doctrine of the Carvakas now the doctrine of the Buddhists is taken up. The main doctrine that is propounded here is that the effect in the form of the world of experience is positive and

that the cause is also positive, the positive world of effects being real in the positive cause.

(1) What is called an effect is not an entirely new creation from a void. There cannot be the creation of what was absolutely non-existent. So the positive effect existed in the positive cause.

(2) We resort to a particular material cause for the production of an effect. If the effect was not existent in that cause, why should we resort to that material cause and why should we not resort to another cause or to no cause at all? If we want a jar, can we take some yarn and if we want a cloth, can we take up some clay? It is on account of the existence of the jar in the clay and of the cloth in the yarn that we resort to these two materials for the respective effects.

(3) Anything cannot be produced from anything. There are the limitations that such and such a thing can be produced only from such and such a thing. This limitation is due to the existence of the particular effect in the particular cause.

(4) This limitation is in the form that only what is competent to produce that effect can produce it, and that something can produce only what is capable of being produced by that something as the cause. So there is special capacity in the cause for which capacity, the effect is the object.

(5) The effect has the nature of cause. We do not produce from cause an effect that is entirely different from the cause. Thus we can produce only a gold ring from gold and an earthen jar from clay.

If the cause is by nature non-existent and if the effect too is non-existent by nature, such a regulation of the series of cause and effect is inexplicable. We experience the world as positive and as such the cause from which it has evolved must also be positive in nature. And the whole of the effect must have been existent in that cause.

The effect is not absolutely identical with the cause. There are differences also. The effect is the cause with some changes. That is why it was said that the effect

is partly similar and partly dissimilar to the root cause which is the cause of the world of effects, in the previous verse. If the cause is non-existent and if the effects are also non-existent, then there is no difference between the cause and the effect. Differences are only in what are existent and not between what do not exist.

The effect exists in the cause in a subtle way and the production of the effect is only the manifestation of what was intangible in the state of the cause, though the effect existed even in that state. In the world of effects, we speak of the effect as existing in a subtle way in the cause and the cause is tangible. Thus we do not cognise the cloth in the thread since the cloth in the thread is subtle. It becomes manifest as effect. In the ultimate state even the cause is subtle. Just as the subtle effect in the manifest cause becomes manifest in the effect stage so far as our experience goes, it is not possible for the ultimate cause to be manifest at all. It is always subtle and the effects in it are also subtle. The effects become manifest, while the cause remains ever subtle.

We can only infer such an ultimate cause, an inference gives us the knowledge of a generic nature, and as such we know only the ultimate cause in its generic nature without any particulars, except such particulars which inference can warrant. If there are particulars, they must be known through some other mode, that mode cannot be perception. Therefore the only way in which we can know the particulars about the ultimate cause inferred through reason, is that of the statement of reliable persons and of scripture. This is also what comes within the scope of the second half of the sixth verse.

It has been said that there are similarities between the world of effects and the root cause of the world. The similarity is mainly in the matter of both being positive in nature. The other grounds for inferring the existence of the effect in the cause also form such similarities. Thus, just as there is a material cause for an effect, which material cause contained the effect, in the same way, the root cause contained the

whole of the world of effects. There is a regulation of the relation of cause and effect between the root cause and the individual facts of the world of effects. This relation is regulated by what is called the relation of a competent cause producing the effect which is competent to be produced by that cause. The world of effects is experienced as positive and it must have the same nature as the cause. These are the similarities between the root cause and the world of effects. Then there are dissimilarities too.

10 *hetumad anityam avyāpti
sakriyam anekam āśritam līngam |
sāyavam para-tantram
vyaktam viparitam avyakṭam ||*

The manifest has a cause, is non permanent ■ non pervasive, possesses movement, is many, is supported is a mark, possesses parts and is dependent on another, the unmanifest is the opposite (10)

(1) Everything in this world of experience is produced from a cause

(2) When it is produced, there was ■ time when it did not exist in a manifest form and there will also come a time when it has to cease to exist in a manifest form in so far as everything produced is destructible

(3) What ■ produced is limited in space, and

(4) Whatever is limited in space can move from one place to another

(5) When a thing is limited in space, there must be things in other places where ■ does not exist, therefore there must be ■ plurality in the things of the world of experience

(6) We can infer another thing from everything in this world of experience, we can infer the cause from the effect and since everything is an effect produced from a cause, its nature as the mark for an inference is self-evident

(7) Whatever is produced has parts. Such ■ the manifest world

There are two more particulars given as related to the things of this manifest world. (8) One is "supported" and (9) the other is "dependent on another." It is very difficult to make out the difference between these two particulars. The classical, medieval commentators give us no clue to it. Gaudapāda says that the effect is supported by its cause. The effect is also declared as dependent on the cause. I see no difference between the two. Vācaspati Mīśra says that the effect is supported by the cause and that every cause depends on Nature for the production of the effect. So, as effect a thing is supported by its cause and as a cause there is dependence on Nature. Even then the difference is not quite noticeable.

In the *Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy*, I have suggested that the difference may be in the effects as individuals being supported by the respective cause and the effects as a whole in the world of experience being dependent on the basic fundamental (pp 180 f). This too is not an explanation. It may be that the effect is supported by its cause and that each fact in the world of experience is dependent on another for its cognition as the general and the particular. Or when everything is composed of parts, each part is dependent on another. There must be some real distinction between support (*āśraya*) and dependence (*pāratantrya*). Neither the text nor the commentaries give us the clue to solve the problem.

I have translated the term *Linga* as 'mark.' The effect is the mark for the inference of the cause, and it was so stated in the eighth verse. But the commentators take the term to mean 'soluble.' At the time of the final dissolution of the world, each succeeding effect dissolves itself into its cause till we come to the ultimate cause. This is the explanation of Gaudapāda. But Vācaspati Mīśra takes the term as 'mark'. It has already been said that the root cause is established as inferred from the effects in the world of experience. Later in the fifteenth and sixteenth verses the same point will be further taken up. There is the difficulty in the

position taken up by Vācaspati Miśra, in so far as the intelligence is inferred with the root cause itself as the 'mark'. This will be taken up in the seventeenth verse. Vācaspati Miśra gives the apology that though the root cause is a mark for the inference of the intelligence, it is not a mark for the inference of itself, while the effects in the manifest world are the marks for the inference of their respective causes and of the root cause. Really it is not the basic root cause that serves as the mark for the inference of the intelligence in that verse, it is the changes in the basic fundamental in the form of the effects in the manifest world that serve as the mark for the inference.

The unmanifest is the opposite of these particulars (1) it has no cause, (2) it is eternal; (3) it is pervasive, (4) there is no activity in it, (5) it is only one, (6) it is not supported by a cause, (7) it is not a mark for the inference of another, (8) it has no parts, and (9) it does not depend on another either as a part or for the cognition of the general and the particular, since there is no such distinction in that stage. It is true that the root cause has three constituents, the three *Gunas* (*Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*). But they are not parts of the root cause. They are the three aspects of an undivided whole.

The entire universe is filled with positive matter, there is no vacuum in the universe. There may be no non-existence anywhere. If we have various articles in a place, one being placed by the side of another, there may be an end to one and the beginning for another. But matter is continuous in the universe. The entire root cause does not evolve into the effects, it is only partially. Yet there is no portion left vacant in the root cause on account of the evolution into the effects. The root cause cannot be divided into parts. There is evolution from that root cause and yet the root cause continues full, pervasive, motionless, changeless. The limitations in the effects do not affect the unlimited character of the root cause. That is how it is the opposite of the effects. The root cause remains even where there are

the effects ' So we cannot divide the universe into two distinct parts, the manifest and the unmanifest

There is some element that goes against logic in the stand taken up in this context It is by an extension of what is observed in the tangible nature that the root cause has been established through inference From effects we can infer a cause and as such we can infer a cause for the aggregate of the effects That was how the root cause was inferred in the eighth verse Now it is found that every cause in the world of effects has its own cause The effect as an effect is impermanent In this way, whatever has been enumerated as the particulars of the effects, i.e., the manifest world, has been found to be the particulars characterising their cause also If we extend this universal even to the cause of the entire aggregate of the effects, we come to an absurdity There ceases to be anything that can be recognised as a root cause in the universe Every cause is the effect of its own cause Thus there is nothing that can be called a root cause with characteristics differentiating it from the aggregate of the effects If the universal relation between an effect and its cause can be extended beyond the effects, why should not the relation of effect to the cause of the cause also be so extended ? Thus either we recognise the Carvaka position that there can be no root cause or we have to admit that the root cause also has a cause which is an absurdity

In the process of inferring a causeless root cause there is a fallacy involved An individual fact is an aggregate of particular features that are its own nature (*svabhāva*) If any one of such features is found in other facts also, we speak of that feature as the particular nature of a group of facts But we extend some features only to facts that are known to possess such features The presence of a feature in one fact does not guarantee its extension to any other fact If a thing is found produced from a cause, we establish the causal relation between the two But how can we say that such a causal relation exists between facts that are not known, facts that had ceased to exist and facts that have yet to come into existence ? In the above process of the inference of a

causeless root cause we are making a postulate about what can never come within the sphere of man's knowing. We note a causal relation between two facts and we extend them to facts that can come within man's knowing. So far it is not unreasonable. If later it is found that the relation does not exist in certain cases, we can discard the relation. But what is the basis for extending it to cases that can never be known? Reason does not guarantee the validity of such an extension. There is a regularity only within what are known and there is nothing that can be accepted as eternally inviolable, as a universal law. Inference depends on a universal relation and a universal relation can only be inferred. This is the fallacy.

In the *Mīmāṃsā* system there is no such root cause without change and movement from which the evolved world was produced. To them the world is ever dynamic. There is nothing that is without activity (*akriyā*), as is accepted in the Sāṅkhya. We do not know what the actual position of the Cārvākas had been in those days. We do not have any classical, standard text dealing with their tenets. I will not call that system by the term "Materialism", it is rather "intellectualism," with no compromise with what is called intuition. There are many points where the position of the Cārvākas comes into contact with the tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas. To both of them the world of activity is sufficient and is supreme.

11 *tri gunam aviveki viśayah
sāmānyam acetanam prasava-dharmi |
vyaktam tathā pradhānam
tad viparītas tathā ca pumān ||*

Made of the three constituents non discriminated, object, general, non intelligent, and having the nature of production—such is the manifest and similarly the Primal. And, in this way, the Self is different from them (11)

The purpose and the scope of philosophy as distinct from science and religion and the method followed in

philosophy by way of reasoning as distinct from observation and authority in the other two methods, were first given. The goal of philosophy is to discriminate between the three factors in the universe, the manifest, the unmanifest and the intelligence. The similarity and dissimilarity between the manifest and the unmanifest were also shown. Now, discrimination is the understanding of two things through their distinctive features. So the distinctive features that differentiate Matter in its manifest and unmanifest stages from intelligence has to be shown. That is what is done in this verse.

(1) Matter in both the aspects is constituted of three elements. They are the *Sattva* (Life), the *Rajas* (Activity) and the *Tamas* (Materiality). (2) The root cause which is unmanifest is the cause of the manifest matter, and in the field of manifest matter, there is the relation of cause and effect, it has been shown that the effect is of the nature of the cause. So, as between the facts of the manifest world mutually, and also between the manifest matter and the unmanifest, there is no absolute discrimination possible. (3) They are all within the scope of cognition, objects of cognition by another. (4) There is no individuality in the matter, they are common to all the intelligent "subjects". (5) They all produce something also. In these respects both the unmanifest root cause and the manifest evolved matter are of the same nature.

In this way there must be something in the universe that is the absolute contrast of these two. Thus, till now the contrast was recognised between the manifest and the unmanifest matter and this contrast was mingled with common features also. Since the common features unite them into a single factor, there must, in this way, be something that is absolutely distinct from both of them. The verse is not primarily meant to point out the similarity between the manifest and the unmanifest matter, the purpose is to show the necessity to postulate something that will be an absolute contrast to matter in either of the two forms.

The verse is rather difficult to explain satisfactorily as it stands and the medieval commentators have their own explanations, the explanations are not at all satisfactory. In the previous verse it was found that there were two terms used, both meaning more or less the same, namely *Āśrita* (supported) and *Paratantra* (dependent on another). In this verse also there are two terms which mean more or less the same. One is *Aviveki* (without discrimination) and the other is *Acetanam* (non sentient). *Viveka* is discrimination and *Viveki* is what has discrimination. It can mean both what is capable of discriminating between two things and also what is capable of being discriminated between. The second will be the meaning if the position is that a discriminating knowledge is possible about them. But the general meaning of the term is the other, namely, what is capable of making a discrimination among other things. That means that it has sentience. The term in the text is the opposite of that *Aviveki*, what has no power of making a discrimination among other things, i.e., what has no sentience or intelligence. In this way there is a repetition of the same feature. It is to avoid this repetition that the term was taken as meaning "what is incapable of being discriminated between, what are not discriminated mutually". Between cause and effect an absolute discrimination is impossible the effect being only the cause, the effect existing in the cause. This is also the explanation given by some classical commentators. But Vacaspati Miśra has another explanation also. What are incapable of producing functioning each by itself are *Aviveki* what are not discriminated. But this explanation too is not very satisfactory. In the end there is the contrast of the manifest and the unmanifest matter from the Self. Then the position will be that matter cannot function individually but only in collaboration while the Self can. This is against the nature of the Self.

What is wanted is that the matter by itself cannot produce the discriminative knowledge among the three factors of the universe the manifest and the unmanifest matter and

the Self, and this discriminative knowledge is the goal of philosophy. The discriminative knowledge should be traced to the Self. If this is so, why should there be the other feature of the matter in its two aspects, namely, being insentient? And it must also be stated here that the Self, according to the philosophy, is not sentient, it is sentience itself and not the locus of sentience. This is a technical defect in the statement of the features in this contrast.

After stating that the matter in its two aspects has these features in common, the last portion of the verse says that the Self is the opposite of these. Thus far it is all right. But there is an expression *tathā ca*. I have translated this as 'in this way'. It can also mean, "and also of this nature". If the second meaning is adopted in the context, the meaning of the last portion of the verse would be that the Self is the opposite of these and is also of this nature. Of course, the Self is not of the nature described in this verse for the matter. But there are certain features in the previous verse where matter in its unmanifest aspect was spoken of as the opposite of the manifest matter. The meaning would be that there are certain features in which the self and the manifest matter, being the opposite of the unmanifest, are similar, like manifoldness. There are also features that are common between the unmanifest matter and the Self, like the absence of a cause, being eternal and pervasive, in which matter in its manifest nature is the opposite of matter in its unmanifest nature. That means that in the two verses, there are given both the features that are common among the three and the features in which they are also the opposites. This is not what is wanted. The context is to show that there is a factor in the universe which is the opposite of matter in both its aspects. Therefore, features common to the two aspects of matter were first enumerated and then it was said that in this way the Self is the opposite of matter in both its aspects, in which two aspects have these common features.

There is the word *Pradhāna* which means the first, or the chief or the primal. It denotes the root cause, the

unmanifest matter from which the manifest matter is generated. It is called by other names also as the *Mūla Prakṛti* (the root cause) and also as mere *Prakṛti*.

12. *prīti-aprīti-iśāda-'tmikāh*
prakāśa-pravṛtti-niyamā-'rthāh |
anyonyā-'bhībhañā-'śraja-
janana-mithuna-vṛttayaś ca guṇāh ||

- 13 *sattvam laghu prakāśakam*
iśam upastambhakam caśāñ ca rajah |
guru varāṇakam eva tamah
pradīpavac cā 'rthato vṛttih ||

The constituents are of the nature of contentment, discontent and sullenness. Their purposes are to illumine, to activate and to arrest. They function through mutual suppression, mutual dependence, mutual production, and mutual combination (12)

Sattva is accepted as light and illuminating, *Rajas* is stimulating and mobile. But *Tamas* is heavy and enveloping. And their function is with a purpose like a lamp (13)

It was stated in the eleventh verse that matter in its two aspects of being manifest and unmanifest has the three constituents. These three constituents and their natures are given in these two verses. The three constituents are called the *Sattva*, the *Rajas* and the *Tamas*, or Life, Activity and Materiality. That is, we experience the world as a series of changes and movements in matter and there is also a phenomenon called life in the universe. The change is found to be from within in some cases and in those cases we say that there is life. There is also the phenomenon called "knowing". This too is an aspect of life. The universe is constituted of these three basic factors.

Sattva is of the nature of contentment, *Rajas* is of the nature of discontent. *Tamas* is of the nature of sullenness. The purpose of *Sattva* is to illumine. The purpose of *Rajas* is to activate. The purpose of *Tamas* is to arrest movement. Sometimes one dominates over the others. Sometimes one

depends on the others. Sometimes one produces the others. Sometimes one is combined with the others. They function in these ways.

Sattva gives illumination and it is light, having the tendency to rise up. This is more figurative than literal. *Sattva* helps evolution, forward movement, progression. It is *Rajas* that gives the impetus and movement to matter. The tendency of *Tamas* is to bring down, to arrest movement. It covers up the illumination. It would be noted that the *Sattva* and the *Tamas* are the opposites of each other. The three are the life, the movement and the matter aspects of the material world. The features of the three constituents must be taken in their widest sense possible.

In a lamp there are three factors when it burns and gives light. There is the wick which is of the nature of *Tamas* as described above; there is the flame which corresponds to the *Rajas* and the illumination all round corresponds to the *Sattva*. There is nothing in common between the wick and the light around. As a matter of fact they are opposed to each other. The wick as it is, can only obstruct the light. Yet they co-operate and there is the purpose served, to enable men to see.

14. *aviveky-āditya siddhas*

trai-guṇyāt tad-viparyaya-bhāvāt |

kāraṇa-guṇa-‘tmakatvāt

kāryasya-‘vyaktam apl siddham ||

The features beginning with non-discriminatedness are established through the nature of the triple constituents, in so far as the opposite does not exist. The unmanifest too is established as such because the nature of the constituents of the cause is the same as that of the constituents of the effect. (14)

In the eleventh verse certain features were given as common between matter in its manifest nature and matter in its unmanifest nature, and the contrast of the Self from both of them was also stated there. The three-fold nature of the world of experience is known to us. That is how we

experience the world. Since the world of experience is of that nature, its cause, the unmanifest matter too must be of that same nature. The constituents of the effect must be the same as the constituents of the cause.

We experience the world as matter as known in a state of movement and change. So we make a broad division of the world of experience into three constituents. If the world is made up of the three constituents, the other features common to matter in both its aspects of being manifest and unmanifest follow invariably since there is not known an opposite of that. No instance has been known in which there is the feature of being made up of the three constituents while there is the absence of being non discriminated and other features. It is because the world is made up of the three constituents that there is no possibility of a clear discrimination between object and object in this world. When there is found a series of objects in a state of change and movement and when the former passes on its nature to the latter, it is not possible to discriminate between the former and the latter in a complete way. Nothing in this world has an absolute individuality, everything is partly this and partly that.

Since there are only the three constituents of matter in change and movement, with the life element, the aggregate becomes an object of being known by some external agent. It has no power to be the agent for knowing. It is true that there is the element of *Sattva* or Life in the constitution of the objects and it is mixed up with materiality and change and movement. The combination of the three is not an agent but only the object, for knowing. What is called the Life element in this combination is not self luminous. It can at best reflect illumination and cannot itself illuminate. If it were pure *Sattva* it could have illuminated things, and as such could have also become the agent for knowing.

What is an object in knowing cannot be sentient. What is sentient is what knows and not what is known. That is how we make the discrimination between the agent and the object in knowing. When there is change and movement, the new

state in this series of change is what is called the effect or what is produced by the previous state which becomes the cause. In this way the five features starting with the nature of being non-discriminated, mentioned in the eleventh verse, follow from the first of the six features enumerated there as common to matter in its two aspects of being manifest and unmanifest. That the matter is general is quite obvious, since they are within the sphere of the cognition of the intelligent agent, or rather of intelligence as agent. So it need not be specially said.

The first of the six features mentioned in the eleventh verse, is that it is made up of the three constituents and the consequent five features are known in our experience as what belong to the various facts of the manifest world. It has already been made clear that the constituents of the effect have the same nature as the constituents of the cause. So, these six features are established as belonging to the root cause, the unmanifest matter in the universe.

15. *bhedānam pariṇāmāt
samanvayāt śaktītaḥ pravṛtteś ca |
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād
avibhāgād valśvarūpyasya ||*

16. *kāraṇam asty avyaktam pravartate
triguṇataḥ samudayāc ca |
pariṇāmataḥ salilavat
prati-prati- guṇā-śraya-viśeṣāt ||*

Since what is differentiated must be a modification, since there is a homogeneous nature and since there is ■ functioning through potency, since there is ■ differentiation into cause and effect, since there can be no differentiation of what has a universal nature. (15)

There exists a cause which is unmanifest. This functions both as three distinct constituents and also in combination. It is also through modification as in the case of water and according to the specific nature abiding in the constituents in each object. (16)

In the eighth verse, It was shown that the unmanifest exists and can be inferred from its effects, the evolutes starting with the "intellect", which are similar and dissimilar to the root cause. The similarities between the root cause and the evolutes and their dissimilarities too have been pointed out in the tenth and the eleventh verses.

Now the process of inferring the unmanifest world from the manifest world of experience is described in these two verses. The various grounds on which the inference is based are given here.

(1) There is uniformity in clay, and from this uniform clay different kinds of effects are produced, like a jar and a wall. The two differentiated things are the modifications of a uniform. Therefore if we reduce the chains of causes and effects to their ultimate stage, then we must come to a stage when there is no differentiation and that is the unmanifest matter, the root cause. If there is differentiation in a thing it must be a modification from another undifferentiated cause from which other effects can also be produced. Therefore we must assume an absolutely undifferentiated cause for the entire world of change and movement and differentiation. What is manifest is only what is differentiated. We know a thing as common to certain things and as different from those things. If there is no differentiation, there can be no manifestation also. So the undifferentiated cause of the entire world of differentiation is unmanifest.

(2) We notice some homogeneity between the cause and the effect and when we proceed backwards from effects to the causes, we find that the differentiation decreases and the homogeneity increases. When the differentiation is completely eliminated and when homogeneity becomes complete, we reach the stage of the ultimate cause which is unmanifest. From cause to effect there is an increase of differentiation and an elimination of homogeneity. That is why we say that a ring and another ornament and a bowl are all effects of gold. Although they are all gold we speak of them by their specific names with differentiations and not by their common name through their homogeneity.

(3) Whatever is homogeneous has a potency to get differentiated. This function of change from cause to effect is due to this potency. Whatever is differentiated has the potency to get resolved into the homogeneous nature. In this way, so long as there are causes which are themselves differentiations, we notice in the homogeneous cause this potency to get differentiated into various effects and we also notice in the differentiated effects the potency to get resolved into the homogeneous causes. But when we reach the stage of absolute homogeneity this potency to get resolved into the cause necessarily ceases and we reach the stage of the undifferentiated, unmanifest, root cause.

(4, 5) We notice the division into cause and effect in this world of differentiation. Such a division itself shows that there is differentiation. When we reach the stage where there is absolute homogeneity, there can be no division at all possible. It is only what is differentiated that can have a cause. When we reach the stage of absolute universality without any differentiation, without any division, we get at a cause which itself cannot have a cause, and at this stage it is the unmanifest that becomes this ultimate cause without its own cause. On such grounds we arrive at the position that there is an unmanifest root cause for the differentiated, manifest world.

This unmanifest root cause functions according to the nature of the three constituents and in unison with one another. In each function one can notice the constituent that is most prominent, and at different times it is one or the other of the three constituents that becomes prominent. At the same time no one of the three constituents functions by itself, they all function in unison with one another. At every such functioning there is modification also and this modification is like the modification in water. The modification takes different forms and the new modification after every function appears to be entirely different from the cause of which it is a modification. It is like the modification in water. Water is found in various forms. It is all water in essence, and yet there are variations in colour, taste, appearance etc. The

variations are so many and so patent that one may even miss the commonness in all such modifications as water. Such great variations in the modifications are due to the specific nature abiding in the constituents of that object. All the varieties in the world are possible though they are all the modifications of three constituents. In each such modification, there is a specific nature attached to the constituents and this specific nature is not found in the constituents in another modification. Even a difference in the ratio of the three constituents by the smallest fraction will sometimes make a great change.

17 *sanghāta parārthatvāt trigunā
'dī viparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt |
puruṣo 'sti bhoktr bhāvāt kaivalya
'rtham pravṛttes ca ||*

Since the combination must have another as the purpose, since there must be something different from the three constituents and other things; since there must be some controlling entity, since there is the position of one being an experiencer, and also since there is the universal activity for the sake of isolation, there is the Self (17)

In the eleventh verse there was the statement that the Self is different from matter in both its aspects of being manifest and unmanifest in respect of the features enumerated in that verse. Now the grounds on which we infer that there is such a Self are given in this verse. In that verse above, there was an indication that since matter in its two aspects is similar to each other in respect of those features, there must be some entity that is different from matter in the two aspects. That was not a proof, the proof is given here.

1. If the three constituents were in a state of absolute equipoise in which stage it is the unmanifest matter, then there must be some explanation for the disturbance in this equipoise. If the three constituents had been always in a state of disturbance without any equilibrium, then there is no ultimate cause for the entirety of the world of change.

It has been shown that we must accept such an ultimate cause which is undifferentiated, in that stage there is nothing that can be called a combination. There are no divisions, and it is only things that are in two divisions that can combine. Therefore either we must say that there is no such root cause and that the world was always in a state of change and movement or we must give some explanation for the change from the undifferentiated, unmanifest state to the state of differentiation and combination and manifestation. That explanation must be with reference to something outside of itself. To say that the change came from within the unmanifest is no answer at all. If the change be absolutely from within itself, then the change also must be there always. That means that we do not again have an absolute as the root cause of the entire world of differentiation. The stimulus for the change must be referred to something outside of itself.

2 In the eleventh verse certain features were given starting with the feature of being made up of three constituents, there must be something that is entirely different from all such features. The three constituents in equilibrium cannot get disturbed from within. There must be something that can be absolutely distinguished from them, since, among themselves such a discrimination is not possible. It cannot be an object of knowing since the world of the three constituents cannot itself be the cause for the production of effects, in that case there must again be an explanation for the change from cause to effect. So what is external to the world of change must be different from all the features starting with the combination of the three constituents.

3 What is wanted is not merely some entity that is external to and distinct from the world of change. That entity must control the change. The start of the change and the direction of the series of changes and the other factors in the change must be determined by that entity that is external. From the nature of the change in what was an absolute uniform, we have seen that for the above reasons there must be an entity postulated that is external to the

world of change, to explain the change from absolute equilibrium to one of disturbance and fluctuations

Now there are two other considerations brought in as explanations for the postulation of such an external entity, from our own experience

4. We have the experience of being the experiencer. The world is the world that is experienced. For every experience there must be the experiencer. We experience the world as one of change and in movement. It is the experiencer that experiences the change and not the experienced world itself. The experiencer does not change. The experiencer continues while there is the change and the movement in the experienced world. It is the experience of an experiencer in all experiences that is depended on here for postulating an entity called the *Purusa*, the sentence, in this universe, apart from the world of experience and its root cause, the absolute matter.

It will be found later that what is called an experience is only a function in the material world. The real sentence has no experience of the world. It is just a sentence. The theory in the Sāṅkhya is that on account of the presence of this sentence there is a reflection of this sentence in one of the three aspects of the matter, that is the *Sattva* aspect, it is matter with this reflection of sentence on it, that becomes the sentient agent for experiencing. There is a clear difference between the sentence and the sentient individual who experiences. The sentient individual is material and this sentence in the sentient individual is not an innate nature of matter, but only a reflected feature in matter.

Why should we not say that the sentence of the sentient individual who experiences is an inherent feature of matter itself? According to the Cārvākas, the experience, the life, in the individual is only a modification in matter just like fermentation in sugar solutions. But the position taken up in the Sāṅkhya is that there is a real difference between the two phenomena. When we pour some sour matter in milk or if we keep the juice of palm tree for some time, fermentation

is found to set in. But there, there is no element of a knowing experienced by us. When a man experiences, we also note the effects of such experiences like joy, sorrow, fear, admiration and so on. From these effects connected with the change in the individual, which changes we do not meet with in the case of fermentation, we conclude that in the case of the individual, there is an element which is absent in the case of the fermented substance like milk or palm-juice. The individual has been found to have the experience that he is an experiencer, which experience of being an experiencer is not noted in the case of the palm-juice or milk. It is on account of this experience of being the experiencer that there is an element called *sentience* postulated associated with the individual.

5. There is one more consideration that forms the ground for postulating a *sentience* in this universe. We all know that there is the universal activity with "isolation" as the goal. Man is not found to be happy in this life and his unhappiness is due to the association with the world of matter. Man tries to release himself from this association. What is it that is to be released, to be isolated, from matter? That must be something entirely distinct from matter itself and that something is the *sentience*. The suffering is not inherent in the experience itself; it is only in the experience of change and movement. This change and movement as an element in experience is due to the association of the *sentience* with matter which alone can change and move. If matter is removed from this experience, then there is only a mere experience of the *sentience* as *sentience* pure and simple. There can be no element of suffering in that experience of that *sentience*. It is the experience in association with the changing and moving matter that is called by the technical term of *Vṛtti* (modification) in the Yoga system, and the goal of the Yoga system is to arrest this *Vṛtti*; in that state, there remains only a pure *sentience*, experiencing itself without any contact and association with matter.

The Cārvākas might as well say that they do not work with any such purpose of isolation as their goal. Their

philosophy is that "one should live happy as long as he can live and that by even borrowing money from others (of course with no intention of returning) one should drink plenty of ghee in his food" A sentience, known by the technical term of *Puruṣa* (Self), has been postulated on the basis of certain logical conclusions : (1) The basic assumption is that since every phenomenon can be traced to a cause, the aggregate of phenomena also should be traced to a root cause and that that root cause must be different from the phenomenal world. The Cārvākas do not accept this extension of the causal chain beyond the realm of phenomena, and so they do not have anything that can be called the sub phenomenal part of the universe (2) Then to explain the change of that absolute root cause into the phenomenal world, some element external to the material world is assumed. This is re-inforced by two considerations, the sense of being the experiencer and the goal of isolation from material contacts, found as a part of religious practices. The Carvakas do not recognise either the extension of inference beyond the phenomenal world or the efficacy of religious practices. As for the sense of being the experiencer noticed in the experiences of an individual, as distinct from the phenomenon of fermentation and other changes, the Carvakas can take it as a feature in material changes

18 *janana marana karanānām
prati nityamād ayugapat pravrttes ca |
puruṣa bahutvam siddham
traigunya viparyayāc ca 'va ||*

Because there is the separate regulation of birth death and activity and because of the activities that are not simultaneous, there is established the plurality of the Self, and also because of the contrast from the three fold constituents (18)

When the root cause which has no differentiation, started on a course of diversification, there was a double current. There was the changing and moving matter formed and also a number of living organisms. Every living organism

has an individuality This individuality must be traced to the individuality of the sentence whose reflection in the matter produced the living beings It cannot be the reflection of the same, single sentence on a large number of reflecting mediums in the changing and moving phenomena If it were so, then there must be a uniformity in the behaviour of all the living organism, they should come into existence together, they should go out of existence together, and during life, they should also behave in a uniform way The differences in these features must be due to the differences in the reflecting sentence Every sentence, reflecting on the changing and moving matter, produced a separate organism and each such organism behaved in its own way In each individual we find a distinct combination of the three constituents in the matter In ability, temperament and other matters, individuals differ from one another and this difference must be due to the difference in the reflecting sentence The reflection of one sentence in matter produces one kind of living organism and the reflection of another sentence produces another kind of organism

Reason takes us only to this plurality of the sentences Reason is against the assumption of a unity in such sentences Reason is also against a unity between the matter and the unified sentences But if there are ways of realising any such unity among the sentences and also between this unitary sentence and the matter, that is outside this system of philosophy There are the following schools of thought

- (a) The Carvakas who refuse to go beyond what can come within observation and who hold that there is only this material world in change and movement, without any root cause out of which the phenomenal world arose, and who further refuse to accept the separate factor called sentence as a fundamental in the universe
- (b) The Mīmāṃsakas who do not accept the root cause and a starting point for the change of this root cause into the phenomena, but who at the

same time accept the sentence based on other grounds

- (c) The Sāṅkhya system of the world of change the root cause and the sentence as a plurality
- (d) The Advaita Vedānta and the Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta, in which, besides the phenomenal world and the root cause and the sentence, there is a unity between the matter and the sentence and also among the sentences

The position in the Nyāya and in the Dvaita Vedānta ■ along other lines

In this way, the subject matter for the system has been already explained so far as the Sāṅkhya system ■ concerned. The three factors enunciated in the second verse have been defined and described and their relations, their similarities and dissimilarities and other features too were explained

19 . *tasmat ca viparyāsāt siddham
sāksitvam asya puruṣasya |
kaivalyam mādhyasthyam draṣṭritvam
akartr bhāvas ca ||*

And because of that contrast there ■ established the nature of this Self as a witness his isolation his neutrality his being an on looker and his being not an agent in activity (19)

In the eleventh verse the difference between matter (in its two aspects of being manifest and non manifest) and *Puruṣa* (Self) has been shown. On account of this difference, there are certain features of the *Puruṣa* that can be established. This was also stated in the seventeenth verse

I A witness is one who has simply seen an event, with no part in the event and with no interest in the event. The events relating to the system of philosophy are the changes and the movements in the world, which it ■ that is called suffering

It is when something has parts something is made up of some constituents, that there is occasion for change and

movement. When there is something that has no such constituents, that thing has no change. But in the seventeenth verse it was also said that the change in the matter with the three constituents has some controlling factor and that that controlling factor is the *Puruṣa*. Here it is explained that this function as the controlling force does not involve the *Puruṣa* in the change and movements. : Because there is the *Puruṣa*, and only because there is the *Puruṣa*, there is such a change and movement. There is only the simple presence of this *Puruṣa* and no active participation of the *Puruṣa* in the change. This is what is emphasised in this verse. It should not be supposed that when the matter changes and moves because there is the presence of the *Puruṣa*, the *Puruṣa* himself is actively functioning in this event. Because, there can be no change or movement in the *Puruṣa* since the *Puruṣa* has no constituents, each *Puruṣa* is a solid whole without parts.

2. *Puruṣa* was and ever remains completely isolated from the changes and movements in the matter. He can be involved in those changes and movements only if he has parts.

3. *Puruṣa* is also completely disinterested in the changes and in the movements in the matter. A change and a movement mean that some parts leave off and other parts come in ; the parts may be only aspects, not really material parts. But *Puruṣa* has no parts and so there can be no such interest for the *Puruṣa* either by way of having some parts removed from it or by way of having some parts added.

4. But that does not mean that the *Puruṣa* does not know what is happening in matter. The *Puruṣa* can see the changes and movements, without any interest in such changes and movements.

5. When the *Puruṣa* sees the changes and the movements in matter the *Puruṣa* does not enter the field of change and movement and does not act at all.

What is meant by a witness as stated in the first half of the verse, is made perfectly clear in the second half

where it is said that the *Puruṣa* is isolated and disinterested sees, but does not act. It is only the words of such a person that can be admitted as evidence from a witness in a court of law. It is the nature of the *Puruṣa* as not having constituent parts, that makes him such a witness. All the other features that are found in matter in its two aspects of manifestation and non-manifestation, also establish the nature of the *Puruṣa* as a witness. Each *Puruṣa* has a distinctness of his own from another and also from matter. *Puruṣa* is not an object of knowing on the part of a subject. Each *Puruṣa* has a specific nature. The *Puruṣa* is sentence itself. Nothing is produced by the *Puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* would have been involved in the changes and in the movements of matter if there had been something common in the *Puruṣa* with matter, if the *Puruṣa* had been the object of being known to the matter, if there had been a generality among the *Puruṣas* and between the *Puruṣa* and the matter and if the *Puruṣa* had been producing something. And he is the sentence so that he can see. Matter and the *Puruṣa* are entirely distinct from each other. There is nothing in common between the two. One is what the other is not and one is not what the other is. That is the position is between the two main factors in the universe, matter and spirit.

20 *tasmāt tat saṁyogād acetanam cetanāvad ita liṅgam |*
guṇa-kartṛtve 'pi tathā karte-va bhavaty udāsinaḥ ||

From such an association of theirs, the Mark which is insentient appears as being sentient. In the same way, though the constituents are the agents of activities, the one which stands by appears as an agent in activity. (20)

Though in absolute reality there is no relation between matter and *Puruṣa*, we see both together involved in each other in our own experience. We cannot deny what is experienced. Inference cannot go against the facts of experience. Certainly we cannot accept the testimony of a reliable person if that too is entirely against the facts as known in actual experience. Therefore it is said here that though the two factors are entirely distinct from each other and although there is

really no sort of inter-mingling between the two, there has arisen a sort of apparent confusion between the two on account of a particular kind of association between the two.

Matter is insentient. But matter has a constituent called the *Sattva*. That is of the nature of illumination. That does not mean that it is self-luminous. It can reflect light and its bright nature is only to this extent. When there is the illumination of sentience in the form of the Self, that illumination is reflected on the *Sattva* element in the three-fold matter. The reflected light appears to be the light of the matter itself, just as the light of the sun, reflected from the moon and the planets, appear to be the light of those bodies.

The actual movements are in the matter, because of the presence of the element called the *Rajas*, which is of the nature of movement. These two natures in the *Sattva* and the *Rajas* elements of matter have been given in the thirteenth verse. If there is change and movement, it is the matter that changes and moves and becomes the agent in the change and movement. But it has been shown in the seventeenth verse that there would have been no change and movement in the root cause in the universe if there had been no such factor called the *Puruṣa*; it is the reflection of sentience from the *Puruṣa* that gives the appearance of sentience in matter and that makes matter really an agent in activities. On account of this reflection of the sentience from the *Puruṣa*, the reflected sentience also appears to be involved in the change and in the movement and is taken to be the actual agent in the activities of the world.

As soon as there is the reflection of sentience in the matter from the *Puruṣa*, which is itself sentience, there is a disturbance in the equilibrium among the three constituents of matter, the *Sattva* having obtained a new feature called the sentience through reflection. Therefore in the stage of being the root cause, there is no such reflection and there is no

appearance of being sentient in the case of the root cause. So both the activity and the apparent sentience are in the manifest matter of change and movement and not in the root cause, that is why in the verse the apparent sentience is restricted to the "mark" (*linga*) and not applied to the root cause (*Prakṛti*) also. The agency in the matter of activity is also applied only to the constituents and not to the root cause in which the three constituents are not separately noted.

The first word in the verse is *tasmāt* (literally "therefore"). But I have taken it as a pronominal adjective meaning "that" and I gave the translation as "from that association". According to the other construction, the meaning would be "therefore from the association". The word "therefore" would mean, "since by a reasoning process, activity and sentience have been shown to exist in separate substates, the experience of the co-existence of sentience and activity in the same substrate in the undivided individual is not real, is only an appearance". I meant that the association of the two factors, the matter and the *Puruṣa*, is of a special nature which we cannot explain. The appearance of sentience in what is dead and the appearance of activity in what stands aloof are due to a special kind of association between the two factors, we do not know how, when and why that association came about. In the end it would be said (see verse 66) that when once there is the discrimination between matter in its two aspects and the *Puruṣa*, this association will cease also and that both will remain in the universe without that association and that when once cut off the particular association will not re-occur. There is no admixture of the Self with matter. The Self remains as Self and matter remains as matter. It is not like the admixture of water and milk nor of grain with pebbles. The word used in the text is *saṁyoga* and it means in this context only the presence together in the universe. There is no penetration of the parts of the one into the parts of the other. In that state neither the self nor the matter has parts, may be that when there is the transformation into manifest matter, matter in that state has parts.

21 *puruṣasya darsanā 'rtham*

kaivalya 'rtham tatha pradhānasya |

pāṇy-andhavad ubhayaḥ

api samyogas tat-kṛtāḥ sargaḥ ||

There is an association of both, like that of a lame man and a blind man, that of the Self being to provide the sight and similarly that of the Primal being for isolation. The evolution is brought about by that (21)

There are two factors in the universe and they are matter and the Self, we experience ourselves as living matter or as life in matter. They are really two distinct factors and yet they appear to be a complex in which one cannot be isolated from the other. But as a matter of fact, it is only like the association of two men, a lame man and a blind man. The lame man can see but cannot move about, the blind can move about but cannot see. For the proper movement of a man, there must be the two elements, the ability to move about and the ability to see. So, in the case of the association of the lame man and the blind man, there is only one complete individual in the matter of moving about, and if there is a detachment of either from the other, the movement stops.

The part played by the Self in this apparent complex is that the self can see, it is sentience and so it can know. Rather, it is sight itself. The part played by the matter is that there is the movement towards the goal. This is exactly what the lame man and the blind man do in their association. The lame man guides the blind man and the blind man carries the lame man along the route determined by the lame man who sees. It is not an eternal association. When they reach the goal they separate and each is isolated. Thus there are the two distinct functions for the two parties in the association. The part of the lame man is to see and the part of the blind man is to reach the goal.

In the world there is the Self which can see while the Self cannot move. There is the matter which can move while it cannot see. So each contributes its share and they reach

the goal, when each is isolated from the other. The evolution of the world and the various objects in our experience are the results of such an association between matter and the Self.

The classical commentators have their own explanations. When I was writing my *Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy*, I was not quite sure of the exact meaning. I have to revise the explanation which I gave there (p. 303). According to the classical commentators the meaning of the passage is that this association is for the Self to see the matter and also for its own isolation. The text has to be strained to get such a meaning, while the real meaning of the passage, when naturally interpreted, is what I have given. They can accept the position that the sight is in the Self; but it is said in the passage that the isolation is related to the matter. They cannot accept that the isolation is for matter. It is man, his Self, that attains isolation. So, they explain the word 'matter' as the object of the seeing by the Self. They also explain both the seeing and the isolation as related to the Self. This is far-fetched. The two words in the genitive case must be taken as the antecedents of the pronouns "of the two" in the second half. Here *kaivalya* (isolation) is at the stage of reaching the goal and the reaching of the goal is the movement to the goal. This is what the matter accomplishes in this joint activity. The verse is very simple. Isolation is for both. If in a part one is isolated from the other, the other is also isolated from this one. Therefore, no one need be frightened that there is *kaivalya* or isolation for matter while *kaivalya* is the goal for the Self.

According to Indian philosophy, there is no bondage or release for the Self, this is true of Sāṅkhya and of Vedānta. The Self is always free, unmanifested by matter. The bondage and the activity and the release are all in matter. In the seventeenth verse, it was said there is an activity for the sake of securing *kaivalya*, or isolation. This activity is in the matter and the *kaivalya* or isolation too is generated in the matter. It is in matter that there arises the

element of suffering and this is due to the reflection of the Self in the matter. Towards the close it will be stated categorically in the sixty second verse that the Self has neither a bondage nor a release. Therefore, in all the cases where there is a mention of the release, it must be understood that the release is in the matter itself, the matter finding itself in bondage on account of the reflection of the illumination from the Self. Then the Self thinks, really the reflected illumination and not the real Self, that there is a bondage and there is the activity for the release in the Self. Therefore, the explanation that there is the release as goal for the matter is not at all against the Sāṅkhya doctrine; that is the real Sāṅkhya doctrine. The verse must be interpreted in such a way that there is the contribution of the matter in the form of release or journey towards that goal.

In all the places where there is a mention of the purpose for the Self or *Puruṣa*, it must be understood to refer to the individual person who is an admixture of matter and sentience and not to the absolute Self or *Puruṣa* in the system. There are many places where the term *Puruṣārtha* or the purpose of the Self is said, in all such cases the reference can be only to the individual in the world and not to the absolute Self or *Puruṣa* in the universe.

What is this element of sight contributed by the Self? The classical commentators say that it is the final vision of the matter by the Self at the time preceding the isolation. Gauḍapāda says, "And the Primal too, securing the final release for the Self, retires, the Self too, having the vision of the Primal attains isolation." Vācaspati Miśra too says, "For that purpose, that is, the vision of the Primal which is the cause of all." It is true that at a later stage there is the mention of such a vision of the matter by the Self as the immediate antecedent of the final release, reading along with that section, the interpretation of the classical commentators is justifiable. But we have to note the simile that is given here. What the lame man in this combination contributes is not his vision of the blind man, but his sight of the path.

along which he has to go. We cannot explain the verse without taking note of the simile. So in the combination of the Self and the matter, the sight provided by the Self is the sight of the path along which the movements and the changes have to proceed after the beginning of the evolution, which has been started by this combination.

The progress of the evolution is along a certain path. There is a law according to which the evolution progresses. Why is it that the evolution, which is only in the matter, proceeds along that line and not along another line? Matter is dead and has no intelligence to see and to know. The path itself has to be settled first. For this also there must be the ability to see. Thus when matter is combined with the Self, there is the illumination reflected in the matter from the Self. This illumination settles the line of the progression and also directs the progression along the same line. That is what the lame man and the blind man will do. If the lame man has to reach one place and if the blind man has to reach another place, there is no possibility of their co-operation. They must have a common destination. Then the lame man must also make it clear to the blind man that he knows the path to be followed for reaching that destination and he must also point out that path to the blind man who can walk. In this way the simile shows that the sight in this verse is not the final vision of the Self relating to matter. In the passage it is clearly stated that the context relates to the combination of the two factors and not to the final goal. The sight is the knowledge of the path to the final destination which is *Kaivalya*. Here the term isolation must be construed as meaning the progression towards the destination. The movement to that destination is contributed by the matter. Neither the right vision of the matter by the Self at the last stage nor the isolation of the Self from its complexities with the matter comes into the picture in this verse.

According to the Sāṅkhya system the union is something like the combination of two metals, say gold and copper. They are two separate things and they come into combination with each other. They must be separated from each other

and the gold that is pure must be secured free from copper That is the goal But according to the Carvākas, there are no two separate factors in the universe as matter and life (sentience) There is no sentience as a distinct and independent factor, there is only matter and what is called sentience is only a state of matter It is like a ball rolling There is nothing like the rolling as a separate entity and we are not uniting the ball with the entity There is only the ball as a thing and a certain state of the ball we call by the name of rolling When the rolling ball stops, the ball continues, only the rolling has the end In the same way, matter continues, and what was called its sentience ceases There is no isolation for the sentience possible At the time of death, the material body remains and the sentience becomes extinct That sentience has no existence except as a state of the material body Matter itself knows the path and matter progresses along the path What is called sentience is only the state of the material body in that state of progression towards a certain stage

22 prakṛter mahāms tato

'hankāras, tasmād gatas ca sodasakāḥ |

tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāḥ,

pañcabhyah pañca bhūtaḥ ||

From the root cause there arises the intellect thence the "I" nature and thence the group of sixteen From the five among the group of sixteen, there arises the five Elements (22)

In the previous two verses, it was said that when there is the combination of the two factors namely, the Self and the matter, there starts the evolution in which the dead matter appears as living and the inactive Self appears as an agent in activity In this verse, the course of that evolution is given

✓ When there is the reflection of the illumination called the Self in the *Sattva* constituent of matter, the bright nature of that *Sattva* becomes very prominent, and the equilibrium between that and the other two constituents of the root

cause gets disturbed. The root cause with the reflection of the illumination from the Self in its *Sattva* constituent, becomes intelligent, sentient. The root cause with this *Sattva* in a dominant position is what is called *Buddhi*. Thus what is called *Buddhi*, or intellect, is only matter with the *Sattva* constituent in prominence and with the reflection of the illumination of the Self in it.

* When there is this disturbance of the equilibrium in matter and when there is this evolution called the intellect, the intellect must have an object for its function, it is knowledge and knowledge must be the knowledge of something. Therefore, the subject-object relation sets in between this *Buddhi* and the rest of the matter. This sense of being the subject, the sense of 'I,' is a transformation of the *Buddhi*, due to its own nature as the knowing intellect and also due to the existence of the rest of the matter which that *Buddhi* can know. And this object that is known by the *Buddhi*, as the subject, gets distributed into sixteen categories. There are the things to be known and there must be the means or channels for knowing them. Such channels are known as the sense-organs. *Buddhi*, the first evolute, transformed into 'I' nature, has to function in respect of the objects, through means and that is the mind. In this way, the *Buddhi* with the 'I' nature and the instrument called the mind (*Manas*) form the complex machinery for knowing, i.e. the internal agent (*antah karana*). There are the five channels through which we know the external objects, and they are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin. They are external and the mind is within.

There is the element called motion in the evolution of matter, as an integral factor in the world of experience. In the organic bodies, the movements come from within and in the other bodies, the movements must come from some organic or living body. These movements within the organic body and the movements started in the inorganic bodies outside are related to five instruments and they are called the hand, the leg, the rectum, the sex organ and the speech.

gan. They should not be taken in their bare meaning ; they rather represent types.

As known through the five-fold channels, called the five sense-organs, there are the five categories of objects. They are, in their own nature, the light (colour), the taste, the smell, the touch and the sound. They are known through the channels of the eye, the tongue, the nose, the skin and the ear. Our own experience of them is as abiding in something and that something in which the colour and others abide is called an element, a *Bhūta*. The corresponding *Bhūtas* are known as the Fire, the Water, the Earth, the Air and the Ether (*Ākāśa*). In the order of their fineness, they may be arranged as the Earth, the Water, the Fire, the Air and the Ether. In itself, i.e., when it is not within the sphere of experience through a channel or a sense-organ, there is the smell and that is called a *Tanmātra*, that in itself. We know the Earth through the organ of smell. When the sense organ operates, the smell, the thing in itself, becomes transformed into the Earth. From the five *Tanmātras*, we have the five *Bhūtas*. There are thus three sets with mutual correspondence and they are :

I	II	III
<i>The sense-organ</i>	<i>The Tanmātra</i>	<i>The Bhūta</i>
1. The Nose	The Smell	The Earth
2. The Tongue	The Taste	The Water
3. The Eye	The Light	The Fire
4. The Skin	The Touch	The Air
5. The Ear	The Sound	The Ether (<i>Ākāśa</i>)

The last set of five is evolved from the preceding set of five, the five *Tanmātras*. The five *Tanmātras*, the five sense-organs and the five organs of action creating motion, and the mind, on the whole sixteen, are evolved from the *Ahaṅkāra*, the "I" nature. This "I" nature evolves from the *Buddhi* or intellect and the intellect or *Buddhi* evolves from the root cause, the *Prakṛti*.

23. *adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ*
dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryaṁ |
sāttvikam etad-rūpam
tāmasam asmād viparyastam ||

Intellect is the determinative knowledge Its *Sāttvika* nature is law, wisdom, detachment and lordly power
 The *Tāmasic* nature is the opposite of them (23)

It has been said in the twenty-first verse that the Self contributes the element of sight. When the illumination from the Self falls on the matter, it is the *Sattva* constituent that reflects the light (1, 2). Then that *Sattva* constituent in predominance knows the law governing the progression and the distinction between the right path and the wrong path (3). It chooses the right path without any attachment towards the results, simply because it is the law (4). In this way it dominates the progression. In its pure *Sāttvika* form, this is the nature of the intellect. (These four features will be taken up later in verses 44 and 45). But *Buddhi* does not always function in its pure form, it is found that in many cases the *Buddhi* that is pure, gets involved in the *Tāmas* constituent in matter and when that *Tāmas* constituent becomes so strong as to eclipse the real nature of the pure *Buddhi* or intellect, then the nature of *Buddhi* in that form will be just the opposite of it. It refuses to go along the path of law, it goes against it and goes astray from that path too. It does not distinguish between the right path and the wrong path. It functions with attachments for some immediate and masual benefits and not for reaching the destination along the path prescribed by the law. In this way it fails also.

24. *abhimāno 'hankāras*
tasmād dvividdhah pravartate sargah |
ekādasakas ca ganas
tanmātrah pañcakas ca | va ||

The "I" nature is the subjective feeling. From that there proceeds the evolution in two currents, namely, the group of eleven and the group of five called the *Tanmātras* (24)

✓ If there is to be a resolute knowledge, there must be some agent, some subject who knows things in that resolute way. There cannot be a simple "Know". It must be in the form of "I know", "I exist", "I have this or that" and so on. It is in the very nature of the first evolute from the root cause, i.e., the *Buddhi*, that there must be a subjective sense; herefore the *Buddhi* takes up the form of an individual agent to know. There cannot be a simple "I know". What and how—these two questions also arise. There are the eleven channels and there are the five objects. —

Such evolutions are not in stages. It is a unitary evolution and even at the first stage, there arises the twenty-three categories all together. The order given above is from the point of view of their relationships and not in point of time. —

25. *sāttvika ekādaśakaḥ*

pravartate valkṛtād aḥankārāt | —

bhūtādes tanmātraḥ

sa tāmasas taljasād ubhayam ||

The group of eleven which are *Sāttvika* in nature proceeds from the "1" nature of the *Valkṛta* type. The *Tanmātras* proceed from *Bhūtād* which is *Tāmasa*. Both proceed from the *Rajasa* type (25)

The transformation of the root cause into the sentient *Buddhi* or intellect contains within itself the feature that it is the subject of a knowing; otherwise it cannot know, it cannot be sentient. This subjective consciousness contains within it the feature that there are objects within the sphere of the subject and its knowing, and also the feature that there are certain channels through which the objects reach up to the subject. It is the channels that bring the object within the grasp of the subject. That means that there is a manifestation of the object through the channels. This manifestation itself implies that there is an element of brightness in the channel. The channels are eleven in number. They are of the *Sāttvika* nature. The objects are not in themselves luminous and it is the channels that illumine them and make them manifest to the object. So the objects are of the

Tamasika nature If the objects are somewhere and if the subjects are somewhere else, there can be no mutual contact unless there is some operation, that means unless there is some activity. This activity is both in the subject and in the object.

The *Sattvika* nature of the subject is known as the *Vaikṛta* or what is generated from the *Vikṛti* or modification. The *Buddhi* or the intellect is essentially *Sattvika* in nature, though in its function it may sometimes be overcome by the *Tamasika* nature of the objects. Its modification, the subjective consciousness, must also be essentially *Sattvika* in nature, and from this direct modification there arises the organs of knowing and the organs of action, along with the mind. Being thus produced directly from the modification (*vikṛti*) of the *Sattvika Buddhi* (Intellect), the organs are known as having proceeded from this *Vaikṛta* (modification of the *Sattvika Buddhi*) aspect of the subjective consciousness.

The subjective consciousness (*Ahankāra*) has its own *Tamasa* element also, since everything contains the three constituents, and from this *Tamasa* aspect arise the five *Tanmātras* or the things in themselves. In so far as they give rise to the five Elements (*Bhūtas*), the aspect of the subjective consciousness that produces the things in themselves is called the *Bhūtādī*, the origin of the Elements or *Bhūtas*.

The *Rajasa* aspect of the subjective consciousness provides the necessary operation to bring the channels and the objects into mutual contact. That is how the three constituents of the subjective consciousness function in the evolution of the world of experience. Its *Tamasa* aspect appears as the matter, first as things in themselves and then as the elements as known by the subject through the organs. Its *Sattvika* aspect appears as the organs and its *Rajasa* aspect appears as the changes and movements.

When we look at a jar or when we taste a lump of sugar or when we smell a rose or when we touch a soft surface, there is only a sensation of a colour (light) or of a taste or

of a touch But we experience these as qualities abiding in matter Really there is only the colour and the other facts, and the matter side as the substrate, what are called the *Bhūtas*, what are produced (in experience) come in only when there is the experience The matter aspect is not a thing in itself, it is produced in experience What is real in itself is the colour and the other factors In the Nyāya and in the Mīmāṃsā systems, the colour and the other factors are the qualities and the qualities abide in the real substance, the substrates of the qualities being as much real as the qualities themselves In the Sāṅkhya system, it is the colour itself that appears as what is coloured, in experience

Even when the other five organs operate to create movement, i.e., the five organs known as the organs of action, there is the element of the *Sattva* constituent predominant in the operation The organs generate a motion and that means a manifestation of a feature in the thing Between the organ and the object there is contact brought about and this operation is the function of the *Rajas* constituent The channels, whether for the knowing or for producing a motion, are themselves of *Sattvika* nature The organs of action produce the changes and movements, the changes and the movements make the object manifest to the sense organs Nothing will be known unless there is change and movement What is absolutely without any change and without any movement cannot be known, cannot be manifest. Thus the constituent of *Sattva* or brightness exists both in the sense organs (for knowing) and also in the organs for action or movement and change It should not be supposed that the organs of action are of the nature of the *Rajas* constituent The constituent of *Rajas* produces the operation in the case of both the sets of organs This operative or active aspect of the subjective consciousness is called *Tajasa* or what is fiery Thus the subjective consciousness proceeds in three ways, as *Sattva* there are the organs (eleven in number), as *Tamas* there are the material objects and as *Rajas* there is the operation of the organs in relation to the objects

- 26 *buddhi 'ndriyāni cakṣuḥ*
srotra ghrāṇa rasanā tvag ākhyāni |
vāk-pāṇi pāda pāyū-
'pasthān karmendriyāny āhuḥ ||

The organs of knowing are what bear the names of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin. They speak of the organs of action as speech, hand, leg, rectum and the sex organ. (26)

The organs should not be taken as the mere external points in the organic body. In the case of the sense-organs they are certain physiological functionaries within those points that we call by the names given like the eye and the ear. The mind too is such a functionary. In the case of the organs of action, they must be taken to mean some types with certain voluntary physiological functions represented by the points within the organic body. Speech must be taken to signify whatever can produce a sound. Whatever can produce a movement in another body is the hand and what ever produces a movement within the body is the leg. What ever is associated with the excretion of unwanted matter is called the rectum and whatever produces some flow through the voluntary operation of glands and other parts are called by the name sex organs. These are the various voluntary activities which cannot be produced by an inorganic body from within, activities for which an inorganic body stands in need of a stimulus from some organic body. No commentator has said so, it is my own suggestion. Similarly the names of the five Elements or *Bhūtas* should not be taken in their ordinary meanings, they represent rather certain gradations in the course of the evolution.

- 27 *ubhayaḥ imakam atra manah*
sankalpakam indriyaṁ ca sādharmaṇā |
guṇa parīṇama vīṣeṣān
nānātvam bahya bhedāc ca ||

Among them, the mind is of a double nature, it is cognitive and also an organ, because of common

features Their manifoldness is explained by the particulars 11 the modifications of the constituents, and also by the differences on the external objects (27)

Mind has been enumerated as an instrument of knowing, as an *Indriya* or organ And in this way there are eleven organs enumerated, five being sense-organs and five being organs of action, with the mind as the eleventh organ But it is not entirely an organ, it has a double nature It is the subject that knows, that cognises, and as such, the mind can be regarded as a subject too, besides being a channel for the subject to contact the object When I look at a jar, it is not merely the eye that functions as the channel to bring the jar into contact with the subjective agent within, namely, the *Ahaṅkāra* and the *Buddhi* (the 'I' nature and the Intellect), the mind also operates in this function of the eye and it is the eye in collaboration with the mind that operates in bringing about the contact In one's experience of his own happiness or suffering the mind brings about the contact of the subject with the object, the object being happiness or suffering In this way sometimes the mind collaborates with an organ (both sense organ and organ of activity) and sometimes it functions alone as an organ, in both the cases it functions as an organ, being the medium between the subject and the object The eye is only a channel and is not what can be termed a cogniser But the mind is also a cogniser It receives the impression of the object and is a partner in the final cognition along with the 'I' nature and the intellect It brings the impression of the object to the subject as a channel and then it becomes the cogniser also, it is not merely the channel like the eye So it is both an internal agent, what will be called the *Antahkarana* and an instrument in cognition When the mind was enumerated among the eleven organs or instruments, this special feature of the mind which distinguishes it from the other organs is noted in this verse

I have taken the term "of a double nature" as referring to the nature of the 'I' consciousness, which is subjective consciousness, *Abhimāna* and also to the nature of the organs

As *Saṅkalpaka*, it is of the nature of the subject, and a channel, sometimes in collaboration with the ten organs and sometimes independently, it is an organ. But the classical commentators and also modern interpreters take the double nature as relating to the nature of the two kinds of organs, the sense organs and the organs of action. Gaudapada says that it is a sense organ among the sense organs and an organ of action among the organs of action. He gives the explanation for this double nature as determining the operation of the sense organs and also of the organs of action. The explanation of Vācaspati Miśra is also more or less the same; he says that it partakes of the double nature since the two sets of organs can function only when they are controlled by the mind.

According to Gaudapada, the *Saṅkalpa* is the determination where and when and how they should operate. But Vācaspati Miśra explains the term *Saṅkalpa* as what determines the impression in a specific way when the sense-organs carry the impressions only in a generic unspecified way.

What the text says is not that the mind is an organ and what determines (*Saṅkalpa*), what the text says is that the mind is what cognises (*Saṅkalpa*) and that it is also a *Indriya* (organ). So the double nature must be that it is an *Indriya* (organ) and is also what determines cognises in a specific way. One nature, that is *Saṅkalpa* abides in the subject, and at the same time it is an organ. Its distinct operation either as a sense-organ or as an organ of action has not been made clear by any commentator or modern interpreter. If it is a collaborator of the two sets of organs then it is not an organ but an accessory to the organ. If the meaning of the passage is that mind is a determining operative organ then the conjunction *ca* (and) has no value. From the text, as it stands the two features must be that it is both a *Saṅkalpaka* (determining agent) and an *Indriya* (organ). The determining agent is the subject. It has some common features with the 1 nature and also with the organs. Therefore it is of a double nature both as a subject in cognition and also as an instrument in cognition.

If the eleven organs are produced from the *Valkṛta* aspect of the *Ahankāra*, that is, from the *Sattvika* or illuminative aspect of the 'I' nature, then how is it that they is a plurality and not a unity? How are they different from each other? The answer is given in the second half of the verse. The *Ahankāra* (subjective agent) is not a homogeneous entity with the *Sattva* constituent in it. It is a complex of the three constituents. This complexity can be in different proportions of the constituents. When the three constituents modify in a particular way, there is the sense organ of seeing and when they modify in another way with another proportion, then there arises the sense of taste. It is on account of the differences in the proportion of the constituents in the modification that there are the differences in the evolutes in the form of the eleven organs.

Then the question still arises why there should be such a difference in the proportion of the three constituents in the modification, and the reply is that this difference is due to the difference in the external objects. The external objects can be brought into contact with the subject as its objects only in different ways according to the differences in the proportion of the three constituents in the object. The different gradations in respect of the fineness in the different material objects are due to the differences in the proportion of the three constituents in the objects. Corresponding to these differences there are the differences in the organs also. There is the variety (*Nānātva*) in the organs and also the difference (*Bheda*) in the external objects on account of the specialities in the modifications of the three constituents, by way of their relative proportions.

28 । *śabda-śrīṣu pañcānām*
ālōcana mātram iṣyate vṛttih ।
vacanā 'dāna-viharano-
tsargā-nandāś ca pañcānām ॥

The function of the five are accepted in respect of the group beginning with sound only as a viewing

That of the five are speech, handling, wandering about, excretion and enjoyment (28)

The five sense-organs simply bring the object into view, of course, they themselves view the objects and bring them into the view of the subject. The subject has some other functions and that is *Saṅkalpa*, determination, cognition as this or that, in a determinate way. Gaudapāda takes the word "only" (*mātra*) out of its position and connects it with "the group beginning with sound" and he says that each of them can have the view only of one of the five. The word *viharana* has the meaning "freely wandering about" in the *Upaniṣad* and also in the Buddhist literature in Pāli. It is from this sense of free movement that there is the name *vihāra* for a monastery.

29 *svā-lakṣaṇyaṃ vṛttis*

trayaśya sat'ṣā bhavaty asāmānyā i

sāmānya karaṇa-vṛttih

prānā-dyā vā, avah pañca ||

For the triad, the function is what has been given as their respective characteristic features. This function of such a nature is not common among them. The common function of these organs consists of the five vital airs starting with supreme vital air. (29)

The triad are the three categories defined in some previous verses, namely, verse twenty-three for *Buddhi*, verse twenty-four for *Ahankāra* and verse twenty-seven for *Manas*. The definition of *Buddhi* is that it is *Adhyavasāya*, resolute knowledge, that of *Ahankāra* is *Abhimāna*, subjective consciousness, and that of *Manas* is *Saṅkalpa*, cognitive function. *Manas* or mind functions as a cognition, *Ahankāra* or "I" nature functions as a subjective consciousness as "I am knowing" and *Buddhi*, intellect, functions as determinative knowledge. Mind brings the knowledge to the subjective consciousness and the intellect knows it as a definitive one. Thus each has a distinct function among them in the ordinary process of knowing. These are cases of what may be called the voluntary activity of the internal organ. There

are three factors in what is called the voluntary activity of knowing, and each of the three factors has its part in the internal functions in its individual capacity and their functions are also distinctly demarcated

But a body is a living body only when there are various other functions going on, and those functions do not come within the volition of the person. They are distinct from the functions of the ten organs of knowing and doing (five in each). In these involuntary functions, the internal organ does not operate according to their method of a distribution of agency among the three constituents of the internal organ. They are just there and the function goes on, without any such process as a first awareness (in the mind) and as a subject for the knowing (in the "I" consciousness) and as a resolute knowledge in the *Buddhi* (intellect). The internal organ is not at all divided into three agencies in this involuntary function. That is why they are called involuntary functions. The three-fold function is what is called volition.

These involuntary functions are generally called the "vital airs", but the actual air functions only in some of them. They are physiological functions within a living organism. The air going out and coming in, in one of such functions, is only a consequence. The beating of the heart is what is called the *Prāṇa* (the supreme breath). Then when there is the function in the upper parts of the body, it is called the *Udāna*, when it is in the lower parts, it is called the *Apāna*. The function in the middle part represented by the navel is called *Samāna* and the function in the entire body without any such distribution is called the *Vyāna*. All the words are derived from *Van*, and that root means "to breathe". The word *Ātman* Self, is traced to this root, what breathes. To this is added *Pra* (supreme), *ud* (upwards), *apa* (downwards), *sam* (together, i.e., neither upwards nor downwards) and *vi* (away, spreading), to form the five separate names. They together form the life function of an organic body. In this function the triad of internal organs the intellect, the "I" nature and the mind function as a unity in common. That is

why there is no special effort on our part in such functions, they simply go on. In a voluntary life activity, the three parts of the internal organs function separately and in the involuntary life activities, they function as a unit, in common

30 *yugapac catuṣṭayasya tu*
vṛttih kramaśaś ca tasya nīrdiṣṭā |
drṣṭe tathā 'py adrṣṭe
trayasya tat pūrvikā vṛttih ||

But the function of this group of four is shown to be simultaneous and in sequence, in the case of perception. Even then, in the case of what is not perception, the function of the triad has that as the antecedent (30)

There are two ways in which knowledge comes to a person. One is by direct perception, through the direct instrumentality of the sense organs. In the other, there is no operation of the sense organs in direct relation to the object known. The second may be either a process of inference or a process of knowledge from another person. This is what has been explained in the fourth, fifth and sixth verses above. It has been said that there are four parties in a knowledge, namely, the three internal organs and a sense organ. In this verse, the function of the four parties is specified in the two types of knowing. All the four must function in every case of knowing; but there is a slight difference in this matter regarding the two types

In the case of perception, the four parties come together and function together simultaneously. But in the other cases, that of inference and the testimony of a reliable person, the sense organ finishes earlier and the other three alone function at the moment of knowing. But the prior function of a sense-organ is necessary even in this type of knowing. Thus when I see a jar, the sense-organ functions as a channel along with the mind and reveals the jar to the internal organ and the internal organ, consisting of the mind and the subjective consciousness and the intellect, finish the knowing. They

function together, without any noticeable interval between the function of each. The word *Yugapad* (simultaneous) does not mean absolute identity in point of time, but only the absence of any noticeable interval between any two.

When I infer fire on the mountain from the smoke known to be there, the function of the sense organ was finished at the time when the universal relation of co-existence between the fire and the smoke was determined through their co-existence in specific cases like the kitchen and the city squares where people gather and warm themselves in a lighted fire. There is a noticeable interval between this function of the sense organ and the process of knowing the fire on the mountain, where one does not see the fire at all and where the sense-organ has no function directly in relation to the fire, if the sense organ functions in seeing the smoke that is another affair, and in that case inference does not operate. Similarly, when I know from a reliable person that there are fruits on the bank of the river there is the man who had seen it and the function of the sense organ was finished at that time. I know about the fruits only after an interval and at that time my sense organs do not function in relation to the fruits. If I hear the statement of the person that is again another affair. That has relation only to the words and not to the fruits known.

The classical commentators have another interpretation to give. The verse says that the four (the sense-organs and the internal organ consisting of three members namely, the mind, the subjective consciousness and the intellect) function simultaneously and in sequence in the case of the perception. They consider this as two distinct types of perception. Both Vacaspati Miśra and Gauḍapāda take the two words as relating to two distinct types of perception. In one, the four function simultaneously as when a man sees a tiger and runs away, there is no sequence between the function of the eye and that of the internal organ: the man sees the tiger and runs away. When he hears the sound of the string of a bow, he may stop and think and then fear that some one might be coming who might do him harm. There is a sequence

between the hearing of the sound of the bow string and the knowing that there is danger. This is the example which Vacaspati Miśra gives for each of the two types. Gaudapāda gives other examples, but their positions are the same.

Even in this example, there is an interval, there must be such an interval between the function of the sense organ and of each of the three members of the *antahkarana* (internal organ). Only, the interval is so minute that it is not noticed. And that is how they understand the term "simultaneity". There is no occasion for such a division of the process of perception into two types. It has been said in the previous verse that the function of the three members of the internal organ is what forms their distinctive features. It is also said in the twenty seventh verse that mind is both a sense-organ and an internal organ. The point at issue is their relative functions. How do they function? Which precedes and which succeeds in the functioning? These are the questions that arise. In the previous verse it was said that the three members of the internal organ function individually in the process of knowing. So, the point had to be slightly modified and that is the force of the term "but" in the verse. The expression "even then" also shows such a contrast between their function in a process of perception and their function in a process of knowing other than perception.

In the fifth verse perception has been defined as a determination in respect of every individual subject. In the twenty third verse *Buddhi*, intellect, has been defined as the determinative knowledge. The term used is the same in both namely, *adhyavasāya*. In the definition of perception, it was said that there is a determinative knowledge (by the intellect, as implied in the later verse) in respect of each individual object. The sense organ functions at the same time as the intellect, this is included by implication in that definition. That is what distinguishes perception from the other two modes in which the sense organ does not function in respect of the object known, what immediately precedes the knowing is only the knowledge of the relation of the mark and what

is marked in the case of the inference and in the case of the testimony of a reliable person, it is the hearing of the words that immediately precedes the knowing. What was implied there, in that classification of knowing into two patterns, is made explicit in this verse

31 *svam svām pratiṣṭadyante
parasparā-ākṛta hetukām vṛttim |
puruṣā-ārtha eva hetur
na kenacit lāryate karanam || (31)*

They take up their respective functions with the intentions of each as the moving force. The goal of the Self is the sole ground, the organ is not activated by any (31)

When there is a jar in front or when there is a lump of sugar or when there is a rose, the eye or the tongue or the nose functions and brings a sensation to the internal organs and the internal organs respond to this presentation. There is a mutual adhesion among the various factors in the world. They are all aspects of the same root cause. They evolve through a process of modifications and further modifications. Such modifications and such further modifications are guided by the illumination from the Self (*Puruṣa*). That is what has been said in the twenty first verse, namely, that what the factor of the Self (in reflection) contributes is the sight. This shows that everything is intelligently planned and worked out in the course of this evolution. When there is the object, the sense organs know which of them should function. The internal organs know when the external organs would be presenting something to them and then they respond. The entire world is living as a single organism. There is nothing that is a chance, that has no plan and no purpose. There is an *ākṛta* (intention with a purpose) in everything in this world. Each responds to the other and they all function in mutual harmony with the understanding of the intention and purpose of one another. When a fly settles on the back of a cow, the tail comes to the help and by its swing, the fly is driven out. When a thorn bites the foot of a man, the hands

come to his rescue by plucking out the thorn. In the same way, there is a mutual understanding of the needs of all by all, and also a collaboration among all, in this world.

Each illumination from the Self (*Purusa*) reflected in the matter settles its goal and its path. The goal alone is what determines the mutual collaboration. In this context, the word *Purusa* (Self) need not be taken in its technical sense of that factor in the universe which is given as the "knower" in the beginning of the treatise in the second verse. It is the individual in the world constituted of the matter in which there is the illumination of the real Self (*Purusa*) that is meant by the term *Purusa* here, and that is the individual person in the world of activity. Each individual has an intelligence and each has the power and the vision to determine his own course and his own goal at the time of starting the evolution. That goal alone impels the various parts of the human organism to function in harmony with one another and also in harmony with the external world.

The instrument is not made to function in a particular way by any external agency. In this verse the instrument (*karana*) means both the external organs and the internal organs. There is no agency outside the individual to regulate the course or to determine the goal. Here what is wanted to be emphasised is that there is no God to regulate the course of human activities. It has been said that the course of the world started from within the root cause through the reflection of the illumination of the Self, that means that there is no God to start the universe on a course of evolution. A God is a God either as Creator or as the regulator of man's activities in the world. He determines what is the right path and what is not the right path. Both the goal and the course are determined by Him. When it is said that there is no external agency to prompt the organs (internal and external) in their functions what is meant is that God has no place in this philosophy. Usually, the operation of an instrument, a *karana*, presupposes the activity of an agent. But in this philosophy the instruments of knowing and of activity operate by themselves.

The position is that this is a philosophy of atheism, without God, a philosophy in which God has no place. But when it is said that there is no external agency to impel the activities of the individual person, there is a further implication, if anyone introduces the question of a God, the philosophy will have to become an anti-theistic philosophy. Reasons will be adduced to show that there cannot be a God. As a matter of fact, the atheistic tendency of the philosophy has been indicated even in the second verse when it was said that the goal is to know the three constituents where God has been given no place. God has a position in religion, this philosophy has been even there, by implication, declared to be superior to religion. One's reason helps man to reach the right goal, far better than what guidance a God can render, God's guidance as given in religion, can take man only to a certain stage and not to the ultimate goal. This is a philosophy of the supremacy of man and also of the absolute competence of man to know independently the ultimate truth and to reach the ultimate goal.

32 *kāraṇam trayo dāśa vidham*

tad āharaṇa dhāraṇa prakāśakaraṇa |

kāryaṇi ca tarjya dasadhā

'hāryam dhāryam prakāśyaṇi ca ||

The organs are of thirteen kinds and they are the agents in seizing, holding and manifesting them. Their objects are also of ten kinds, being what are seized, what are held and what are manifested. (32)

In a process of voluntary activity there are three factors, namely, the agent, the objects and the instrument. The instruments are either internal or external. The external ones are divided into two groups, namely, the organs of activity and the sense organs. There are three internal instruments (*antahkarana*) and there are five organs of activity and there are five sense organs. In that way there are thirteen instruments.

In this process there must be the first contact with the object, then the object must be held in that contact and there

must be the manifestation of the object. This is true both in the process of a knowing and in the process of an activity. The ten external instruments contact the object along with the mind, the mind retains the contact and presents the object to the internal organ, of which it is itself a member, and then the internal instruments have the awareness of the object either in knowing or in activity. It makes no difference whether I am seeing a jar or whether I am lifting up a jar. The difference is only in the external instrument. If I see a jar, it is the eye that contacts the jar, and in lifting it, it is the hand that contacts the jar. It is the mind which is common to both the acts, that maintains the continuity of the process. There is no break up in the process between the eye or the hand on one side and the internal instruments on the other side, there is a transfer from one to the other, without any break in the process.

Corresponding to the three-fold function of the instrument, there is the three-fold aspect of the object. The object is contacted, is kept up in the contact, and is manifested. These objects are here divided into ten. They are the five *Tanmātras* (things-in-themselves) and the five elements (*Bhūtas*). I see or I lift up a jar with a colour. I take a lump of sugar and eat it, along with the sweet taste and so on.

The classical commentators have their own interpretations. Gaudapāda says that the organs of activity do the function of contacting or seizing, the sense-organs manifest objects and the internal organs maintain or hold the life on. The ten objects are the five *Tanmātras* and the five activities mentioned in the twenty-eighth verse. Vacaspati Miśra too accepts the same interpretation, only, he divides the objects of the sense-organs and of the organs of activity into two further subdivisions as human and divine.

I have already said that there is an element of manifestation in the function of the organs of activity. It is not merely a dead activity. This seems to be a more natural interpretation. But the classical commentators have taken the three sets given in the verse as relating to the three sets of instruments. To me, the three refer to all the instruments

33 *antah karanam tri-vidham
 dasathā bahyam trayasya viśaya 'khyam |
 sāmprata kalam bahyam
 tri kalam abhyantaram karanam ||*

The internal organs are of three kinds the external ones are of ten kinds bearing the designation of being objects of the three. The external organs function only in respect of what are in the present time, the internal organs function in respect of what are in the three divisions of time (33)

The internal organs consist of the three members, namely, the intellect (*Buddhi*) the subjective consciousness (*Ahankāra*) and the mind (*Manas*). The external organs are the five sense organs and the five organs of activities. Mind is internal even when it is a sense-organ.

The eye and the other sense organs and the hand and the other organs of activity can function only in respect of objects that are at the present time. One cannot see a thing that existed long ago or that will come into existence only long after. But the internal organs can also function in respect of what are past or what will come in the future. This means that the mode of perception operates in respect of objects that exist in the present moment while inference and the statement of another person can operate in respect of what are past or what are present or what will be in the future.

Here it must be borne in mind that in the Sankhya system there is no category called the Time. There is no Space either as a category. Time and Space are only the relations between events and events. There are only the events and not something external to them to relate them to one another. The events are related as cause and effect, the fundamental and the modification. The cause is prior to the effect and one event is here while another event is there. The events do not have substrates like here and there or now and then.

An event is a modification of the root cause or a further modification of some such modification. If such an event requires a substrate then the question arises whether that substrate is itself a modification of the root cause, or whether it is a modification of anything else or whether it is another basic category. If it is the first alternative, then there is infinite regression. If it is either of the latter two, then there are other categories of a basic nature besides the root cause (*Mūla Prakṛti*) and the Self.

The relation between the three internal organs and the ten external instruments is given as, "bearing the title of being the objects of experience (*Bhogyā*) for the three." That is, there is the subject object relation between the two groups. Vacaspati Miśra takes the term in its etymological sense. *Vijaya* is object and *Ākhyā* is knowing. They are what make the external objects known to the internal organs, they form the channel between the internal organs and the external objects.

The meaning is that the ten are the objects of the three, being controlled by the three. Their functions are controlled and supervised and directed by the internal organs. It has already been said in the thirty-first verse that each of them functions independently, knowing the intentions of the others. That is slightly qualified here. There must be the attention in the mind if the external instruments are to function, and it has been said in the seventh verse that lack of such attention is one of the causes for the non cognition of an object. That point is made clear here.

34 *buddhi-śāndriyāni teṣāṃ*
pañca viśeṣā-śiṣeṣa vijayāni |
vāg bhavati śabda vijayā
śeṣāni tu pañca vijayāni ||

Among them the organs of knowing have as their objects things specific and things not specific. The organ of speech has sound as its object, but the remaining have the five as their objects. (34)

Of the ten external instruments, the five sense organs have as their objects what are specific and also what are not specific. There are the ten objects mentioned in the previous verse, they are the five things in themselves (*Tanmātras*) and the five elements (*Bhūtas*). The five things in themselves are the specific objects for the five sense organs. Colour is cognised only by the eye, taste only by the tongue, smell only by the nose, touch only by the skin and sound only by the ear. In the case of the five elements, earth, fire and air are perceptible, both by the eye and by the touch. Sound is cognised only by the ear, but it is also the object of the organ of activity called the speech, which produces the sound. The remaining, that is, the four other organs of activity have the five, namely, the five elements or *Bhūtas* as their objects. The hand can give a movement to earth, water, fire and air, that is quite understandable. How *Ākāśa* or ether comes within the sphere of function of the organs of activity is a matter that gives some trouble.

It may be that there is an acceptance of the doctrine of the admixture of the five elements. *Ākāśa* is simple *Ākāśa* (Ether). But in the case of the other four elements, the doctrine is that they contain also the other elements in admixture. We call earth by that term on account of the predominance of the earth element in it, not because it is purely earth. Air contains air predominantly and ether as a subordinate admixture. In the same way, fire contains ether and air also and water contains ether, air and fire too. Earth contains all the five. There are different theories about this. There are slight differences among the systems of philosophy regarding this admixture of the five elements in the formation of the five elements.

Gaudapada interprets the terms specific and non-specific in his own way. He says, 'Men grasp sound, touch, colour, taste and smell along with a qualification that is the qualification of pleasure, pain and ignorance. Gods grasp them without such qualifications.' About the five organs of activity also, Gaudapada says that there is no difference between men and gods in the matter of speech, they all recite

and talk in the same way. According to Vacaspati Miśra, the specific and the non specific are the gross elements and the subtle things-in-themselves (*Tanmātras*). While I accept that the reference is to the ten mentioned by him, I take the terms specific and the non specific in another way, not to distinguish between the subtle *Tanmātras* and the gross elements. My interpretation is that some are specific objects of the senses and others are common to the senses.

When sound is excluded from the objects of the organs of activity in general in so far as it is the object of the speech organ, there are again the five objects mentioned for the remaining. Gaudīpāda says that there are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell in the hand. The leg walks freely on the earth which is characterised by all the five beginning with the sound. In this way he explains the function of the remaining two also. I am not satisfied with his explanation. Vācaspati Miśra says that the remaining organs of activity handle things that are characterised by the five *Tanmātras*, things in themselves. This must be based on the doctrine of all the elements containing the admixture of the other elements. Vācaspati Miśra is not clear on the point.

The object that is specific for one among the five organs of activity, namely, sound for the organ of speech, has been clearly stated in the verse. Therefore, consistently, in the first half also, what is meant must be the distinction between objects that are specific for some sense organs and objects that are not so specific. That is why I have given my own interpretation, without accepting the classical commentaries.

35 *santahkaranā buddhiḥ*

sarvaṃ viśayaṃ avagāhate yasmāt |

tasmat tri vidham karanam

dvāri dvarāṇi seṣāni ||

Because the intellect combined with the internal organs, comprehend the entire field of objects, the three fold organ is what has a channel, and the rest are the channels. (35)

The internal organs with the intellect as their chief, pervades the entire field of the objects of knowing. It has already been stated in the thirty third verse that the ten external instruments are the objects for the three internal instruments. That point is now made quite clear, the thirteen instruments in knowing do not have the same status. The three internal organs control the channels and the ten external instruments are only the channels. Even among them the intellect is the chief, it is to show this that the intellect is specified separately among the internal organs. The expression "combined with" must be taken to mean "having the others as subordinates, as associates." The external instruments can grasp only what are in the present moment, as stated in the thirty third verse and they can function only if there are no such obstacles as are enumerated in the seventh verse. But the internal organs can grasp everything whether they are past or future whether they are immediately before or far off, whether there are interceptions or not. The internal organs function always and the external organs are made use of as channels only when they have to get anything from outside. In the sphere of inference, which is the important mode followed in the system of philosophy, the external instruments have little scope. It is dominated by the internal organs. That is why this importance is attached to the internal organs. It must be understood and recognised that the internal organs cannot supercede what are brought to the internal organs by the external instruments and cannot also function independently contradicting what are brought to them by the external instruments. The importance of the internal organs is only in the philosophy, where in the process of reasoning they have a dominant place and can function without the operation of the external instruments.

36 *ete prādīpa kalpāḥ*

paraspara vīlakṣaṇā guṇa vīśeṣāḥ ।

kṛtsaṇam puruṣasyā 'rtham

prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti ।

- 37 *sarīram praty upabhogam*
yasmāt puruṣasya sādhaṃyati buddhiḥ
sai 'va ca vīśīnaṣṭi punah
pradhāna-puruṣa-'ntaram sūkṣmam ||

These particular formations of the constituents, like a lamp, having separate characteristics different from one another, yield to the intellect the entire purpose of the Self after illuminating it (36)

And therefore the intellect accomplishes for the Self the experience in respect of everything, that intellect itself again distinguishes the subtle difference between the root cause and the Self (37)

In the thirteenth verse the illustration of a lamp was given. In the twenty-seventh verse it was stated that there is a large variety in the world of experience on account of the various combinations of the three constituents. Each of the external organs is different from the others and this difference is due to the difference in the combinations of the three constituents. In the thirteenth verse it has also been said that the functions of the three constituents have some purpose. In the thirty-first verse that purpose is made clear as the goal of the individual.

The function of the external instruments is to present the external objects to the internal organs. The internal organs do not proceed outside. The external instruments are the channels through which the internal organs contact the external objects. The external instruments go to the external objects, seize them and present them to the internal organs. They do not function at random. There is the goal and they know what the goal is and what the method of procedure is to reach that goal.

Their chief function is only to seize the external objects and bring them to the internal organs. In the verse there is an indication that the illumination is also a function of the external instruments. That is how a strict construction of the passage will yield a meaning. When the external instruments, along with the mind, bring the object to the external

organ, then the mind holds it on and then along with the subjective consciousness, the object is presented to the intellect, which is the real chief. The illumination is only at this stage. Along with the presentation of the external object to the intellect there is the illumination. It has been said in the thirty-second verse that there is a three-fold agency in the function of the thirteen members, seizing, holding and illumination. Here the term "illumination" means only "producing the illumination" which takes place only when the object reaches the intellect. In the present verse, the superior position of the intellect is made clear.

There is room for a doubt why there must be such an importance attached to the intellect, why it should be accepted that the external objects are presented to the intellect by the other instruments. Can we not say that all the instruments, including the intellect, were in co-ordination? The reply is that the other instruments may function and yet the individual does not have the impression of being the experiencer, either by way of enjoyment or by way of suffering in respect of the external objects until the intellect functions. We may see so many things, we may do so many things, yet there will not be the impression in the form, "I have seen or I have done" until the intellect too has functioned in respect of that object.

Further, the goal of philosophy is to discriminate between the root cause of the world of change and movement and the sentence. That is accomplished only by the intellect and not by the external instruments or even by the mind and the subjective consciousness. That final discrimination is an intellectual function without any reference to the other instruments in knowing. It is for these reasons that a distinction is made between the intellect and the other twelve instruments though they are all instruments in knowing.

Gaudapada takes the first half of the verse as the ground for the statement in the second half of the verse. There is the word *Yasmāt*—wherefore—in the first half and so he adds the word *Tasmāt*—therefore—in the second half. Wherefore the

intellect accomplishes for the Self the enjoyment in respect of everything, therefore, it is he alone that discriminates between the subtle difference of the Self and the root cause. Here also there is the implication that the intellect has a superior position relative to the other instruments of knowing. Vācaspati Miśra takes the whole verse as an additional ground for the eminence of the intellect.

38 *tanmātrāṇy avīśeṣāḥ*
tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhīḥ |
ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ
śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca ||

The things-in-themselves are non-specific. From these five the five elements arise. They, being specific, are spoken of as calm, insurgent and faint (38)

In the thirty-fourth verse the sense-organs were spoken of as having specific and non-specific objects. Though the same terms are used here, I take the terms in a different sense in this verse. In the stage of being things-in themselves, they cannot be distinguished among themselves. They are not the specifications of anything. They are in that stage when they are not the objects of sense-organs. When they become such objects of sense-organs, they become the elements and the elements can be distinguished among themselves. We experience the elements in three ways. Some impress themselves on us in a very calm way, others produce a very violent impression on us, still others make only a very faint impression. It is when the *Sattva* constituent is prominent that there is the first impression, when the *Rajas* constituent is prominent, there is the second kind of impression and when the *Tamas* constituent predominates, there is the faint impression.

Gaudapāda says that only gods can experience the things in themselves and to them there is no such difference as calm, insurgent and indifferent, they experience them all as calm without any undue intensity and undue faintness.

39 *śukṣmā māta pitr-jāh*
saha prabhūtais tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ |
śukṣmās teṣāṃ nityā
māta pitr jā nīvartante ||

The subtle and what are generated from the mother and the father along with the gross elements—the specific are thus of three kinds. Of them the subtle are constant, what are generated from the mother and from the father retire (39)

It has been said in the previous verse that the five gross elements are specific. In this verse it is said that the specific are of three kinds in which the subtle ones are also found included, and the subtle ones are non specific according to the previous verse. There is an apparent inconsistency here. To avoid this inconsistency, we have to take the term *Viśeṣa* (specific) in this verse to mean not the gross elements, but the gross body which are specific for each individual, and which are mainly of the nature of the gross elements. What distinguishes the individual among themselves is the presence of the gross elements constituting the body. In this body there are three elements. There is a subtle part and there is also a gross part. The gross part is of two kinds, what is generated from the parents and what is assimilated from the outside world within the womb and after the birth. It is the part contributed by the parents along with the matter assimilated from the external world when in the womb and after the birth, that distinguishes one individual from another. Then there is the subtle part, which will be explained in the next verse. This subtle part persists while at the time of the death, the gross part retires from the individual. That subtle part of the body takes up a new gross body, first assimilating the parts contributed by the parents in the womb and also assimilating matter from external sources both within the womb and after birth, gradually. What is called an individual is the subtle part with the gross part assimilated by it in the womb and after the birth.

When the subtle part assimilates matter from outside and when there is the matter contributed by the parents to form the nucleus of the gross body, there is some special anatomical formation specified for the gross body. This anatomical formation is described in the works on medical science, especially in the *Susruta Samhita*. In verse thirty-eight, the *Tanmātras*, the things-in-themselves, are spoken of as non specific. In this verse, there is the term *Sūkṣma*, subtle. It is true that the *Tanmātras* are *Sūkṣma*. But they do not exhaust the subtle part. They are included within the subtle part and there are other subtle elements also in the body. All these subtle parts are related to the gross part. These subtle parts form a combination and are called the subtle body. It is in this sense, the sense of a subtle body, that the word *Sūkṣma*, subtle, is used in this verse. And this subtle body is described in the next verse.

40 *purvo tpannam asaktam*
mj atam mahad ādi sul sma paryantam |
samsarati nirupabhogam
bhāvair adhivāsitam lingam ||

Born prior unattached, constant, constituting of what begin with the intellect and what end with the subtle—this. Mark transmigrates, free from experience, with the dispositions abiding in them (40)

When there was the diversification of the uniform root cause into twenty three categories, namely, the three inner organs (intellect and subjectivity and mind) the five sense organs, the five organs of activity, the five *Tanmātras* (the things in themselves) and the five gross elements, it was not a mere diversification. Along with this diversification, there have been formed an infinite number of combinations of eighteen of them, excluding the five gross elements, and they form certain units that hold together. It is these units that are really understood by the term Self, *Ātman*, and the whole function of the evolutes from the root cause, mentioned before and later also, is for the sake of this unit. They gather a gross body around them, with the material contributed by the

parents and assimilated from the external world both within the womb and after the birth. The gross body is cast off and another gross body is gathered. This is what is called the transmigration of the Self. It is this unit that transmigrates and not the *Puruṣa* or the Self. They are combinations, they are units that cannot be broken up. They remain constant when the gross bodies change.

This subtle body has been ever there, earlier than any other evolute. Here the term *utpanna* (born) should not be taken in its literal sense of a production of what was not prior. All that it means is that the subtle body was there prior to all. The fact is that the world of changes and movements has no real beginning. There was no interval between the evolution of the various categories and the formation of the subtle bodies.

It is not attached to anything. The classical commentators take the word "*Asaktam*" to mean what is not obstructed in its movement by anything what can enter even the thick rocks, as they say. The presence of a material body is an obstacle in the way of another, but in the case of this subtle body, it can be there where there is the other matter also. But I think that what it means is that the subtle body is not attached to any gross matter. The body remains free from any sort of attachment to the gross elements. They gather the elements and then they cast off the elements, thereafter they gather new elements. This gathering of new elements is what is called the embodiment. Even when the body is thus in a state of association with the gross matter, there is no attachment. Gross matter comes and goes while the subtle body remains unattached to such changing gross matter.

The subtle body is constant. The classical commentators say that it remains from the very beginning to the final dissolution. This is what *Vācaspati* says. *Gauḍapāda* says that it remains till the rise of the true knowledge and the transmigration comes to a stop. I take it to mean that the subtle bodies are not mixed up with one another, this is

what is given in the eighteenth verse. There is a constancy regarding each individual and this was given as one of the grounds for inferring the plurality of the *Puruṣa*. Each subtle body is the result of the reflection of the sentence from each separate *Puruṣa* on the root cause. Each such body is constant to the *Puruṣa* also, without any sort of admixture. Along with this the term "unattached" may as well be taken to mean what is not attached to the *Puruṣa*, i.e., the *Puruṣa* is not affected by the body. The *Puruṣa* remains pure even though the subtle body is generated by the reflection of the sentence from that *Puruṣa* without any sort of attachment of the body to the *Puruṣa*.

It consists of the eighteen evolutes starting from the intellect, the *Buddhi*, up to the subtle elements, the *Tanmātra*. They are what are enumerated in the twenty second verse omitting the first, namely, the *Prakṛti* and the *Puruṣa* and the last five, i.e., the gross elements. In the previous verse, the term *Sūkṣma* meant the entire subtle body with its eighteen constituents, but in this verse, the term means only the subtle elements the five *Tanmātras*.

This subtle body has no experience of its own. The experience is only in the gross body that it gathers round it. The experience is from the point of gathering the gross body up to the point of the gross body dissolving, what is called death. It transmigrates from gross body to gross body.

Although it has no experience, it is the abode for some dispositions. When there is an experience, that experience leaves some residue and this residue can remain only in the subtle body, the gross body falls off and cannot carry such residual impressions. Such impressions or dispositions are called *Bhava*, a mental state or modification. Each such body is distinguished from the other bodies on account of such dispositions. Otherwise the subtle bodies have no distinguishing mark. Though the *Puruṣas* are only pure sentience, there is some individuality in them, which produces some such distinguishing disposition in the subtle body even at the very start. That is why there is no uniformity in the impressions

of the various subtle bodies. The fact that a particular subtle body is the result of the reflection of the sentence from a particular *Puruṣa*, is itself a distinguishing feature for that subtle body and this determines also the nature of the progression of that subtle body.

These subtle bodies have an individuality. But they have no structure, no form, no volume, no mass. They are at the same time absolutely material. They should not be confused with the cells of modern biology. The cells are material formations with a structure and a mass and a volume. When a cell is destroyed and when a new cell is produced, that second cell has a factor called life. That factor existed in the first also. The life factor in the first cell determines the nature of the life factor in the second. Thus a cell that can evolve into the body of the elephant cannot produce a cell that can evolve into the body of a horse. This life factor in the two cells, the one that is dead and the one that is generated, is what may be called the subtle body. It is called a *Linga*, a Mark. It is this body that "marks" the individuality that runs through an infinite number of gross bodies that are in succession gathered by the same subtle body and that are cast away by it. When a man is born, there is a new personality found in that body. But he is not born with a blank life in which dispositions are generated. When a man is born, there is some antecedent. This antecedent is of two kinds, one determining the genus to which the organic body belongs and the other determining the dispositions of that body. It is the factor generated from the parents, as mentioned in the previous verse, that determines the genus. The material contributed by the parents belonging to the elephant genus can produce only a body that belongs to the elephant genus. Thus, the fact that when a man is born, he belongs to the human genus is due to the material which the body has received from the parents, who are men. The subtle body selects the place, the particular womb where it can receive the material contributed by the parents belonging to the human genus. But the fact that he is born of such and such parents does not

result in the newly born man developing certain dispositions like intellectual capacities and tastes. They are carried forward from the previous embodiment by way of dispositions, the *Bhāvas*. We must distinguish between the personality in an individual and individuality running through a whole series of such personalities. Each such personality is a link in a chain, which entire chain has an individuality determined by the subtle body. The dispositions within this individuality are enduring, carried from birth to birth.

41 *citram yathā 'śrayam ite
sthānvā-'dibhjo vīṇā yathā chāyā ।
tadvad vīṇā viśeṣaḥ
na tiṣṭhātī niraśrayam liṅgam ॥*

Just as a picture cannot remain without a support, just as there cannot be a shadow without a post or other things, in the same way, the Mark cannot remain without a support, without the specific (41)

A picture cannot be painted in an empty vacuum and there can be no shadow in a vacuum. There must be a wall or some such surface on which a picture can be painted and there must be some material body which alone can cast a shadow. In the same way, the subtle body, the Mark, must have some support to stand on, there must be the specific factors.

Gaudapāda reads the text as *Vīṇā viśeṣaḥ* and says that the subtle body cannot remain without the unspecific. The unspecific are the subtle elements, the *Tanmātras*, as given in the thirty eighth verse. By *Linga*, he does not mean the entire subtle body, but only the thirteen constituents in it excluding the five *Tanmātras*. The printed editions of Vacaspati read the text as *Vīṇā viśeṣaḥ*. *Viśeṣas* are what are specific. The meaning given by Vācaspati is *Sūksma-sarīra*, the subtle body. From the context it is found that he too means the five *Tanmātras* by the term *Viśeṣa*, specific.

The meaning, according to the classical commentators, seems to be that the thirteen constituents of the subtle body among the eighteen enumerated in the previous verse, cannot

remain without the five *Tanmātras*. I do not know how the question arises at all. The subtle body consists of the eighteen factors and the question does not arise whether any part of them consisting of the thirteen, can remain without the other part, consisting of the five. There is a division possible between the thirteen forming the instruments, the *Karanas*, for knowing and for activities and the five forming the nucleus for the body. But no question arises about either part remaining without the other.

In the thirty eighth verse, it was said that the five *Tanmātras* are non-specific (*Aviśeṣa*) and the five gross elements are specific (*Viśeṣa*). The subtle body does not contain the five gross elements. The question that can arise is whether the combination of the eighteen forming the subtle body can remain at all independent of the five gross elements. The answer is given in this verse that although there is the subtle body without the gross elements, the remaining eighteen in combination and forming the subtle body can never remain as an independent entity. They always remain associated with the five gross elements. At the time of death, the gross elements drop off and the eighteen factors forming the unit continue. But they cannot endure independently, they require other gross elements for their continuity. That means that there is never a stage when the subtle body remains as a free, independent subtle body. It always remains with a gross body also. This is indicated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* where there is the mention of the doctrine of transmigration. When one body is left off, there is resort to a new body. There is no disembodied state. The subtle body has a gross body gathered round it at all times, though the unit called the subtle body is a separate entity, distinct from the gross elements.

42 *puruṣa-rtha-hetukam idam*

nimitta naimittika-prasaṅgena |

prakṛter vibhūtvā yogān

naśavad vyavattīkṣhate līṅgam ||

This mark appears in manifold forms with the goal of the Self as the ground, in the contexts of the means and what the means serves, on account of the association of the root cause with pervasiveness like an actor (42)

This subtle body presents itself in the world in various forms. It has been said in the previous verse that as soon as a gross body falls down there must be another gross body for the subtle body to remain, it cannot remain by itself without such a support. The new body is always found to be different from the previous body. Each such gross body which a subtle body assumes in succession is distinct from another. And the bodies assumed by different subtle bodies are also different from one another. It is like an actor who assumes different roles in his profession.

There is an infinite number of subtle bodies and each must always have a gross body as its support. When a gross body perishes there must be a gross body ready for the subtle body to adopt as its support. The gross body is produced in the womb and the subtle body cannot get into the womb directly. It has to get into it through some natural channel. How is this arrangement made in the universe for each subtle body to be provided with a gross body at all times when it is in need of it and how is it also that each such gross body is found to be distinct from the other bodies, both in the case of the gross bodies assumed by the same subtle body and also in the case of the gross bodies assumed by different subtle bodies? The answer is given in the expression 'On a count of the association of the root cause with pervasiveness. There is such an immensity in the root cause that there is no hitch in this arrangement.

The subtle body does not remain static. There is a change and a movement in the gross body moment by moment and there is a great change when one gross body is cast off and another is assumed. This is due to the law of causation. There is a stage which is the cause and this cause produces an effect. Then that effect becomes a cause in its turn for

another effect. This is the context in which the world moves and changes. No cause can wait for the production of its effect. The process is continuous. For this reason there can be no delay for a subtle body to be provided with a gross body when the previous gross body perishes. The world is dynamic and the movement goes on in the world as in a machine. There is a law on account of which the whole world moves and functions like a single machine.

The law means the start, the course, the pace and the destination. The start is when there was the reflection of the sentence from the *Puruṣa* on the root cause. Each such reflection has its own characteristic feature and as such the course and the pace for each subtle body is distinct from those of others. In the subtle body there is a confusion of two distinct factors, the confusion of activity with the changeless, immutable sentence, the *Puruṣa* and that of sentence in what is really insentient, the root cause. The destination is for the subtle body to be freed from this confusion when the *Puruṣa* becomes the pure sentence without any activity and the basic fundamental reverts to its equilibrium of the three constituents without any sentence and without any experience.

How can there be a start for something with its own dissolution as the goal at the close of the course? Either there need not have been this confusion or such a confusion should be what will continue. Self-destruction cannot be accepted as a goal for any step taken. The only possible answer is that there is no real dissolution at any future stage of the subtle body along with the gross body in which it has to find a support for its very existence. The progression is not from a start towards a self extinction. The progression is from imperfection in experience to perfection in experience. Even at the ultimate stage, the subtle body and the gross body continue. The experience and also the activity both continue. The limitation, the sense of imperfection, in both the experience and in the activity, comes to a close, and there is secured perfection in experience and in activity. In the stage

of the ordinary subtle body, the experience is that of the gross body being the locus for a process of knowing which is limited in scope and also for an activity which too is limited in its scope. At the final stage, there is the full knowledge of the two factors, the *Puruṣa* which is sentience, as perfect sentience and the root cause as a uniform of the three constituents. The progression of the subtle body through a series of gross bodies will result in the expansion of both the knowing and the activity, finally resulting in freedom from limitations in both.

43. *sāmsiddhikaś ca bhāvaḥ*
prākṛtikaḥ prakṛtikaś ca dharmā- 'dyaḥ |
dīṣṭaḥ karaṇa 'śrayinaḥ
kārya 'śrayinaś ca kalala 'dyaḥ ||

The primal dispositions and the acquired dispositions starting with *Dharma* are found to abide in the causal body the embryo and other factors abide in the produced body (43)

In the fortieth verse it was said that the subtle body has some dispositions abiding in it. There it was said that the dispositions are of two kinds, one determining the genus etc., and the other determining the capacities etc., of the newly born person. The subtle body contains eighteen constituents. Of them thirteen are of the nature of organs, three internal and ten external. Then there are the five *Tanmātras*. When a man is born, the genus, the anatomical features and other factors are associated with the gross body that is produced. The capacities and other factors remain in the organs. The *Tanmātras* are not the abodes of any disposition. They simply develop into the gross body as constituted of the five elements. The dispositions that result in the capacities etc., are of two kinds. There is the innate disposition by which the course and the pace and other factors in the progression of the person are determined. That is why there is such a great difference in the progression made by different persons. Such innate differences do not bind the man for ever. He can acquire certain dispositions. These latter may be called

the evolution of the individual. It is partly determined by the innate disposition, but is not completely bound by them, the acquired dispositions also determine the later stages in the progression. Thus there are two factors in evolution. One is the condition of the start and the other is the success or failure of the individual after the start.

The classical commentators lived in an age of mythological lore and religious beliefs. They have to explain everything consistent with such a background. Vācaspati Miśra divides the first kind of *Bhāvas* into two classes. The innate dispositions like *Dharma* and wisdom are primeval, as in the case of Kapila who is the founder of the Sāṅkhya system. The *Maharṣis* like Valmiki, the son of Pracetas, acquired some dispositions through their effort. Gaudapāda speaks of three kinds of such dispositions as primeval, innate and acquired. Kapila had the first variety, the four sons of Brahmā, namely, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra, had the second variety and people like us who acquire wisdom from the teacher have the third variety.

44 *dharmaṇa gamanam ūrdhvam*
gamanam adhasṭād bhavaty adharmeṇa |
jñānena cā 'pavargo
viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ ||

Through *Dharma* there is the movement upwards, through *Adharma* there is the movement downwards. And through knowledge, there is complete release and from its opposite, if accepted, there is bondage. (44)

Man starts with a certain disposition. He has his Free Will and he can acquire new dispositions. There is a Law governing the progression which applies to all. If a man follows this Law, his progression will be continuously forward, i.e., he will have *Abhyudaya*, movement upwards or forward towards a goal. In the previous verse, the dispositions were spoken of as *Dharma* and others. The classical commentators have explained this term as meaning *Dharma*, *Jñāna* (wisdom), *Valrāgya* (freedom from attachments) and *Atirāgya* (lordliness). From this verse it seems that what the

author had in his mind must be *Dharma* (Law), *Adharma* (Chaos), *Jñāna* (Knowledge) and its opposite. These are the four factors that he gives in this verse. By going against the Law, by creating chaos, there is downfall, *Pratyavṛtṭya* (movement downward or backward, away from the goal). Knowledge of the distinction among the three factors mentioned in the verse, leads a person to *Apavarga* (separation away from) which is *Kaivalya*. From the opposite of this is bondage.

There is a Law in the world. One can attain the goal by following the Law. One has also to know the Law and also the factors of the universe in which the Law operates. The primeval dispositions and the Free Will to determine the course and the pace in the progression are there in the person, there is no God to determine such things. It cannot also come as a gift from another person. It cannot either be taken away by a God or by another person.

45 *vairāgyāt prakṛti layah
samsāro bhavati rajasād rāgāt |
alīkṛtyād avighāto,
viparyayāt tad viparyāśah ||*

From non-attachment there is the dissolution of the root cause. From attachment, which is of the nature of *Rajas* there is the transmigration. From lordliness, there is the removal of obstacles. From the opposite there is the opposite thereof. (45)

There is a Law governing the progression. That is of the nature of a Law of Causation. The cause at this stage was the effect in the previous stage and the effect in this stage becomes the cause in the next stage. If a man knows this Law of Cause and Effect and if he works along such lines prescribed by the Law there results the disposition of the basic fundamental. He works up the cause knowing that the cause will produce the effect. He does not attach himself to the effect directly. If instead of working up the cause, he attaches himself to the effect, he does not secure the effect for himself. That delays his progression. In the sixty third

and sixty-fifth verses, there is mention of the seven out of these eight forms, as obstacles, it is only when there is cessation of these seven that there is the final release. The dissolution of the root cause in this verse is given as the result of the break of attachment, *Valrāgya*, which is the one of the seven to be terminated for the same release. It may be that in this verse, the emphasis is on the function of *Rāga* or attachment, which brings about the transmigration. In contrast to that, *Valrāgya* is a path to the dissolution of the root cause. Some slight contradiction is noticeable here.

The lordliness is his Free Will. If he applies his Free Will according to the Law, the effects naturally follow the causes and there would be the removal of all obstacles in his path in securing the effect, which effect becomes the cause for the subsequent effect. But if he uses his Free Will in another way, there would be the obstacles coming in his way. When he does not use his Free Will in the proper way, what it means is that he surrenders his Free Will, and by such a surrender of Free Will, he allows obstacles to come in his way. The four features given in this and in the previous verses were already mentioned in the twenty third verse.

46 : *esa pratyaya sargo*
viparyayaḥ sakṣī tuṣṭi-siddhya 'khyāh |
guṇa-valāṃbha vimardāt
īasya ca bhedaś tu pañcāśat ||

This evolution of the dispositions, bearing the designations of wrong knowledge, incompetence, contentment and attainment is due to the mutual impact of the uneven constituents. And their varieties, on the other hand, are fifty. 46)

In the forty fourth verse eight factors were given, namely, *Dharma*, *Jñāna*, *Vīrāga* and *Aisvarya* and their opposite. In the next verse, which is the previous one, four factors were given as *Valrāgya*, *Rāga*, *Aisvarya* and its opposite. There are thus, *Dharma*, *Jñāna*, *Valrāgya* and *Aisvarya*. There are their opposites also. In the present verse, there are four factors given, namely, *Viparyaya*, *Aśakti*, *Tuṣṭi* and *Siddhi*.

Dharma, *Jñāna*, *Valrāgya* and *Alśvarya* come within *Tuṣṭi* and *Siddhi* and the other four come within *Viparyaya* and *Asakti*. Such a variety in dispositions is due to the mutual impact of the unevenness of the three constituents, the *Sattva*, the *Rajas* and the *Tamas*.

Vācaspati Miśra explains the second word as "Intellect's (*Pratyaya*) creation (*Sarga*)". I take the term *Pratyaya* as identical with *Bhāva*, mental dispositions. I have translated the word *Sarga* by the term "group". It means what has come out. Really the meaning is "the dispositions that have become manifest". The classical commentators give the reason in the beginning of the second half as the ground for the division into fifty, while I take it as the ground for the division into the four mentioned in the first half. The mental dispositions take the form of wrong knowledge and incompetence and also of contentment and attainment, which latter two are the opposites of the first two.

The primary classification of the dispositions into four, as given in the first half, is on the basis of the differences in the proportion and intensity of the three constituents. The further classification into fifty is also due to the same difference. When there is the predominance of *Tamas*, then, when the *Sattva* is very weak, there is *Viparyaya* (wrong knowledge) and when the *Rajas* is weak, there is *Asakti* (incompetence). When *Tamas* is weak, then in the domination of *Rajas* there is *Tuṣṭi* and in the domination of *Sattva*, there is *Siddhi* (attainment). The further sub divisions into fifty and still further sub divisions are given in the subsequent verses.

The real contrast is between the *Tamas* on one side and the *Sattva* and the *Rajas* together on the other side. If through the impact of *Tamas*, there is a suppression of the *Sattva*, the *Rajas* remaining, then there is the wrong knowledge, if there is the suppression of the *Rajas*, the *Sattva* still remaining, there is incompetence. In the same way, if the *Tamas* is suppressed through the dominance of the *Rajas*, there is *Tuṣṭi* (contentment) and if the suppression of the *Tamas* is through the dominance of the *Sattva*, there is *Siddhi*.

(attainment) The classical commentators seem to associate *Siddhi* or attainment with wisdom or *Sattva*. To them *Siddhi* is the attainment of the final release through wisdom. But I contrast wrong knowledge with *Tuṣṭi* or contentment and *Aśakti* or incompetence with *Siddhi* or attainment.

47 *pañca viparyaya bheda
bhavanty aśaktis ca karana vaikalyāt |
aṣṭā vimśati bheda
tuṣṭir navadhā 'stadhā siddhiḥ ||*

There are five divisions of wrong knowledge. Incompetence, caused by the defect in the organs, is of twenty eight kinds. Contentment is of nine kinds, attainment is of eight kinds. (47)

In this way the four kinds of dispositions mentioned in the previous verse, are of fifty kinds in all.

48 *bhedaḥ tamaso 'ṣṭa vidho
mohasya ca daśa vidho mahāmohaḥ |
tāmīśro 'ṣṭa daśadhā
tathā bhavanty andhatāmīśrah ||*

There are eight varieties of *Tamas* and also of *Moha*. *Mahāmoha* is of ten kinds. *Tāmīśra* is of eighteen kinds, *Andhatāmīśra* is of the same kind. (48)

In the previous verse the wrong knowledge was given as of five kinds. Here their names and their further sub-divisions are given. The five kinds of wrong knowledge are mentioned here by name, along with the sub-divisions of each of them. The five kinds are known as *Tamas* (darkness), *Moha* (delusion), *Mahāmoha* (great delusion), *Tāmīśra* (gloom) and *Andhatāmīśra* (blinding gloom). The commentators give the nature of the divisions.

1. *Tamas*. In the Yoga system this is called *Avidyā* (nescience). The unmanifest fundamental, the intellect, the subjective consciousness and the five *Tanmātras* are not really the Self, the knowledge that they are what is called the Self, is the eighth kind of wrong knowledge.

2 *Moha* There are eight kinds of attainments or supernatural powers in the course of Yogic progression. They are *Anima* (atomic nature), *Mahimā* (immensity), *Laghimā* (lightness), *Garimā* (weight), *Isitva* (overlordship), *Paśitva* (possession), *Prāpti* (reaching any place) and *Prakāśya* (manifestation). A man can make himself atomic in size, immense in size, light so that he can fly or heavy so that nothing can lift him, he can attain control over the world and get possession of everything, he can transfer himself to any place and he can make himself manifest anywhere. If a person considers these as the final release, this is *Moha* or delusion and they are of eight kinds according to the eight kinds of attainments.

3 *Mahāmoha* There are the five objects of sense cognition like the sound. They can be human or divine. Attachment to them is *Mahāmoha* or the great delusion.

4 *Tāmisra* There are the ten objects of sense cognition as stated in the previous verse and the eight attainments mentioned in the still previous section. Conflicts among them as objects that produce some joy form the eighteen forms of *Tāmisra* or gloom.

5 *Andhatāmisra* The blinding gloom is the fear that one may be deprived of the same eighteen factors that are supposed to give joy.

The above facts are taken from the commentary of Vacaspati Miśra. The same is the position taken up by Gauḍapada.

49 *ekā daśa 'ndriya vadhaḥ
saha buddhi vadhaḥ aśaktir uddiṣṭā |
sapta daśa vadhā buddher
viparyayaḥ tustī siddhīnām u*

Incompetence is enumerated as injury to the eleven organs along with injury to the intellect. Injury to the intellect is of seventeen kinds, on account of the failure of contentment and attainments. (49)

The twenty eight kinds of incompetence are given here. It may be due to any injury to any of the eleven organs (mind

and the five sense organs and the five organs of activity) There are nine kinds of contentments and eight kinds of attainments. If there is a failure of any of these seventeen that are in the intellect, there are twenty-eight on the whole as incompetence, failure to move forward

50 *adhyātmikāś catasrah*

prakṛty upādāna kāla bhāgān-'khyāh 1

bāhṃ viśayo 'paramāi

pāñca nava tuṣṭayo 'bhīmatāḥ ॥

Four pertaining to the Self, named Nature, Means, Time and Providence, and five that are external on account of the withdrawal from the sense-objects—the nine contentments are thus recognised (50)

There are four kinds of contentments arising from within oneself. There are also five kinds of contentments arising externally, on account of the cessation of sufferings produced by the five external objects. In this way there are nine kinds of contentments.

In the forty-sixth verse, four kinds of dispositions were enumerated. The classical commentators speak of them as what is produced by the intellect (*pratyaya sarga*). I speak of them as the mental moods (*pratyaya*) manifested (*sarga*). Of these the classical commentators speak of the first three as infirmities in the mind and accept the last one, *Siddhi* or attainment, as the real positive factor. *Siddhi* or attainment is the attainment of the final release. Consistent with such an interpretation, they do not accept the nine *Tuṣṭis* or contentments as assets in the mind. They are only such apparent assets, what people regard as contentments, what are not really objects for contentments.

The four internal contentments are what are based on *Prakṛti*, *Upādāna*, Time and Providence. There is some sort of contentment which is in the nature of some persons. It is not due to any gain or to the satisfaction of any want. Then when the means is found, that produces some contentment in the mind. This is not a case of any material gain. It is just a knowledge that one has been able to secure the means for

the satisfaction of the want. Then time works up some contentment, and in other cases, it is Providence that works out the contentment. In all the four cases, it is a mere mental feature. It arises out of oneself.

Then one may have some feeling of suffering on account of sense craving. The external objects come within the sphere of a person through the five sense-organs and when there is some satisfaction for the mind on account of the fact that the cravings of the five sense organs have been satisfied, there is a contentment. This contentment is external so far as its source is concerned. These are the nine kinds of contentments.

To the classical commentators these are only cases of an apparent contentment. According to Vācaspati Miśra the four kinds of internal contentment are as follows:

1 *Nature* The direct experience of discriminative knowledge is a particular kind of the modification of the *Prakṛti* (root cause) and the root cause itself will bring it about, there is no need to take to repeated meditation. So one may remain as he is without any effort. The contentment arising out of such a teaching is this variety.

2 *Means* The discriminative knowledge does not arise out of the fundamental. The *Tanmātras* are common to all persons and yet the discriminative knowledge does not arise in all. It can arise only in those who take to renunciation and wandering about, and so one should take to such a means. The contentment arising out of such a teaching is what is called the contentment through the Means.

3 *Time* Even such means cannot bring about discriminative knowledge all of a sudden. One must wait. There is no need to be in a hurry. The contentment arising out of such a teaching is the contentment out of Time.

4 *Providence* Discriminative knowledge does not arise in any of the above ways. It comes only through luck. The contentment arising out of such a teaching is what arises out of luck.

Gaudapada's interpretation is not much different from this, though in details there are slight differences.

- 51 *ññah śabdo 'dhyāyanaṃ*
duḥkha viḥātās trayāḥ suḥti-prāptiḥ |
dānāñ ca śiddhayaḥ 'śtau
śiddheḥ pūrvo 'nkuśas trividhah ||

Reasoning, scripture, study, the three fold destruction of suffering, attainment of companions and gifts—these are the eight attainments. The three that precede the attainment are curbs (51)

Attainment is the attainment of the discriminative knowledge as stated in the second verse. Wrong knowledge and infirmity are real obstacles to this attainment. Contentment can also be such an obstacle, if contentment becomes the halting place and not a stage for further progression. The first two must be avoided and the third shall not be allowed to act like a break. Even the eight factors mentioned here are not final attainment, they are what leads one to the final attainment, which is the attainment of the discriminative knowledge mentioned in the second verse.

Vacaspati Miśra interprets the word *Dāna* as purity and not as gift. But he gives that meaning also as an alternative, given by others.

One must apply his reasoning powers, one must listen to what others have to say, one must study. One must detach oneself from the three fold sufferings mentioned in the first verse. One must discuss the matters with others. I think that the last of the eight, *Dāna*, is neither money gift, nor purity. It is the gift of one's knowledge to others.

- 52 *na vinā bhāvaḥ lingam*
na vinā lingena bhāva nīrvṛtiḥ |
lingā khyo bhāvā khyas
tasmād dvividhah pravartate sargah ||

There is no Mark without the dispositions. There is no accomplishment of the dispositions without the Mark. Therefore the evolution proceeds in two ways called as Mark and also called as dispositions (52)

In the fortieth verse, it was said that the dispositions abide in the Mark (*Linga*). Then something was said about the dispositions. Did the subtle body, the Mark, appear first and did it acquire the dispositions later? Or did the dispositions come first and did they then find an abode in the subtle bodies? The position taken up is that the real fact is a third alternative, that both arose simultaneously. One of them cannot have an existence without the other. When there was the diversification on account of the reflection of the sentience from the *Puruṣa* on the root cause, there resulted the infinite number of combinations of the eighteen evolute, called the subtle bodies, along with certain dispositions in them.

The classical commentators take the words *Linga*, Mark, to mean the *Tanmātras*, the things in themselves, and not the subtle body consisting of the eighteen factors. It is said that the term is used in this secondary sense. The *Bhāvas* or dispositions are, according to them, the creations of the intellect (*Pratyaya sarga*) as interpreted by them. But in the fortieth verse, the subtle body (*Linga* or Mark) has been stated to be the combination of the eighteen factors. Later, the classical commentators bifurcate this combination into two parts, one consisting of the thirteen organs and the other consisting of the five *Tanmātras*. I see no evidence in the text, nor any reason or need, for such a bifurcation.

53 *aṣṭa vikalpo dāivas*

tairyag yonas ca pancadhā bhavaḥ |

mānuṣakaś ca 'kavīdhaḥ

samāsato bhautikah sargah ||

The divine are of eight kinds and what relate to the lower beings are of five kinds. And the human is of one kind. On the whole these are the elemental evolutions. (5)

It has been said that at the time of the evolution or diversification on account of the reflection of the sentience from the *Puruṣa* on the root cause, there arose also an infinite number of subtle bodies, the *Linga* or the Mark. They gather a gross body around them. The classification is on the basis of such

gross bodies. There are eight such genera of evolutions that are divine and that are above the human genus. Below, there are five genera. Man is a single genus.

The eight divine genera are what relate to (1) Brahmā, (2) the Lords of humanity (Prajāpatiḥ), (3) Indra or the Lord of the heaven, (4) the departed forefathers (Pitṛs), (5) Gandharva, (6) Yakṣa, (7) Rākṣasa and (8) Piśāca. The last four are demigods and demons. The five kinds of lower beings are (1) Paśu (cattle), (2) Mṛga (animals), (3) Birds (Pakṣin), (4) Reptiles (Sarīrpa), and (5) immovable (Sthāvira). There are the trees and the creepers. Perhaps the first two mean the domestic and the wild varieties. We need not worry much about the soundness of the biological classification. This classification is not a cardinal one in the philosophy and takes note of the lore of the days.

It is to be noted that humanity is regarded as a single genus. This has always been the doctrine that governed the international relations of ancient India. Unity of the human race has been a cardinal doctrine among the ancient India starting from the Vedic times.

54. *urdhvam sattva-viśālas
tamo-viśālas ca mūlataḥ sargah |
madhye rajo-viśālo
brahmā'di-stamba paryantah ||*

What are above have the expansion of *Sattva* and what are below have the expansion of *Tamas*. In the middle there is the expansion of *Rajas*. This starts from Brahma and comes down to the grass. (54)

There are three varieties or genera, eight above, five below and one, the human, in the middle. This is the order of the evolution. There is the range of *Sattva* above the human genus with the eight genera within and there is the range of *Tamas* below with the five genera. In the middle there is the range of *Rajas* with the human genus in it.

In the thirteenth verse, the characteristic features of the three constituents were given. When there is the predominance of *Sattva*, there is lightness and there is illumination,

Thus the genera above can move about freely through space without any restriction of the gravitational pull. They have knowledge also far superior to that of man. The genera below are weighted down and their range of movement is very much restricted. Trees cannot even change their spot. An animal can move about and can set other things into motion through impact. But an animal cannot change its conditions and environments, for which the *Sattva* constituent is necessary in them.

Man can know, man can move about, man can set other stationary things into motion. Man can also change his conditions and his environments. His activity is greater than his knowing, so far as the range is concerned. Man is essentially an active being and he can also work up his own final release from the sufferings of life.

55. *tatra jarā maraṇa kṛtam*
duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ |
lingasya 'vinivṛttes
tasmād duḥkham svabhāvena ||

There, the sentient Self endures suffering brought about by old age and death. Therefore, up to the time when the subtle body retires, suffering is natural (55)

There is a distinction between the *Puruṣa* or Self that is sentience itself and the Self, *Puruṣa*, who is sentient. The sentient Self here is the subtle body really. On account of the association of the Self with the subtle body, for whose generation, contact with that pure *Puruṣa*, the sentience, is the ground, the pure sentience himself appears to be suffering. As mentioned in the twentieth verse. A time will come when there will be the discriminative knowledge of the three factors in the universe, mentioned in the second verse, and at that time the subtle body will retire as a limiting factor. So long as there is the confusion between the subtle body, which, being a modification of the root cause, cannot have sentience and the *Puruṣa*, which, being pure sentience, can have no experience, there is this suffering. Such a suffering is natural, up to a point and at

that point, the suffering comes to a close. The classical commentators connect the part "up to the time when the subtle body retires" with the predicate "endures suffering". I take that portion as relating to the predicate "is natural". Therefore, since there is such a suffering endured by the subtle body through old-age and death, the suffering is natural so long as the subtle body remains

56 *ity eṣa prakṛtiḥ kṛto*
mahad ādī vīśeṣa bhūta paryantah |
prati puruṣa vimokṣā 'rtham
sva 'rtha na parā-'rtha ārambhah ||

In this way, this start generated by the root cause beginning from the intellect and ending with the specific elements, operates for the sake of the final release of each separate Self, to subserve the purpose of another, and it looks as if it were for subserving its own purpose (56)

There is the subtle body consisting of the eighteen factors and there is the gross body consisting of the five elements. The subtle body gathers a gross body round it and later it casts it off to assume a fresh gross body. This process goes on. The real purpose is that the *Puruṣa* may know that he is pure and that there is no activity in him and so no suffering in him, that the activity and the suffering are in the matter, the root cause in its evolved condition. The activity is only in the evolutes of matter and it would seem that the activity has as its purpose some end for itself. Really the purpose is for the *Puruṣa*. The purpose is the attainment of isolation, *Kaivalya*. It is not merely *Kaivalya*, it is the awareness of this *Kaivalya*. Such an awareness can be only in the sentience and not in the insentient matter. Each subtle body with a gross body around it works for each separate *Puruṣa*.

57 *vatsa vyāddhi nimittam*
kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya |
puruṣa vimokṣa nimittam
tathā pravṛttiliḥ pradhānasya ||

Just as there is the activity of the milk (within the breast of the mother) for the growth of the baby, though the milk does not have a knowing, in the same way the activity of root cause is for the final release of the Self (57)

The question is about the activity of the root cause, which is insentient, with a purpose. A purpose is what an intelligent one keeps before him in his activity. When there is an activity in what is insentient, we do not say that the activity in that thing has some purpose. If there is some purpose, it is not in that thing, but in the intelligent agent that has set that thing in operation. Here it is said that even in the activity of the insentient objects, there is a purpose sometimes. Thus the milk flows from the breast of the mother with a purpose, and that purpose is the growth of the baby. It may be that the movement has ultimately to be traced to some intelligence. Here in the Sāṅkhya system it has been accepted that the movement started in the insentient matter on account of the reflection of the sentence from the *Puruṣa*.

What is the real question that has been answered in this verse? According to the classical commentators and also according to Sankara's criticism of the Sāṅkhya position in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (II II-19), the question is: How can the insentient *Pradhāna* function at all? The illustration is the milk that flows though the milk has no sentence. This explains how even the insentient *Pradhāna* can function.

But in the context that is not the question. The context is about the function of the *Pradhāna* for the purpose of another as if it were for its own purpose. Can there be the function in one entirely to subserve the purpose of another, as is given in the previous verse? I think that this is the real question. So there is no need to emphasise the word *Ajñānya*, the insentient. The emphasis must be on the word *Yatsavivṛddhīnimittam* (for the purpose of the growth of the baby). Whether an absolutely insentient object can function at all has been settled in the twentieth verse where it is said that there is insentience reflected from the *Puruṣa* on the *Pradhāna*. Here the *Pravṛtti* (activity) in the *Avyakta*

(unmanifest) is only in the form of its diversification, through a disturbance in the equilibrium of the three constituents. The subsequent functions are in the *Vyakta* (manifest) and not in the *Avyakta*. This is also the case with the milk flowing. What is meant in the context is the first flow of the milk; then it reaches the udder and enables the baby to drink it through many other functions in other factors. Was there sentence reflected in the *Pradhāna* (root cause) when it was absolutely in a state of equilibrium for the three constituents? There was not. The reflection and the disturbance of the equilibrium are simultaneous, and they form a single action. But this is not the point at issue.

The reference may be to the milk in a cow flowing for the growth of the calf. In this context, Śankara refers to the change of grass into milk. I have put the point in a general way, without restricting the milk to what flows from a cow. The real question is whether the point at issue is what is meant by the word *Vatsayivddhīnimuttam* or whether it is what is meant by the word *Ajñasya*. I prefer the former. The latter has no relevancy to the context. The subsequent illustrations relate to the work for another and has no relation to function in what has no sentence.

58 *autsukya-nivṛtṭi-artham*
yathā kṛiyāsu pravartate lokah |
puruṣasya vimokṣā-rtham
pravartate tadā avyaktam ||

Just as people engage themselves in activity in order to be relieved from some eagerness, similarly, the non-manifest functions for the purpose of the final release of the Self (58)

It has been said in the fifty-sixth verse that something has been started for the sake of subserving another's purpose, though it may appear to be only for the sake of subserving some purpose of its own. For this also, some example is given here from actual experience. The eager desire is in the form "I wish I could do it." The desire is only to do it and not at all to serve any other purpose like some gain for

oneself. There are people who engage themselves in an activity simply for the purpose of doing it, and when that is done, there is the cessation of that desire. They want nothing more. The purpose served may be of another. But when they carry out the activity, they do it with such an enthusiasm that others would think that they are doing it with some personal end in view. The activity of the root cause is just like this. The only purpose is that of securing the final release of the *Puruṣa*. The root cause has no end to gain.

59 *rangasya darśayitvā
nīvartate nartakī yathā nrītyat ।
puruṣasya tathā 'tmānam
prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ ॥*

Just as a lady dancer retires from her dance after her exhibition to the audience, in the same way the root cause retires after exhibiting itself to the Self. (59)

The final goal is what has been stated in the second verse i.e. discriminative knowledge of the three factors. A knowledge is possible only in the case of sentience, and it is the *Puruṣa*, among the three, that is sentience. As stated in the twentieth verse, there has been a confusion through a mutual transfer, between the root cause and the *Puruṣa*. What is not sentient becomes apparently sentient and what is inactive apparently becomes active. When the *Puruṣa* is able to have a view of the root cause as the abode of activity, then the *Puruṣa* knows that there is no activity in himself. He also sees the root cause as not having any sentience. Thus, the goal kept in view by the root cause is to exhibit itself to the *Puruṣa*. This is compared to a lady dancing on the stage. When her purpose of exhibiting herself is served, she retires and she has nothing more to do with the audience.

60 *nānā-vīdhaḥ upāyair
upakārinḥ anupakārinah puruṣah ।
gunaiścaty agunasya satas
tasyā 'rtham apārthakaṁ carati ॥*

She (root cause) carries out the purpose of the Self without keeping any purpose in view for herself, by resorting to the means of various kinds, she being helpful while he renders no help, she being endowed with constituents (*Guna* or good qualities) while he is without constituents (*Aguna* or without good qualities) (60)

Here also there is an example by implication, taken from our common experience. The question arises how the root cause can be assumed to be functioning simply for subserving the purpose of another, the *Purusa*, without any purpose for itself. Here the example is taken of a woman working in a house, engaged by the master of the home. She takes up the various means for serving the purpose of the master at home. She helps the master while she receives no help at all from the master of the house. She handles the various means while he does nothing of the sort. In this case, there is a double meaning for the terms "endowed with constituents" and "without constituents". The word used is *Guna* for constituents. *Guna* also means a good quality. There are cases of faithful servants working in the household while the master may not have any such good qualities of being grateful for the good work. Absolutely unselfish work, even under hard conditions, is seen in our experience. The function of the root cause is just like that.

61 *prakṛteḥ sukūṁārātaram*
na kūñcid asti 'ti me matir bhavati |
yā dṛṣṭā 'smi 'ti punar
na darsanam upate puruṣasya ||

There is nothing else which is more tender than the root cause—such is my view. She, when she has been once seen by the Self, does not appear within the view of the Self again (61)

There have been various imageries introduced to describe the function of the root cause in relation to the *Puruṣa*. The milk flowing from the mother's breast, selfless work for simply the satisfaction that one has been able to do the work,

and the lady dancing on the stage were first introduced. Then came the dutiful woman who works in a household in a faithful way under hard conditions. Now there is introduced the picture of a lady born of a noble family, to illustrate the role of the root cause. The word *Prakṛti* meaning the root cause is feminine and hence in many cases the comparison is with a lady. The comparison here is only by implication.

Now there is the fear that when the root cause makes its appearance to the *Puruṣa* and thus serves the purpose of the *Puruṣa*, there is the possibility of the root cause making its appearance again in another way and binding the *Puruṣa* again, as it had once done. In that case, what is called a release is not final and hence it is no release at all. To allay this fear, the verse says that the root cause is like a lady born of a very noble family, who is very tender in heart and as such is full of modesty and is also very bashful, she makes her appearance only for serving the purpose of the lord of the home and never makes her appearance in public at all moments and creates inconvenience to the master of the house. She is not at all like a forward and aggressive lady who is always present in the places where others too come in the house.

In the twenty first verse the union of the root cause and the *Puruṣa* was compared to the union of a blind man and a lame man each co-operating with the other and each serving the purpose of the other. In the illustrations given in these five verses beginning with the fifty seventh, there is not even an indication that the root cause is an enemy of the *Puruṣa*. In the case of the dutiful woman working faithfully in a home there is even a touch of superiority in the *Prakṛti* in relation to the *Puruṣa*, the latter being stated to be *Aguna*—devoid of good qualities by implication while the *Prakṛti* is *Guṇavati*, full of good qualities.

62 *tasman na badhyate 'ddha*
na mucyate nā 'pi samsarati kaścit |
samsarati badhyate mucyate
ca nāna 'śraya prakṛtiḥ ||

Therefore, there is no one, verily, who is bound, no one who is released and even no one who transmigrates. The root cause, being the abode of manifoldness, transmigrates, is bound and is released (62)

There are many places where it is said that the function of the root cause is to subserve the purpose of the *Puruṣa*. Now the author takes stock of the whole situation and says that for the reasons stated above in the whole work, there is certainly no bondage or release or suffering for the *Puruṣa*. Suffering has been stated to arise out of old age and death, in the fifty fifth verse. That indicates transmigration. Sub-serving the purpose of the *Puruṣa* can mean only subserving the purpose of the reflection of the sentence on the *Puruṣa* on the root cause. It is on account of this reflection that there has arisen the manifoldness in what was in a state of uniformity and equilibrium, this manifolding resulted in the formation of many combinations of the evolutes of the root cause and such combinations are called the subtle bodies. Such subtle bodies gather organic bodies of a gross nature around them. There is the reflection of the sentence from the *Puruṣa* and that is how the organs work, in the subtle bodies. On account of the reflected sentence of the *Puruṣa* on the subtle body, the subtle body experiences itself as active and as the enjoyer of the fruits of the activities. There are thus limitations in the possibilities of the activity and in the fruits of such activities. There is also the phenomenon of the gross body gathered round the subtle body, falling off and a new gross body gathering round it. It is this that is called bondage and transmigration. The release is for the subtle body, since the bondage and the transmigration are in the subtle body. The author emphasises this point of the absolute freedom from suffering for the *Puruṣa* by the term *Addha*, verily.

The root cause itself can have no suffering, suffering is an experience and for experience there must be sentence. The root cause has no sentence. The *Puruṣa* is pure sentence and cannot have any activities, and as such, there can be no

suffering Really there is no suffering, no bondage for anything in the universe Then there is no question of a release also That means that this system of philosophical thought too has no scope

It is this point that is explained in the verse There is no real suffering no bondage, either for the root cause or for the *Puruṣa* and is such there is no need for any release for either of them, and they exhaust the whole of the universe Yet there is a bondage and a suffering experienced as real on account of the particular combination of the two basic facts of the universe The sentence in the *Puruṣa* is reflected on the root cause and then through this reflection there is a reflected sentence in the root cause This enables the root cause to experience What experiences in this way is neither the pure root cause nor the pure *Puruṣa* but the reflection of the *Puruṣa* on the root cause So, the suffering and the bondage and the release are in the root cause and for the root cause, in a state of a particular kind of association with the *Puruṣa* It is only on account of this particular kind of association that there is produced the variety in what was uniform If there is no such manifoldness there is no bondage and no suffering, and hence no scope for a release and for a philosophy showing the path to that release

63 *rūpaṁ saptabhīr eva tu
badhnāty ātmānam ātmanā prakṛtiḥ ।
sat 'va ca puruṣā 'rtham prati
vimocayaty ekarūpeṇa ॥*

But the root cause simply binds itself, by itself through the seven forms And she herself effects her release through the one form, in order to subserve the purpose of the Self (63)

It has always been said that the function of the root cause is for the sake of the *Puruṣa* But it is not really so It is to show this that the word *Tu* is used in the text, which I translate as "now" In the twenty third verse four forms of the *Sattvika* type and four forms of the *Tāmasika* type for the *Buddhi*, intellect, were given They are

Sattvika—Dharma, Jñāna, Virāga and Aśvarya

Tamasic—Adharma, Ajñāna, Rāga and Anaśvarya or Asakti

In the forty-fourth and forty fifth verses these eight were taken up and it was said that they lead to their respective goals. After elaborating on them, in the fifty-first verse it was said that there are three that are like curbs on man and that it is only one, the last, namely, *Siddhi*, attainment, that is to be taken up. The four were given in the forty-sixth verse as wrong knowledge, incapacity, contentment and attainment. These four are only other forms of the same as were given in the two verses previous to it.

In this verse it is now stated that the whole course of the world of experience consists of three or the first four with their opposites and the opposite of *Jñāna*, which is the one remaining in the first group. Thus the world and the life in the world consist of *Dharma* and *Adharma*, *Virāga* and *Rāga*, *Aśvarya* and *Asakti* and *Ajñāna*. The release is through the eighth, *Jñāna*. All these seven factors are within the manifolded world of experience. The eighth takes the individual out of it. That is what is called subserving the purpose of the *Puruṣa*, but this is only in the secondary sense.

This verse must be compared with the forty fourth and the forty fifth verses. There it was said that through *Jñāna* there is *Apavarga* or complete separation, which is complete separation of the *Puruṣa* from the *Prakṛti*. Here also it is said that there is the release through *Jñāna*. This is in agreement with what was said in the previous context. But in that context it was said that through *Vairāgya*, there is the dissolution of the *Prakṛti*, and this dissolution can be nothing other than the *Apavarga* or complete separation mentioned about *Jñāna*. But here that is included among what brings in bondage to the *Puruṣa*, and only *Jñāna* among the eight mentioned in the previous context, is here considered as what brings in release for the *Puruṣa* from the bondage. There appears to be a slight inconsistency. I have already added a note on this point in the previous context under the forty fifth verse.

64. *evam tattvā'bhyāsān-
nā 'smi na me nā 'ham ity aparīṣaṃ |
aviparyayād viśuddham
kevalam utpadyate jñānam ||*

In this way, through the repeated practice of the truth there arises the knowledge in the form "I am not, it is not mine, I am not that" without any residue resulting thereby, pure on account of the absence of an opposite, absolute. (64)

One has to reason, one has to study, receive instructions from others and discuss matters with others, as stated in the fifty-first verse. One has also to give instructions, as stated there according to a possible interpretation. Then one has to contemplate repeatedly on the truth arrived at through such processes. This implies the eight-fold process of the Yoga system. It is not a mere intellectual equipment; it is a realisation. It must become an inner experience of a direct nature.

The experiences like "I am, this is mine, and this is myself" are all modifications within the root cause and not the pure knowing in the *Puruṣa*. It is the subtle body with the gross body gathered round it that has the above experience. All such modifications leave a residue and such a residue, in itself the effect of some antecedent, becomes the cause for a subsequent effect. But the knowledge arising out of the repeated contemplation of the truth leaves no such residue. But the new knowledge has no such opposite and so it is pure knowledge. But this knowledge is isolated, absolute, *Kevala*.

The seven factors do not lead to such a knowledge; it is the eighth factor, knowledge, that can lead to this final, absolute experience. The seven factors keep man tied up to the world. It is this eighth factor that shows him the way out of the world. In the verse the knowledge is given in the form of three negative sentences; (1) *Na* (not) *Asmi* (am); (2) *Na* (not) *Me* (my); (3) *Na* (not) *Aham* (I). I see little difference between the first and the last, Vācaspatī Mīśra

says that in the first there is the denial of activity in the Self and in the third there is the denial of the Self as the agent. Gauḍapāda says, "I myself do not exist, I am not my body.; the third denies the egoism."

The three forms may be "my existence", "my possession" and "my identity with other things". Śaṅkara in his *Brahmaṇṣambhāṣya* gives as example of *Adhyāsa* (superimposition), the two forms "I am this" and "this is mine". (The opening section). The first may refer to "my very existence". That is how I understand the three forms.

65. *tena nivṛtta-prasavām
artha-vaśat sapta-rūpa-vinivṛttam |
prakṛtiṁ paśyati puruṣaḥ
prekṣakavad avasthitaḥ svaçchaḥ ||*

Thereby the Self views the root cause, standing by like an onlooker, when that has withdrawn from the production (of the chain of cause and effect), has withdrawn from the seven-fold form, in so far as it has served the purpose. (65)

When there was the first reflection of the sentience from the *Puruṣa* on the root cause and when there was the evolution, mainly in the form of the dispositions that are eight in number, of which seven continue during the evolution, and of which the eighth contributes to the production of the release, the purpose was that the *Puruṣa* should be released through right knowledge. When the right knowledge of the nature described before arises, there is no longer any scope for any evolution, production of the series of cause and effect and the working of the dispositions. At this stage of the right knowledge, the *Puruṣa* has a view of the root cause, remaining just like an onlooker. Till the right knowledge arose, there was the confusion between the real nature of the basic fundamental and of the *Puruṣa*, as stated in the twentieth verse. Now that confusion ceases and the *Puruṣa* becomes an onlooker as described in the nineteenth verse, he becomes pure, clean from the confusion, *Svaçcha*,

Vacaspati Misra interprets the word *Artha vasāt* to mean "on account of the *Artha* or right knowledge" But Gauda pada interprets it to mean "having accomplished the purpose of the *Puruṣa* "

Is it the pure *Puruṣa*, the sentience, or is it also the subject of the phenomenal world? In the eleventh verse, the root cause and the manifest world are both spoken of as the 'object' In the nineteenth verse, the *Puruṣa* is spoken of as a *Sakṣin*, a witness and as one who sees *Draṣṭar* So the position may be that the *Puruṣa* has resumed its real nature and the root cause too has reverted to its state of uniformity and equilibrium The pure *Puruṣa* has a vision of the root cause in its real nature

66 *dr̥ṣṭā maye 'ty upekṣaka*
eko dr̥ṣṭā 'ham ity uparamaty anyā |
satt samyoge 'pi tayoh
prayojanam nā 'sti sargasya ||

"She has been seen by me"—in this way one becomes indifferent. "I have been seen"—in this way, the other ceases her activity Though the association continues between the two, there is no longer any purpose in evolution (66)

In the state of evolution and during the course of evolution, the *Puruṣa* does not see the root cause in its real nature at all By the reflection of the sentience from the *Puruṣa* on the root cause, the power of seeing is transferred to the root cause and the reflected sentience assumes the role of activity which is really in the root cause In that state, the root cause in its evolved state sees itself, it is not the *Puruṣa* that sees the root cause. The system does not recognise a prior stage when there was no such association and mutual transfer of features The purpose and the goal of evolution is to restore the root cause and the *Puruṣa* to their respective natures When once that nature is restored, there is no longer any possibility of a further evolution due to the association of the two in a particular way, in which there is such a mutual transfer of features It is only when

there was a first beginning of the transfer of the features mutually between the fundamentals of the universe, the root cause and the *Puruṣa*, that there is a possibility of a second beginning of the same transfer mutually through a similar association. The doctrine of the system is that when there is the right knowledge about the true nature of the two fundamentals, a similar association will not start again

67 *samyag-jñāna-dhigamāḍ
dharma-dīnāṁ a' āraṇa-prāptau |
tisthati saṁskāra vaśac-
cakra bhramavad dhṛta śarīrah ||*

When through the attainment of the right knowledge, the *Dharma* and other factors come to the state of being no cause, he remains with a body kept on account of the residues, like the whirling of the wheel (37)

The *Dharma* and other factors, seven in number, excluding the *Jñāna* which is the eighth, mentioned in the twenty third verse, become the cause for various activities and stages in the life of an individual, as mentioned in the forty fourth and forty fifth verses. When the eighth factor namely, *Jñāna*, arises, the others cease to be the cause for any such production of activities and stages. The question arises whether at the time of real knowledge, the body immediately falls down. The subtle body ceases to exist and as such the gross body too must drop down. The reply is that the gross body and the life phenomenon of such an individual, who has attained perfect knowledge or the truth, still continue till the close of the natural life. This is what is called the stage of *Jīvanmukti*, final and absolute release even during life.

Here an example is given from common experience. When a potter makes a pot, placing the clay on the wheel and giving it a turn, so that he could give the proper form to the pot when the wheel whirls, the pot becomes ready and he removes it from the wheel. But the wheel continues to whirl on account of the

residue of the force applied to it when he was actually giving a shape to the pot, and even when that purpose is served, the wheel continues its movement through the previous impact. In the same way, the previous activities of the subtle body had given a movement to the gross body and on account of that impact, the gross body continues its function for some time more. When that body drops down, at the time of the death of the individual who has attained the perfect knowledge, there is no subtle body functioning to gather another gross body around it. That means that the transmigration comes to an end. That is the final release of the *Puruṣa*.

68 *prāpte sarīra bhede*

caritā-rthatvāt pradhāna vinivṛttau |

aikāntikam atyantikam

ubhayam kaivalyam āpnoti ||

When the separation from the body has taken place and when there is the retirement of the root cause after accomplishing the purpose, he obtains isolation of both the kinds, what is invariable and what is absolute. (68)

When the root cause has accomplished its purpose of securing the final release of the *Puruṣa*, it retires, having no further function to perform and at that stage, the *Puruṣa* has been separated from the body. This separation from the body and the consequent isolation is both invariable and absolute. When there is the ultimate knowledge of the truth, there is no possibility of a failure on its part to bring about the isolation. It is not like a medicine and other remedies, mentioned in the first verse, which are not invariable in the production of their effects. And when once there is that separation, there is no possibility of a recurrence of the same association of the *Puruṣa* with the body, it is final and absolute. It is not at all like the effects of medicines and other remedies mentioned in the first verse.

When there is the dissolution of the root cause, there is no longer any possibility of a subtle body remaining, and

without such a subtle body, there will be no gross body gathering around it. That is the final close up of the individual. The individual gets extinct. In this sense, what is called *Kaivalya* is not a state of freedom from all limitations and bondages for the individual. It is a termination of any further state.

The text started with the statement that ordinary remedies are neither invariable nor absolute and the text closes with the statement that the remedy provided by philosophy is both invariable and absolute. One has to apply seriously one's thoughts regarding the final stage to which philosophy brings an individual. What was promised in the first two verses is that through philosophy there would be an invariable and an absolute cessation of suffering for the philosopher. Now at the close it is found that it is not the suffering that terminates, but the sufferer, the individual himself. If this be the position, there are various inconvenient positions in which we find ourselves landing. What is promised in the beginning is a continuation without suffering and what is promised at the end is a final end, not to the suffering but to the individual himself. There appears to be some inconsistency. The reply can be that what is promised is the termination of suffering for the *Puruṣa* and that when there is a termination of the subtle body and a consequent dissolution of the root cause, there is the continuity of the *Puruṣa* as a viewer of the true basic fundamental. But nothing has really been accomplished for the *Puruṣa*, which was always pure and free from all sufferings. What suffered was the subtle body which gathered a gross body around it and there is no continuity for this individual free from suffering.

Further, if there is such a cessation of the individual at the time of reaching the goal, there is none in the world who has reached the goal, on reaching the goal, the individual ceases to exist. Thus freedom for the individual is an illusion, just an extinction for him.

The commentators mentioned Kapila, the founder of the system, as having been born with perfect knowledge. If perfect knowledge brings about the cessation of the body, how can there be an individual with perfect knowledge in a body? Kapila was born of his mother with a body and he gave his instructions about this system of philosophy to his mother with a gross body like any other person. It is a contradiction to say that when there is absolute knowledge, there will be no body and that there is a teacher who has absolute knowledge and who at the same time has a body with which he gave instructions. How can there be a subtle body for one with perfect knowledge and how can he remain individual at all? This is the case of a person born with perfect knowledge. Birth is only when there is no perfect knowledge. Then there are cases of those who have attained perfect knowledge at a later time. Do they become extinct? Take the case of Veda Vyāsa. According to tradition, he is an eternal individual, a *Citrāṅgin*. Then there are Brahmā and his four sons mentioned by the commentators in the forty-third verse. The point also must be made clear whether the divine orders in creation, given in the fifty-third verse, have to drop off their bodies.

Personally I feel that this is not the true doctrine of the Sāṅkhya system. I propose a different interpretation for the sixty-seventh verse. When there is the perfect knowledge (*Samyag-jñāna*) and when *Dharma* and other factors cease to be links in a chain of cause and effect, still, the individual continues with a body, (*tiṣṭhati dhṛta sarīrah*), just like a wheel which continues whirling on account of the momentum given to it previously (*Samskāra-vasar*). In that state the body need not drop off. The individual can continue with a body. The only difference is that there is nothing called *Karma* and its consequences, nothing called the evolution, for the individual, he has reached the final stage in the evolution. Till that stage, the experience was that there is a confusion between the *Puruṣa* and the subtle body regarding seeing and activity. The individual at that stage discriminates between the two separate loci of seeing and activity.

The organ for knowing is within the subtle body and the gross body ceases to be a limitation for this knowing by the individual, consisting of the subtle body and the gross body. The *Puruṣa* attached to that individual ceases to be a mere reflection of the basic fundamental. The *Puruṣa* becomes the true *Draṣṭā* (one who sees) as stated in the nineteenth verse, and he is only a *Sākṣin* (witness). The activity is in the root cause, in the individual consisting of the subtle body and the gross body. The *Puruṣa* views such an activity as a witness (*Sākṣin*). The *Puruṣa*, the body with the gross body gathered round him and the basic root cause are known as distinct from one another, as stated in the second verse.

There is the expression *Samskāra vasāt* in the sixty-seventh verse. The classical commentators take it along with the expression *Tiṣṭhātī dhṛta saṁśṛāṇ*. That means that the individual continues occupying the body on account of the residue of his prior activities and experiences. I have also translated it and interpreted the portion in the same way, following the classical commentators. But I am not satisfied with the position. So I take the expression *Samskāra vasāt* along with *Cakrabhramavat*. The meaning is "Just as the wheel of a potter when he was making the pot, even after the pot is made." The question arises how there can be a body when there is no purpose to be served. The example of Kapila and Sanaka and others is enough. Here the answer is given in a more specific way.

Generally the body exists to subserve a purpose. It is like the wheel of the potter which whirls for a purpose. But the wheel can whirl even when the purpose it served, even when there is no purpose to serve. Similarly, normally the body subserves a purpose, but in rare cases there can be the body even without that purpose. That is the case of those who have attained the release. They are the *Jīvanmuktas*, those who are finally released and who yet continue to live in a body. The bodies of Kapila and of Sanaka and of Veda Vyāsa are like this. There is no purpose to serve. They live in the state of perfect knowledge. Perhaps that body can continue eternally or such individuals can assume a new

body at their will I do not know if at the time of the fall of their body, after reaching perfect knowledge, there is a termination of that individual also, since no new body is assumed. One thing is certain and that is, that the goal is reached when there is the perfect knowledge in that body and there is no waiting till that body falls.

Here the real treatise on the subject is finished and the following verses conclude the text

- 69 *puruṣa-rtha jñānam idam
guhyam parama rṣinā samākhyātam |
sthity utpatti pralayāś
cintyante yatra bhūtānam ||*
- 70 *etat pavitram agryam
munir āsuraye nukampayā pradadau |
āsurir api pañcasīkṣayā
tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tatṭvam ||*
- 71 *śiṣya paramparayā gatam
īśvarakṛṣṇena ca tad āryabhīṣṇ |
saṅkṣiptam ārya matinā
samyag vijñāya siddhāntam ||*
- 72 *saptatyaṁ kila ye rthas
te rthah kṛtsnasya saṣṭitantrasya |
ākhyāyikā virahitāḥ
para vāda vivarjitāḥ ca pi |*

This wisdom about the goal of the Self, very esoteric, has been taught by the greatest among the sages in this are considered the sustenance, the origination and the dissolution of the beings (69)

This, the foremost holy wisdom, the Sage gave to Āsuri through compassion. Āsuri gave it to Pañcasīkha and by him the truth was made very elaborate in many ways (70)

And this which came down through a succession of teachers and disciples has been condensed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, endowed with a noble heart, in the form of Ārya verses, after having understood the doctrines completely (71)

Whatever meanings there are in the entire *Śaṣṭitantra*, they are verily what is contained in these seventy verses, excluding the anecdotes and also free from the discussions about the doctrines of the opponents

Here the authentic succession of the author starting from the original teacher is given. The system was first propounded by the great Sage Kapila and he taught it to Āsuri and Āsuri taught it to Pañcaśikha. Pañcaśikha has expounded the system in a very elaborate way. The system came down through a line of teachers and disciples and Īśvarakṛṣṇa belongs to the direct line of this succession. He has understood the entire doctrine and he has given the doctrines in a very condensed way in the form of seventy verses in the *Ārya* metre. The nobility of his heart is due to the proper training he had in the system and also to the unbroken succession from the original founder.

Prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa there was an elaborate work called the *Śaṣṭitantra* or the Sixty treatise. It must have contained sixty topics. That may be the reason why it is called by that name. Such a work has been known to later commentaries. We do not know what the sixty topics are. Vacaspati Miśra mentions them. We are sure that he had not actually seen the work, he mentions them from what he had known through another work, the *Rājavartika*. There must have been many anecdotes in it to illustrate and to explain the various points. Perhaps the illustration of the union of a lame man and a blind man contained in the twenty-first verse may be remnant of such anecdotes. The references to the faithful servant working under hard conditions and to the actress may also have some such basis. There must also have been detailed discussions of the various views of other systems of thought, to refute them and to substantiate the doctrine of the system. The *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Sankara presupposes such a work, he could not have been thinking of the work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Karikas 1-2

Page 43

Dṛṣṭa means what is seen. It denotes all such facts and events in the world that come within the normal process of knowing, namely, direct perception, inferences coming naturally from it and the statement of persons who had a direct perception. This constitutes what the Carvākas accept as the world.

Page 47 :

I have translated the word *Satī* in the Eight fold Path as learning taking the Sanskrit word *Śrutī* as its equivalent and not the Sanskrit word *Smṛtī*.

The passage in Vācaspati Miśra is cited below, on account of its great significance.

एष हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत यदि दुष्टं नाम जगति न स्यात् सद्वा न जिज्ञासितं जिज्ञासितं वा अशक्यं समुच्छेदम् । अशक्यसमुच्छेदुता च द्विधा दुष्टस्य नित्यत्वात् तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा । शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपायभूतत्वाद्वा सुरुक्ष्योपायान्तस्य सद्भावाद्वा ।

Karika 3

Page 48 :

Prakṛti is the material cause and *Vikṛti* is its modification. *Mūla-prakṛti* is the root material cause, it is also called merely the *Prakṛti* and also *Pradhāna* or the chief or the first.

Page 50

The Sāṅkhya deals with only the basic situation out of which the world of experience and Man's experience started. That is why all the Five Elements are taken collectively, it is true that within the evolved world, there are aspects of the Five Elements that are both the *Prakṛti* or the material cause and also *Vikṛti* or its modification. But no new category arises out of the Five Elements. It is in this sense that they are only the *Vikṛtis* and that they are never the *Prakṛtis*.

A thing is real only as it is an object of knowing. If *Puruṣa* or the Self is itself a *Vikṛti*, there is no possibility of a knowledge of the cause of which it is a modification. And to that extent, its cause is not a reality. If the *Puruṣa* can modify itself into some *Vikṛti*, that modification cannot come within the sphere of knowledge; if it is sentence still, then it is not a modification of the *Puruṣa*; it is *Puruṣa* itself. If there is no sentence in that modification of *Puruṣa*, it is only *Prakṛti* and not anything else. Thus, the very nature of the *Puruṣa* as sentence proves it as neither a *Prakṛti* for another category nor as a *Vikṛti* in the form of a new category.

Kārikas 4-5

Page 51 :

In these *Kārikas*, the word *Drṣta* means the specific mode of knowing called perception.

Page 53 :

The passage in Sabarasvāmīn's *Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya* is अनुमान शतसंख्यस्यैकदेशादर्शनादेकदेशान्तरेऽसन्निकृष्टेऽयं बुद्धिः (I. 1. 8)

Abhava is not recognised as a reality in the Prābhākara School of the *Mīmāṃsā*. To that School, the world is a complete positive reality. So a mode of knowing called *Abhava* is also not recognised in that school.

Page 54

What the Carvākas deny is a reality that can be known only through inference or through the authority of a reliable person. As is mode of Man's normal recognition, they too accept inference and the authority of a reliable person.

For the prescription चैत्य व-देत there is only the authority of a reliable person, it is not determined either by perception or by inference.

The passage from Vac spati Mīra about the statement of a reliable person is very significant and is cited below नानुमान प्रमाणमिति वदता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्न. सन्दिग्धो विपर्ययो वा पुरुष कथं प्रतिपद्येत। न न पुरुषान्तरमवा अज्ञानसन्देहविपर्यया शक्या अवागम्या प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतिपद्युम्। नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण अनभ्युपगमात्

अनवधृताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु ॥ कंचन पुरुष प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचन
तया प्रेक्षावद्भिन्नमत्तवदुपेक्षेत ।

The division of the modes of knowing recognised in the Sāṅkhya system is based on the distinction between science, philosophy and religion. Science recognises only such facts as can come within the normal modes of knowing. Philosophy recognises facts that can be known only through inference also. Religion recognises even facts that can be known only through the authority of a reliable person, facts that can neither be known through the normal modes or through inference. The division is not exhaustive and there are no sub-divisions introduced as in the case of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā. But all such divisions and sub-divisions are included within the Sāṅkhya scheme also.

Kārika 6

Page 60

The word *pratītiḥ* should be carried backwards to the first *Pāda* also as *Sāmānyatās tu pratītiḥ dṛṣṭat atindriyānām pratītiḥ anumānat*.

Page 62

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that details about the nature of the Self must be known from the Vedānta.

इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकारिणु-
राऽमासिता माध्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।
दृढत्वमेतद्विषयावबोध.

प्रयाति वेदान्त निषेयेन ॥ (I : 5-148)

This closes the fifth *Sūtra* in his commentary on the *Śābara Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* called the *Slokaṛtīka*

Page 63 :

The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* says that the world secured through *Karma* is what will decay. VIII-vi-1.

Page : 65

Kārika 68 says that the release is final and without a failure

Kārikas 7-8

Page 67

It is not impossible to connect the two Kārikās in a single sentence. The position then will be, 'Just as there is the *Anupalabdhi* through these reasons in ordinary experience, there is *Anupalabdhi* of the *Mūla prakṛti* through its own *Saukṣmya*.' We have to add the words—*yathā etair hetubhir loke anupalabdhis tathā*

Page 68

The *Saukṣmya* in normal experience is different from the *Saukṣmya* in the *Mūla prakṛti*. In the *Mūla-prakṛti*, there is *Saukṣmya* because there is the absence of differentiation and differentiation is necessary for any cognition. We cognise a thing as 'like this' or as 'unlike this'. *Sādharmya* and *Vaidharmya* are necessary to know a thing in its true nature, and that is why in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* it is said सधर्म्यवैधर्म्या तत्त्वज्ञानात् (I : 3). *Sādharmya* and *Vaidharmya* presuppose differentiation. Therefore in case of the *Mūla prakṛti* by its very nature, there can be no cognition. Just as in normal experience, things not directly perceived through such causes are known through the authority of a reliable person, things that are by nature outside the sphere of perception are known by inference. This is failure of cognition in our normal experience on account of such causes, similarly in philosophy also, there is such a failure of cognition through a special kind of *Saukṣmya*.

Although it is not impossible to connect the two Kārikas into a single sentence, I prefer to connect Kārikā 7 with Kārikā 8. It does not mean that according to the system, what is to be known through authority are what are unknown through such causes. Here also the passage has to be interpreted as, "Just as certain things are not known by perception and by inference through such causes, there are other things that are also unknown through perception and inference, and for their knowledge, one must have recourse to authority."

Kārika 7 is incomplete and some words must be added to make the sense complete. The reality of the *Mūla-prakṛti* is not in the context. *Kārika* 8 follows from the second *Pāda* of the *Kārika* 6. The question whether there is such a *Prakṛti* has not been raised.

Page 69

The Cārvākas also might have doubted the inviolable law of cause and effect. From the fact that there is now found some regularity between cause and effect, can we say that this regularity will continue at all times and that it existed at all times before? Causal relation is regular within our experience and there is no method of inferring some law outside of this field of experience.

Page 70

The *Mīmāṃsā* theory is that a mode of knowing is a valid mode only if through that we know what cannot be known otherwise and had not known otherwise. *Ajñāta-atyavārtahajñāpaka* is what is called a *Pramāṇa* or mode of knowing.

About the Cārvāka theory of life, we do not know what it could have been. We know the theory only as contained in the records of the opponents of the Cārvāka system, and such presentations are always of the nature of a caricature and not a true presentation of the theory in the objective manner. They might have accepted the "Life" as a fundamental, what they did not accept is only the enduring nature of the "Life" so that it can go to heaven after death, as a result of the performance of the rituals prescribed in the texts. Thus "Life" is something more than the fermentation of sugar. The belief in the happiness in life in this world is not against the Sāṃkhya and the Vedic theories. If heaven is an extension, perhaps the Cārvākas could not have opposed it, what they opposed was only the migration from life to heaven.

Page 71

There are different theories about this infinite Absolute as the fundamental. In the Nyaya, the Absolute is the aggregate of the parts that constitute the different phenomenal

facts of the world In the Advaita Vedānta, there can be no relation between the Absolute which is infinite, and the phenomenal which is finite There is only the infinite 'Life' (Parabrahman) knowing itself as the truth The finite individuals knowing the finite object are really each the infinite knowing the infinite Its appearance as the knowledge of the infinite by the finite individual is *Mithyā*, what is neither true nor false In the Viśiṣṭadvaita, the finite individuals know the finite objects and each finite has a beyond and this beyond is the infinite, which is a common beyond for all finites, the knowing individual and the known object

Kārikā 10

Page 75

It may also be that the difference between *Āsraya* and *Pāratantrya* lies in dependence on another (*Āsraya*) for its mere existence and dependence on another (*Pāratantrya*) for its cognition

Kārikā 11

Page 79

In point (3), matter is the object of knowing only for the conditioned *Puruṣa* The question arises whether what is conditioned can come within the cognition of the Absolute *Puruṣa* It is true that *Puruṣa* is mentioned as *Dṛṣṭā* (Kārikā 19) and it is said that at a later stage, the *Puruṣa* sees the *Prakṛti* (Kārikā 65) Here what the *Puruṣa* sees is the *Prakṛti* in its absolute nature and not in its phenomenal nature In Kārikā 66 also it is this absolute *Prakṛti* and not the phenomenal *Prakṛti* that is seen by the *Puruṣa* Thus in the Kārikā under consideration the absolute *Prakṛti* is the *Vijaya* of the absolute *Puruṣa* and the phenomenal *Prakṛti* is the *Iṣaya* for the conditioned *Puruṣa* as defined in Kārikā 20 In point (5) there is the same *Prakṛti* which is the common *Iṣaya* for the many *Puruṣas*

Page 81

In Kārikā 17, it will be found that the *Puruṣa* is inferred on the ground of its difference from *Prakṛti* both in its absolute and its phenomenal aspects (*Triśūnya nīparjāyāt*)

Partial similarity between *Prakṛti* in its absolute nature and phenomenal nature and their differences are given in *Kārikā* 10 (*Viparitam avyakṣitam*) and in *Kārikā* 14 (*Kāranaguṇālinakativāt Kārikā*). It was also stated in *Kārikā* 8 (*Prakṛtisarūpam vīruṇāṁ ca*). The point of a similarity between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (absolute and phenomenal) has no relevancy in the context)

Kārikas 12-13

Page 83 :

It is *Rajas* that produces the movement, when there is *Sattva*, this movement has an upward tendency and when there is the *Tamas*, it becomes downwards. Upwards and downwards are not spatial directions, they represent only evolution and retardation, being only figurative.

Kārikas 15-16

Page 85

In point (1), *Parināma* has both movement and change, that is change in position. In an absolute thing without any differentiation, there can be no *Parināma*. If *Prakṛti* had been absolute at any time how could *Parināma* start in it? Thus, this *Parināma* is without a beginning.

Kārikā 17

Page 88

Point (1) If the world is a "full" without a vacuum, and is also still, without any motion within it, then the movement cannot be from within. Some special force is wanted. But if movement is an integral feature in the world then such an external force is not needed. There is no "first movement".

Even if the movement started from within, that movement from within must be referred to what amounts to a "Life". Along with this movement effected from within, there is also the healing from within, natural selection, determination of the direction and the pace of the movement and various other factors. What is "Life" distinct from this? This integral power may be the absolute, and the life functions

of a later stage may be its manifestation just as the phenomenal matter is the manifestation of the uniform, absolute matter. There is a very weak point in modern Materialistic Dialecticism which denies in an uncompromising manner the integral and original nature of 'Life' in matter. As a matter of fact there is no matter, there is nothing in the universe that is not propelled by the "Life Fundamental". The distinction between organic and inorganic matter is only relative and not absolute. I have made the point clear in the *Fundamental Problems of Indian Philosophy*, chapter bearing the title 'I Know' (Ch 16). The two grounds (1) and (3): A first movement cannot arise from what is "Dead Matter" (*Jada*), it can come only from "Life" (*Jīva*).

Point (4) The *Bhoktṛbhāva* is only in the conditioned *Puruṣa* as defined in *Kārika* 20. There cannot be a *Bhoktā* who is absolutely distinct from the *Bhoga* and the *Bhogyā* (enjoyment and the object of enjoyment).

Page 91

Point (5) The whole system will fall down, if this ground is removed. It must be taken note of that even in modern science, there is a final terminus for this world. That may not be technically *Mokṣa*. In essence there is no difference between the final terminus of the world as accepted in modern science and *Mokṣa* accepted in this system. It is a reversion to the pre evolution stage, in both *Mokṣa* is only modern science in a religious garb. If there was the world always and if it will ever be there, the modern theory of evolution also crumbles down. I do not ignore the theory of concurrent creations, instead of a single point creation of the world. But all schools of thought in modern science accept a pre life and a post life stage for the world.

That *Kaivalya* is the main ground for the recognition of a *Puruṣa* is given in Udayana's *Kusumanjallī*, which can be taken as a mode for ancient Indian thought of the medieval stage. *Yadi buddhīr nityā, aulmōkṣaprasaṅgah* (If *Buddhi* or intellect is eternal, there would occasion the impossibility of

final release) So there must be a *Puruṣa* distinct from *Buddhi* to explain *Mokṣa*. This is given in discussing the Sāṅkhya theory in the first *Stabaka* (Translation in the Adyar Library Series, Section 128, P 37.)

The *Yoga Sūtra* is *Yogas citta-vṛttīnirodhah* (I 1)

Kārika 18

Page 93 •

In the Nyāya and the Dvaita Vedānta, there is a duality, rather a plurality, which is fundamental. There is difference from the Mīmāṃsā position to the extent that the creation (the movement of what was still) was due to a God. God is the Supreme and at the same time, unlike in the other Vedāntas, distinct from the world and from the souls.

Kārika 19

Page 94

A witness (*Saksin*) cannot have any purpose to be served in the context. This shows that the *Saksin Puruṣa* and the *Puruṣa* with a purpose to be served (*Puruṣasya artha*) are not the same.

Page 95

Point 4. This *Darsana* (seeing) is distinct from the ordinary seeing by the people. There is no *Vṛtti* (function) in this seeing. The *Prakṛti* is still in its absolute nature, with the changes in it. But such changes are not a limitation for the *Puruṣa* to see the entire *Prakṛti* with the changes in it. In the ordinary *Darsana* (seeing), the seeing itself is limited. For the *Viparyāsa* (contrast) see *Kārikās 17 and 18*, and also *Kārika 11*.

Kārika 20

Page 90

To the extent that the life function started after this combination the theory corresponds to the modern science that "Life" is a later phenomenon in the world, long after the matter with its initial stages of evolution, but this initial stage is not accepted in the Sāṅkhya. Even in such an initial stage, there was the Life Fundamental as the reflection of sentience from *Puruṣa* on *Prakṛti*. Thus there is no "pre-

life" stage in the Sāṅkhya, though there is a "pre-life-function" stage

There is the subtle indication, though not meant that the *Puruṣa* is the culprit in forming the cause for the sufferings in the world, this combination is the sufferer

I think that this *Kārikā* should follow the *Kārikā* now marked as 21. After describing the two constituents of the world, namely, *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, we expect a mention of their combination, and then from "that combination" there is the admixture. This will better explain the term *Tasmat* (from that). The difficulty of explaining the term, on p 97, would also disappear then

There is a similarity between this *Kārikā* and the statement of Śāṅkara, *satyārte mithunīkṛtya ma aham idam mamedam it nalsargiko 'yam lokavyavahārah*, in the beginning of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*

Kārikā 21

Page 58 ff

The simile should not be stretched too far, if it is stretched to the pre-combination period, then all sorts of questions would arise which would be difficult to answer. If they were apart at any prior stage as they would be at a later stage (*Kārikā* 66), why did they come together to produce this confusion between the two and if from their pure (*Kevala*) stage, they can get mutually involved, the stage mentioned in *Kārikā* 66 is also capable of producing the same combination and confusion at a later stage

Definitely, this *Kārikā* should come before the *Kārikā* numbered as 20. They came together and then there was a confusion of their nature. But they proceed towards the goal of isolation and though both remain together in the universe, there is no production of the world of change

Page 101 :

It is shown that there was the guidance in the progression and that the course to be followed by matter and spirit must also be the same. It is not that the *Prakṛti* took possession of the *Puruṣa* and that the *Puruṣa* works for being

extricated It is a mutual combination The meaning will be

पुरुषस्य सयोगो दर्शनार्थम् । तथा प्रधानस्य सयोग कैवल्यार्थम् । (एवं)
उभयोरपि (प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः परस्परं) सयोग पट्व-धत् (पट्वन्धयो
परस्पर सयोग इव) भवति ।

The three points, namely, the contribution of the *Puruṣa* as *Darsana* (seeing), the contribution of the *Prakṛti* as *Kāivalya* (isolation) by way of receding (*Uparati*) and their association, are mentioned later in *Kārikā* 66, with the difference that in that stage, there is no creation (*Sarga*) This *Kārikā* must be read along with that later one

Kārikā 22

Pages 103 ff

There is no interval between the various stages in this evolution of the twenty three categories from the *Pakṛti* through the presence of the *Puruṣa* It is a single modification and the stages are only in our intellectual abstraction The world is a projection of the *Ahankāra*, this projected *Ahankāra* requires an external reality So far as the physical world is concerned, what is called the *Tanmātra* is external and at the same time it may be only what can be termed a wave But when the physical world is formed, the waves become material particles Thus the world is "Idea", "Wave" and "Matter" at the same time It is not any one of them alone, it is all the three We cannot say that there is only an "Idea" and that the external world has no reality The same position holds good for the other theories also The difference is only aspectual and not real It is subjective and not objective

Kārikā 26

Page 109

I have presented the *Karmendriya* as generic and not specific for the reason that there are certain voluntary activities which cannot be referred to any *Karmendriya* unless their nature is made more generic If I kick a ball with my foot, does it come under "*Gamana*" or walking or when I lift up a thing with my foot does it come under the function of *Pada* (walking)? If I clap my hands and produce a sound, which I can do instead of calling a man, does it come under "*Vak*"?

But all such activities should be brought under the function of a *Karmendriya*.

Kārikā 28

Page 114 :

Viharana means 'to wander about' and is equivalent to "walking", which is the function of the legs (*Pāda*). When Yajñavalkya settled everything and wanted to go away the word used is *Vijahāra* (wandered about). This is in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV v-1⁶. In *Dhammapada*, section XV is devoted to happiness (*Sukha*) and this word appears in *Viharāma* (let us live freely in happiness, without any cares) in the first 3 verses (196, 197, 198).

Kārikā 29

Page 115 :

Prāṇa is only the "Life" force. The *Prāṇa* functions are involuntary. The *Karmendriya* functions are voluntary. The internal organs associated themselves, as a unity, with the one or the other of the *Karmendriya* and that is what is called a voluntary activity. But when they function as a common factor, enabling the *Karmendriya* to function, there is the *Prāṇa*. The *Karmendriyas* function on account of the *Antahkarana* and the *Antahkarana* functions on account of the *Prāṇas*.

Kārikā 30

Page 116

Dṛṣṭa means perception and *Adṛṣṭa* is what is other than perception, i.e., inference and authority. That the inference has the prior relation between the *Linga* and the locus of the *Linga* was given in *Kārikā* 5.

Kārikā 31

Page 121 :

Atheism becomes Antitheism only if God is introduced on the authority of reason. But if God is realised through any superrational faculty the Sāṅkhya has no objection. This is what is meant in the *Kārikā* 6 and this is what is explained in the Introduction on Page 13.

There are three currents of thought on this point,

1. Nyāya, represented by the *Nyāyākutumāñjali* of Udayana. God is not strictly within the sphere of rational

proof But as a preliminary stage to put the mind towards God realisation through contemplation, rationalism is a factor in Theism

2 Sankhya God cannot be brought into any relation with rationalism

3 Mimāṃsā If rationalism is introduced, then we arrive at a denial of God This is the subject matter of the *Mimāṃsā Sūtras*, Ch IX, *Pāda* 1, *Adhikarana* 4 (*Sūtras* 6 10)

Thus, neither Atheism nor Antitheism is anti Vedic and Theism is not the only Vedic current

Karika 33

Pages 123, 124

Time (*Kāla*) and Space (*Dik*) are not external realities In the diversified world, the diversified objects are apprehended as related to one another, there cannot be a plurality with out a mutual relation also The relation is apprehended either as in time or as in space Sankhya does not accept either of them as external realities and they find no place in the scheme of categories in the Sankhya Nyāya and Mimāṃsā accept them

There is time and there is space because there are diversified objects Thus, instead of the diversified objects existing in time and in space, time and space exist in the diversified objects Time and space are not different from the objects apprehended as existing in the time and space They are only aspects of the objects

Just as the acceptance of time lands us in infinite regression or in the acceptance of other categories, acceptance of space also lands us in the same difficulties

Prakṛti can be related to the diversified world as prior and also as a beyond in space in relation to the diversified world But there is no such beyond, either in time or in space for the *Prakṛti* Within the *Prakṛti* too there is no diversification and as such no scope for the time and space

Karika 34

Page 124

In this *Karika*, *Vak* means the articulate sound or language sound in general can be produced otherwise too as in the case of clapping the hands to express an idea

But all such activities should be brought under the function of a *Karmendriya*

Kārikā 28

Page 114

Viharana means 'to wander about' and is equivalent to "walking", which is the function of the legs (*Pada*). When Yājñavalkya settled everything and wanted to go away the word used is *Vijahāra* (wandered about). This is in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV-v-15. In *Dharmapada*, section XV is devoted to happiness (*Sukha*) and this word appears as *Viharāma* (let us live freely in happiness, without any cares) in the first 3 verses (196, 197, 198).

Kārikā 29

Page 115

Prāṇa is only the "Life" force. The *Prāṇa* functions are involuntary. The *Karmendriya* functions are voluntary. The internal organs associated themselves, as a unity with the one or the other of the *Karmendriya* and that is what is called a voluntary activity. But when they function as a common factor, enabling the *Karmendriya* to function, there is the *Prāṇa*. The *Karmendriyas* function on account of the *Antahkarana* and the *Antahkarana* functions on account of the *Prāṇas*.

Kārikā 30

Page 116

Dṛṣṭa means perception and *Adṛṣṭa* is what is other than perception, i.e., inference and authority. That the inference has the prior relation between the *Linga* and the locus of the *Linga* was given in *Kārikā* 5.

Kārikā 31

Page 121

Atheism becomes Antitheism only if God is introduced on the authority of reason. But if God is realised through any superrational faculty the Sāṅkhya has no objection. This is what is meant in the *Kārikā* 6 and this is what is explained in the Introduction on Page 13.

There are three currents of thought on this point.

1. Nyāya, represented by the *Nyāyākusumanjallī* of Udayana. God is not strictly within the sphere of rational

proof. But as a preliminary stage to put the mind towards God realisation through contemplation, rationalism is a factor in Theism

2 Sāṅkhya . God cannot be brought into any relation with rationalism

3 Mīmāṃsā . If rationalism is introduced, then we arrive at a denial of God This is the subject matter of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, Ch IX, *Pāda 1*, *Adhikarāṇa 4* (*Sūtras 6-10*)

Thus, neither Atheism nor Antitheism is anti Vedic and Theism is not the only Vedic current

Kārika 33

Pages 123, 124 .

Time (*Kāla*) and Space (*Dik*) are not external realities In the diversified world, the diversified objects are apprehended as related to one another, there cannot be a plurality without a mutual relation also The relation is apprehended either as in time or as in space Sāṅkhya does not accept either of them as external realities and they find no place in the scheme of categories in the Sāṅkhya Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā accept them

There is time and there is space because there are diversified objects Thus, instead of the diversified objects existing in time and in space, time and space exist in the diversified objects Time and space are not different from the objects apprehended as existing in the time and space They are only aspects of the objects

Just as the acceptance of time lands us in infinite regression or in the acceptance of other categories, acceptance of space also lands us in the same difficulties

Prakṛti can be related to the diversified world as prior and also as beyond in space in relation to the diversified world But there is no such beyond, either in time or in space for the *Prakṛti* Within the *Prakṛti* too there is no diversification and as such no scope for the time and space

Kārika 34

Page 124

In this *Kārika*, *Vak* means the articulate sound or language, sound in general can be produced otherwise too as in the case of clapping the hands to express an idea

is explained in the *Saṅgitaratnakara*, Chapter I, Section II. The point is also developed in detail in works on Medical Science, especially in the *Suśruta* and in the *Aṣṭāṅgharḍaya* in the *Sarīrasthāna* (Part relating to anatomy and physiology).

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* says that as a caterpillar, after it has reached the tip of a leaf, makes a beginning upon another and draws itself towards it, so also the self, after it has shaken off the body and freed itself from ignorance, makes a beginning upon another and draws itself over towards it (IV-iv-2 6)

Karika 45

Page 142

Vairagya, absence of attachment, need not mean any renunciation and membership of a monastic order, with saffron robes. There is no indication of any renunciation and the association with a monastic order or saffron robes, as a necessary preliminary for the understanding of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy or for the attainment of *Mokṣa* (final release thereby), Sankara also does not say that the understanding of his Advaita depends on renunciation and membership in a monastic order and wearing of saffron robes.

Prakṛtilaya, dissolution of the *Prakṛti* or matter, need not amount to an inability of the individual to continue the body, a body is necessary for the released Self to experience the limited world and also to function in this world of limitations, thus, the complete inability to acquire a body deprives such an individual of any chance for social service. He can initiate a body which will be only a means for him and not at all a limitation for him.

Karika 51

Page 149

The three fold destruction of suffering is the destruction of the three sufferings as stated in *Karika 1*. The three that precede *Siddhi* are *Viparyaya*, *Aśakti* and *Tuṣṭi* as given in *Karika 46*.

Karika 52

Page 149

Bhāva is mental disposition, life is the root of all evolution, life gives the stimulus for the evolution to start. Man did not start with a blank state. There was something written on the slate even at the very beginning and at the beginning of each birth something is written, what is written here has its influence in deciding the direction, the pace and the destination in evolution. Perhaps many features like the genus and the sex are determined by such original *Bhāvas* or dispositions which abide in the *Lingasarīra*. Such differences are not due to any difference in the material content of the gross body (what is described in *Kārikā* 39) that had been supplied by the parents.

Karika 54

Page 151

This *Kārikā* may be compared with the *Gītā*, XIV-18

Karika 55

Page 152

What has been said in *Kārikā* 19 is what started the suffering. Suffering is by nature. It is an integral factor in the combination of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. But this is not the suffering which ordinary individuals experience. This is what only a philosopher can experience and he is released from that suffering when he realises that there is a distinction between the two factors in his being, which became mixed together.

Karika 57

Page 154

Is it the feature of the milk being insentient that is emphasised here? Śāṅkara takes the context to relate to the activity like an intelligent one in what is insentient. But in this context, there is no special emphasis on this factor at all. What is emphasised is the function of milk in its flow for the sake of another (*Parārtha*). This is the case with all succeeding illustrations, they all show how there can be for the sake of another.

The illustrations show the spirit of the original Sāṅkhya in which *Prakṛti* (Matter) is not at all a sin, but a beneficent factor in the universe. It is only by work in the material world that Man can attain his final goal, and not by avoiding it, nor by renunciation. Emphasis on *Sannyāsa* in the *Jñānamārga* (Path of knowledge) must have later altered this spirit considerably through the admixture of the belief in Matter being a seat of sin and a source of suffering.

Kārika 62

Page 158

The *Kārika* starts with the word *Tasmāt* (therefore). But no such ground is given previously for the theory that the *Puruṣa* is not bound nor released and that such features belong to *Prakṛti*. I fear that some *Kārika* is missing.

The subject matter in the system closes with *Kārika 68*, there might have been 70 *Kārikās* explaining the philosophy as is indicated in *Kārika 72*. *Saptatī* might be the work which Kapila taught to Āsuri (*Kārika 72*). Īśvaraśrīna says that these *Kārikās* are not the original work of Kapila but only a condensation (*Saṅkṣipta* as stated in *Kārika 71*). I feel that something is missing here. There was a similar difficulty about the word *Tasmāt* (therefore) in the beginning of *Kārika 40* but that can be got over if the *Kārika* now marked as 20 is put after the *Kārika* now marked as 21. Here, the previous *Kārika* does not give the ground for the doctrine expounded in *Kārika 62*.

Kārika 63

Page 160

The seven are what are given as the aspects of *Buddhi* in *Kārika 44*. What bind the *Puruṣa* are *Dharma* and *Adharma*, *Ajñāna*, *Virāga* and *Rāga* and *Aśvarya* and *Anaśvarya*. The *Jñāna* does not come within this scheme of seven, that is what brings about the final result. The single aspect (*Ekarūpa*) is *Jñāna*.

It had been said in *Kārika 44* that *Jñāna* brings about *Apavarga* and in *Kārika 45*, it has been said that *Vairāgya* brings about *Prakṛtilaya*. Is there an *Apavarga* distinct from

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Prakṛtilaya? I do not know why *Valrūgya* has not been clubbed along with *Jñāna* as means for the final emancipation

Kārikas 65-66

Page 163

The imagery of the actress continues. After the performance, the audience thinks of the actress only as a citizen among themselves and not as a character of the drama. There is an identification of the audience with the actress and that ceases when the drama closes.

I can understand how the absolute *Puruṣa* can be the subject for the absolute *Prakṛti*, but I cannot understand how such an absolute *Puruṣa* can be the subject for the differentiated *Prakṛti*. Thus I think that a body continues attached to the *Puruṣa* even at this stage, though the body may not be a limitation nor a cause for suffering.

The word *Samyoga* (union) in this *Kārikā* must be related to the word in *Kārikā* 21, as the union of a blind man and a lame man. There, there was an evolution through the union, but there is no such evolution through the union in this state.

An absolute and undifferentiated *Prakṛti* and the evolution on account of the presence of the *Puruṣa* are only intellectual abstractions. Similarly a final break up of the two factors is also an intellectual abstraction. It is nothing more than the final disintegration of the sun and the stars through radiation as accepted in modern science, that is our *Mokṣa* also. But no one considers that final disintegration of the universe as a goal to be aimed at as a goal for the termination of the sufferings in the world. How can this intellectual abstraction have such a practical value?

We must also consider the question whether the *Puruṣa* at that final stage is like a member of the audience, but without a body. Or does he continue the body like the audience? That there is a difference in the relation between a member of the audience during the drama and after the drama, is quite clear. What is not clear is whether there is a difference between the *Puruṣa* during life and the *Puruṣa* at

the stage of *Kaivalya*, that means, in respect of having a body and not having a body.

Kārika 67

Page 165

This is what is called *Jīvanmukti*, *Kapila* and *Vyāsa* are in that stage

Kārika 68

Page 166

If there is a complete break up between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, I find it difficult to explain how there can be a *Kapila*. *Kapila* had certainly a body. Then the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* were separate, *Kapila* could develop a body, why should it not be possible after the separation of the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* as given in (Kārika) 65? I have a preference for the *Mīmāṃsā* position of Man being a knowing and dynamic formation. If such a formation of a body is possible at the stage of *Kaivalya*, the *Sāṅkhya* position too becomes quite acceptable. If *Puruṣa-Prakṛti* combination is to be reduced to a unity either as pure *Prakṛti* or as pure *Puruṣa*, I have a preference for the *Vedānta* position that, that unity is *Puruṣa* (*Parabrahman*) from which *Prakṛti* arose, I cannot accept the position of modern science that Matter in its absolute state was dead without "Life" and that "Life" appeared in it as a product at a later stage. The unity as an abstraction must be the *Puruṣa* and not the *Prakṛti*. Life can evolve into Matter, but what has no "Life" cannot evolve and as such cannot produce "Life" at all.

I recognise that there is no occasion for an evolution (*Sarga*) at that stage, the purpose (*Prayojana*) for the *Prakṛti* to secure the *Kaivalya* of the *Puruṣa*. But is there not a *Prayojana* (Purpose) in the form of social service? Can there not be an evolution for this purpose?

TEXT

सांख्य-कारिका

- दुःख-त्रयाऽभिघाताज्, जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतोः ।
 * दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत्तेकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥
 दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धि-क्षयाऽतिशययुक्तः ।
 तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताऽव्यक्तज्ञ-विज्ञानात् ॥२॥
 मूल-प्रकृतिरविकृतिर्, महदाद्याः प्रकृति-विकृतयः सप्त ।
 षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥
 दृष्टमनुमानमाप्त-वचनं च सर्वप्रमाण-सिद्धत्वात् ।
 त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेय-सिद्धिः प्रमाणादि ॥४॥
 प्रतिविषयाऽव्यवसायो दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
 तल्लिङ्ग-लिङ्गि-पूर्वकमाप्तश्रुति-राप्तवचनं तु ॥५॥
 सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादुत्तीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
 तस्मादपि चाऽसिद्धं परोक्षमाप्ताऽऽगमात् सिद्धम् ॥६॥
 अतिदूरात्, सामीप्यादिन्द्रिय-घातान्मनोजवस्थानात् ।
 सौक्ष्म्याद्, व्यवधानादभिभवात्, समानाभिहाराच्च ॥७॥
 सौक्ष्म्यात् तदनुपलब्धिर्नाऽभावात् कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
 महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृति-सरूपं विरूपं च ॥८॥
 असदकरणदुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाऽभावात् ।
 शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारण-भावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥९॥
 हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
 सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥१०॥
 त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसव-धमि ।
 व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥११॥
 प्रीत्यप्रोत्ति-विपादात्मिकाः प्रकाश-प्रवृत्ति-नियमार्थाः ।
 अन्योन्याऽभिभवाश्रय-जनन-मिथुन-वृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥१२॥
 सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
 गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवन्वाऽर्थतो वृत्तिः ॥१३॥

2C-2-76

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात् तद्विपर्ययाऽभावात् ।
कारण-गुणाऽऽत्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याऽव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥१४॥

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयाच्छक्तिः प्रवृत्ते-श्च ।
कारण-कार्य-विभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूपस्य ॥१५॥

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥१६॥

सङ्घात-परार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादि-विपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृ-भावात्, कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥१७॥

जन्म-मरण-करणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुष-बहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्य-विपर्ययाच्चैव ॥१८॥

27-2-76

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥१९॥

तस्मात् तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुण-कर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥२०॥

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं, कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥२१॥

27-2-76

प्रकृतेर्महास्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चम्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥२२॥

27-2-76

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥२३॥

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥२४॥

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥२५॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुः-श्रोत्र-घ्राण-रसन-त्वगाद्यानि ।
वाक्-पाणि-पाद-पायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥२६॥

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणाम-विशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्य-भेदाश्च ॥२७॥

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादान-विहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥२८॥

स्वालक्षण्य वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य संपा भवत्यसामान्या ।
 सामान्य-करण-वृत्ति प्राणाद्या वायव पञ्च ॥२९॥
 युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्ति क्रमशश्च तस्य निदिष्टा ।
 दृष्टे तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विवा वृत्ति ॥३०॥
 स्वा स्वा प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुवा वृत्तिम् ।
 पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते वरणम् ॥३१॥
 करण त्रयोदश-विध तदाहरण-धारण-प्रकाशकरम् ।
 कार्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्य च ॥३२॥
 अन्त करण त्रिविध दशधा बाह्य त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
 साम्प्रतकाल बाह्य त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तर करणम् ॥३३॥
 बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषा पञ्च विशेषाऽविशेष-विषयाणि ।
 बाग्भवति शब्द-विषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥३४॥
 सान्तःकरणा बुद्धि सर्व विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
 तस्मात् त्रिविध करण द्वारिद्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥३५॥
 एते प्रदीप-कल्पा परस्पर-विलक्षणा गुण-विशेषा ।
 कृत्स्न पुरुषस्याऽर्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥३६॥
 सर्वं प्रत्युपभोग यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धि ।
 सैव च विशिनष्टि पुन प्रधान पुरुषान्तर सूक्ष्मम् ॥३७॥
 तन्मात्राण्यविशेषास्तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चम्य ।
 एते स्मृता विशेषा शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥३८॥
 सूक्ष्मा माता-पितृजा सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषा स्युः ।
 सूक्ष्मास्तेषा नियता माता पितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥३९॥
 पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्त नियत महदादि-सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
 ससरति निरुपभोग भावैरधिवासित लिङ्गम् ॥४०॥
 चित्र यथाऽऽश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
 तद्वद्विना विशेषेर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रय लिङ्गम् ॥४१॥
 पुरुषार्थ-हेतुकमिदं निमित्त-नैमित्तिक-प्रसङ्गेन ।
 प्रवृत्तेविभुत्वयोगान्तद्वद व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥४२॥
 सासिद्धिकाश्च भावा प्राकृतिवा वैकृतिवाश्च धर्माद्या ।
 दृष्टा करणाश्रयिण कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्या ॥४३॥

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भूवत्यधर्मेण ।
 ज्ञानेन चाऽपवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥४४॥
 वैराग्यात् प्रकृति-लयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
 ऐश्वर्यादिविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥४५॥
 एष प्रत्यय-सर्गो विपर्ययाऽशक्ति-तुष्टि-सिद्ध्याख्यः ।
 गुण-वैषम्य-विमर्दात् तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥४६॥
 पञ्च विपर्यय-भेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करण-वैकल्यात् ।
 अष्टाविंशति-भेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥४७॥
 भेदस्तमसोऽष्ट-विधो मोहस्य च दश-विधो महामोहः ।
 तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥४८॥
 एकादशेन्द्रिय-वधाः सह बुद्धि-वधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
 सप्तदश-वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि-सिद्धीनाम् ॥४९॥
 आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादान-काल-भाग्याख्याः ।
 बाह्या विपर्ययोपरमात् पञ्च च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥५०॥
 ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःख-विघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
 दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥५१॥
 न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भाव-निर्वृत्तिः ।
 लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥५२॥
 अष्टविकल्पो देवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
 मानुषकश्चैकविधः समाप्तो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥५३॥
 ऊर्ध्वं संत्त्व-विशालस्तमो-विशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
 मध्ये रजोविशालो ग्रहादिस्तम्ब-पर्यन्तः ॥५४॥
 तत्र जरा-भरण-कृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
 लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥५५॥
 इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादि-विशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
 प्रतिपुरुष-विमोक्षार्थं स्वायं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥५६॥
 यत्स-चिबुद्धि-निमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
 पुरुष-विमोक्ष-निमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥५७॥
 भीतमुक्थ-निवृत्त्यर्थं यथा त्रियामु प्रवर्तते सौरः ।
 पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तददभ्यस्तम् ॥५८॥

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
 पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाशय विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥५९॥
 नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
 गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्मात्कार्यमपार्थक्यं चरति ॥६०॥
 प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
 या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनरं दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥६१॥
 तस्मान्न वध्यतेऽसौ न मुच्यते नाऽपि संसरति कश्चित् ।
 संसरति वध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥६२॥
 रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
 सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥६३॥
 एवं तत्त्वाऽभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
 श्रविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥६४॥
 तेन निवृत्त-प्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूप-विनिवृत्ताम् ।
 प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः सुस्थः ॥६५॥
 दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
 सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति संगस्य ॥६६॥
 सम्यग्ज्ञानाऽधिगमाद्धर्माऽऽदीनामकारण-प्राप्ती ।
 तिष्ठति संस्कार-वशाच्च न भ्रमिवद् धृत-शरीरः ॥६७॥
 प्राप्ते शरीर-भेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधान-विनिवृत्तेः ।
 ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं केवल्यमाप्नोति ॥६८॥
 पुरुषार्थ-ज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।
 स्थित्युत्पत्ति-प्रलयादिचिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥६९॥
 एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
 आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तत्त्वम् ॥७०॥
 शिष्य-परम्परयागतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
 सक्षिप्तमार्थ-मतिना सम्यग्बिज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥७१॥
 सप्ततयां किल येष्यांस्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य पण्डितन्त्रस्य ।
 आख्यायिका-विरहिताः पर-वाद-विवर्जिताश्चापि ॥७२॥

INDEX OF HALF-VERSES

(The references are to the verses)

atidurat samipyat	7 a	gunaparināma viśeṣāt	27 b
adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ	23 a	gunavaty agunasya sataḥ	60 b
antahkaranam trividham	33 a	gunavaiśamyavimardāt	46 b
anyonyābhībhavaśraya-	12 b	guruvaranākam eva	13 b
abhimāno 'hankarah	24 a	citram yathāśryam ūte	41 a
aviparyayaḥ siddham	64 b	jananamaranakaranānam	18 a
avīkyaḍiḥ siddhaḥ	14 a	jñānena cāpavargah	44 b
aśṭavikalpo danah	53 a	tatra jarāmaranākyam	55 a
aśṭavimśatibhedah	47 b	tadvad vīna viśeṣaḥ	41 b
asadakaranād upadana	9 a	tadviparitaḥ sreyaṇ	2 b
akḥṣayakavirahitah	72 b	tanmātrāny avīśeṣaḥ	38 a
ādhyātmikāś catasrah	50 a	tal līngalīngipūrvakam	5 b
āsurir api pañcaśikḥṇya	70 b	tasmāc ca viparyāsat	19 a
ity eṣa prakṛikṛitah	56 a	tasmāt tatsamyogat	20 a
ubhayātmakam atra	27 b	tasmāt trividham	
ūrdhvam sattvaviśalah	54 a	karanam	35 b
ūhaḥ śabdo dhyayanam	51 a	tasmād api cā siddham	6 b
ekādaśakāś ca gapah	24 b	tasmād api soḍaśakāt	22 b
ekādaśendriyavadhaḥ	49 a	tasmān na badhyate sau	62 a
etat pavitram agryam	70 a	tāmisro śtādaśadha	48 b
ete pradīpakalpah	36 a	tiṣṭhatī samskāravasat	67 b
ete smṛta viśeṣaḥ	38 b	tena nivṛttaprasāvam	65 a
evam tattvābhyāsat	64 a	triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ	11 a
esa pratyayasargah	46 a	trividham pramānam	4 b
aikāntikam atyantikam	68 b	danam cā siddhāyo śtau	51 b
aśvāryad aṅghātah	45 b	duḥkhatrayābhīghātāt	1 a
autsukyanivṛttyartham	58 a	dṛṣṭamanumanam apta	4 a
karanam trayodaśa	32 a	dṛṣṭavadanuśravikah	2 a
kāranakārjyavibhagāt	15 b	dṛṣṭaḥ karanaśrayiṇah	43 b
kāranagunātmakatvāt	14 b	dṛṣṭa mayety upekṣakah	66 a
kāranam asty avyaktam	16 a	dṛṣṭe tathāpy adṛṣṭe	30 b
kāryaṇi ca tasya daśadha	32 b	dṛṣṭe śāpartha cet	1 b
kṛtsnam puruṣāryartham	36 b	dharmaṇa gamanam	44 a
kaṇḍalyam m idhyasthyam	19 b	na vīna bhāvair līngam	52 a
gunakartṛtve pi tatha	20 b	nanāvidhair upayaiḥ	60 a